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The Rise of Finance: Cultural Production and Politics in Mexico and Brazil after 1982 
examines the impact of the rise of finance, or the turn from production-based forms of 
accumulation to financial ones, on cultural production, social life, and subjectivity in Mexico and 
Brazil in the period from the 1982 debt crisis to the present. 
The first two chapters of this dissertation examine how cultural production reacts in the 
aftermath of the 1982 debt crisis and to the process of state and capital restructuring which 
follows. In the opening chapter, I trace how Jorge Volpi‘s En busca de Klingsor, in the face of 
financial indeterminacy, reconstitutes the racialized imaginary of the national popular, turning 
away from defining race via biology or culture, by specifying an ―ontological‖ or moral division 
between good or bad subjects, which prefigures the emergence of the category of delincuente (a 
category not marked explicitly by biology or culture but which nonetheless does the work of race 
of distributing resources and selecting certain populations for premature death). The second 
chapter examines the same time period in Brazil and argues that the specificity of the post-82 
period was not that of generalized crisis (as in the Mexican case) but one of hyperinflation. As a 
result, the recomposition of the national popular form of social control which cultural production 
participates in takes a different form: again, as a turn away from race thought as biology or 
culture, but which is replaced in the Brazilian case by a spatial division between the formal and 
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informal city (a division, I discuss, by drawing on contemporary heterodox Marxist cultural 
theory, as a form of ―real abstraction‖).  
The chapters in part 2 of the dissertation argue that the post-2001 moment is marked by, 
in Brazil, what I term, ―failed forms of financial corporativism,‖ or the attempted use of finance 
in the form of personal credit to bind subjects to the nation, and, in Mexico, a turn of the 
economy not to personal credit, but rather to ―circulation‖ more generally (i.e., a turn away from 
the sphere of production into drug logistics, finance, and remittances) in which the state is unable 
to produce either processes of subjectivization or meaningful collectivities. Chapter 3 examines 
three transformations wrought by the massive entry of finance into Brazil after 2003: a form of 
(failed) financial corporativism, a projective structure of feeling, and on the level of the subject. 
In chapter 4, I track how, during the turn to circulation in Mexico, the corporativist structures of 
the developmental state have been replaced by a military-policing apparatus, which is no longer 
concerned with producing subjects and collectivities, and I examine how cultural objects from 
this period repeatedly return to the question of how to produce, in the absence of state-generated 
forms of collectivity, new forms of relation between the individual and the collective which 
could serve as a stay or defense to the predations of state and capital.  
 Finally, in the conclusion, I examine what the twin conditions of increasing surplus 













 The early and mid-2000s witnessed a spate of books celebrating the seizure of political 
power across Latin America by a new set of social movements, the marea rosada. By the close 
of the decade, however, it was abundantly clear that the majority of these new ―Left‖ 
governments were not only developmentalism in a new financialized and extractivist guise, but, 
more importantly, they were even less successful than their national populist forebears in 
addressing the contradictions of capitalist development. In Bolivia, the very miners and 
indigenous groups who brought Evo Morales to power have rioted. In Venezuela, after the death 
of Chavez, the most intensive discussions have been around how to undo the bureaucratization 
into the state of the ―revolution from below.‖ In Brazil, millions have marched in the streets. And 
in countries, like Mexico, where there was never a Left turn, we have unparalleled death. What 
each country shares is that they have been unable to address in a substantial way, first, the 
changes that occurred in the new insertion of Latin American economies into the world economy 
after 1973 (the year of the first oil crisis and the United States‘ exit from the Bretton Woods 
agreement) and, second, the specifically capitalist contradictions that have arisen from their new 
developmental strategies. That is, in each case, and throughout Latin America as a whole, the 
Left turn has doubled down on capitalist development and (failed) finance-led accumulation (i.e, 
expansion of stock markets, derivatives, and personal credit). The inability to propose, indeed to 
even think, something beyond the developmentalist program first conceived in the 1930s and 
1940s and the need to be able to do so form the horizon of this project. While this dissertation is 
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focused on the linkages between political economy, culture, and social theory, it is the tepid 
return of state-led, partially ameliorative, fully financialized responses to the long downturn of 
capitalism since the end of the 1960s and early 1970s that has provided the background, framing, 
and motivation for it. 
 Indeed, the last forty years in Latin America, since the beginning of the end of the post-
war boom, have been nothing if not a history of crisis. Starting with the Mexican currency 
devaluation in 1976, the landmarks of the subsequent decades bare the names crisis and crack 
(i.e., the Spanish term for stock market crash) and the restructurings of this period are often both 
preceded and followed by crashes, crises, or failures of attempted finance-led accumulation. This 
dissertation, then, is an attempt to take this history of crisis seriously and to think finance as a 
central category of Latin American cultural and political economy of the last forty years—with 
the aim of setting the stage for a potential rethinking of political forms of intervention into this 
on-going crisis.  
I affect this centering of finance by focusing on two countries, Mexico and Brazil, which 
I have chosen for the rich set of comparative possibilities they offer. Both countries, one with 
and one without a (formal) dictatorship, take on massive amounts of debt in the 1970s. Both pass 
through the 1982 financial crisis, but with different paths: Mexico is ground zero of the crisis, 
while Brazil is almost able to keep its creditors at bay (before they finally agree to a credit 
bailout in 1983 [Oliveri 120]). Similarly, both have major crises in the 1990s, but their shape and 
temporality are distinct. While in the post-2001 period, their paths diverge, with Brazil massively 
expanding consumer credit as a form of financial corporativism and Mexico making a turn to 
circulation that brings along with it mass destruction and death. This project, thus, does not claim 
to say everything that is possible about finance in Latin America, nor even in these two 
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countries, rather my primary aim is to make finance perceptible as a social force and to trace a 
few of what feel like its most important inflections. 
 
A Brief History of Finance in Mexico and Brazil 
The historical argument that frames this project is that the rise of finance is the 
centerpiece, in Latin America, of a response to failing capital accumulation, the end of the post-
war cycle of expansion, and the beginning of the long downturn that occurs in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The uneven rise of finance from the 1970s to the present is a process that occurs, 
roughly, in three stages that created a new financial integration of Latin American countries into 
international capital circuits and a new financial architecture for processing, receiving, and 
mitigating flows of finance capital and redirecting them internally. To center finance as a social 
force, it is necessary to have some sense of these processes, the new architectures, and finance‘s 
history in the region. Thus, in the following, I trace three stages of finance—dwelling mostly on 
the most recent period—and develop a comparative framework for Mexico and Brazil, placing 
them into the context of a longer historical frame of Latin American capitalism.   
Since the independence of Latin American nations, there have been three major forms or 
periods of integration of Latin American countries into the world market: resource extraction 
(running from the end of the 1900s to Great Depression), the import substitution period (post-
WWII to 1973), and the subsequent period of the long downturn, crisis, and failed forms of 
finance-led accumulation. Each form of integration has implied a specific financial architecture 
and a means for controlling commodity chains and flows. The establishment of resource 
extraction economies in the middle of the nineteenth century brought with it the construction of 
rudimentary pieces of what we would now recognize as a modern financial architecture: banks, 
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forms of credit, consolidation of national (as opposed to regional) currencies, and, more 
importantly for our narrative, foreign debt (most often in the form of bank loans or lines of credit 
for specific governments). The stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent Great Depression 
wiped out lending to Latin American countries—which did not start again until after the Second 
World War (Drake 50; Griffith-Jones 26).  
Within the post-WWII international architecture, many Latin American countries opted 
for some form of developmentalism, often in the form of import-substitution strategies [ISI]. By 
the mid-1960s however it was clear, that the first stage of ISI (commodity good production for 
domestic markets) was beginning to hit growth ceilings and that countries would have to switch 
to the production of capital goods, in particular heavy industry and machinery. The reasons for 
the failure of this switch continue to be debated,
1
 but here we have our first divergent temporality 
between Mexico and Brazil. In Brazil, the slowing of the post-war boom was registered in the 
early 60s—this accounts, in part, for the military takeover of 1964, a coup that installed a new 
national development plan and significantly reconstituted the country‘s financial structure in an 
attempt to attract foreign investment flows. In Mexico, the slowdown, while perceptible at the 
end of the 1960s, doesn‘t fully register until 1973 and the first oil shock—although Mexico as 
early as the 1950s begins to seriously court international capital flows.
2
 What both countries 
have in common, however, is that during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s they turned to 
foreign debt as a way of attempting to grow themselves out of the end of the post-war boom—a 
strategy, which we will see, had disastrous consequences. What is important for our narrative is 
                                                          
1
 See for example Enrique Dussel Peters Polarizing Mexico: The Impact of Liberalization Strategy (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2000) and Fernando Ignacio Leiva Latin American Neostructuralism: The Contradictions of Post-
Neoliberal Development (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2008).  
2
 After the Second World War, the Avila Camacho administration settled Mexico‘s outstanding international 
obligations, including outstanding debt to oil companies who had been expropriated in 1938, as a means of clearing 
the slate to look for foreign capital to finance industrial expansion. The Alemán administration furthered this policy 
and openly invited foreign capital to ―participate in Mexico‘s economic development‖ (Wright 73). 
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that in many Latin American countries at various points in the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, 
as much as in the global North, the limits to the post-war model became evident. What follows is 
a history of crisis, which is at the same time a history of the rise of finance and a series of failed 
attempts at restarting a new cycle of global capitalist accumulation.
3
  
 Generally speaking, however, the first turning point in Latin America of the crisis of the 
post-war boom was the 1973 oil shock. Towards the end of 1973 and into 1974, in response to 
the United States pulling out of the Bretton Woods agreement (which effectively decreased the 
amount of dollars received per barrel) and the Yom Kippur war, OPEC countries increased the 
price of a barrel of crude from US$ 3 to 12. While the effects of the increase in price of this key 
industrial input and consumer good was felt throughout the world, its most important outcome in 
Latin America was financial. The dramatic increase in oil prices meant enormous sums of dollars 
accumulated in Arab countries, and, in the midst of the general world-wide economic downturn, 
there was no profitable place to invest them.
4
 This excess capital was, in part, recycled through 
the Euro-dollar market into loans to Latin American countries. As a result, financial profits, in 
particular from this process of recycling petrodollars into Latin American debt, became a partial 
solution to the declining rate of profit in the United States: by 1976, for example, interest 
                                                          
3
 This is not to say, as is discussed in more detail in chapter 3, that there is not a recovering of the rate of profit at 
certain points or new expansion, in particular in the extractive industries in Brazil. But even in Brazil it can be 
difficult to determine how much of this apparent expansion and accumulation was inflated by state investment.  
4
 This sequence of events has received a number of important treatments: Susanne Soederberg, The Politics of the 
New International Financial Architecture: Reimposing Neoliberal Domination in the Global South (London:  Zed 
Books: 2004); Stephany Griffith-Jones and Osvaldo Sunkel, Debt and Development Crises in Latin America: The 
End of an Illusion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Ernest J. Oliveri, Latin American Debt and the Politics of 
International Finance (London: Praeger, 1992); Pablo González Casanova and Hector Aguilar Camín (eds.), México 
Ante La Crisis (México: Siglo XXI, 1985); Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo and Júlio Gomes de Almeida, Depois da Queda: 
A Economia Brasileira da Crise da Dívida aos Impasses do Real (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2002); 
Jeffry A. Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Carlos Morera Camacho, El Capital Financiero en México y La 
Globalización: Límites y Contradicciones (México: Ediciones Era, 1998); Julio Gambina (ed.), La Globalización 
Económico-Financiera: Su Impacto en América Latina (Buenos Aires: CLASCO, 2002); Institute of Latin 
American Studies, The Debt Crisis in Latin America (Stockholm: ILAS, 1986); and Thomas Marois, States, Banks 
and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey (London: Elgar, 2012).  
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payments from Brazil on foreign debt represented 20% of Citibank‘s bottom line (Roddick 65). 
It took only a few short years for the first signs of the disjunct between attempts at finance-led 
growth and actual GDP growth to manifest: Brazil has a major stock market crash in 1971 and 
Mexico in 1976 declares what will be the first of many currency devaluations, and we witness 
the first of what will become increasingly severe financial crises in both countries.  
 During this same time, also as a response to the end of the post-war boom, a new 
international financial architecture was being built. The centerpiece of this new architecture was 
the effective end of the Bretton Woods agreement or the switch from national currencies being 
tied to the gold standard to a system of floating exchange rates, where national currencies are 
directly convertible into one another via currency markets. This had two important results. First, 
it allowed for the proliferation of fiat money or credit money, as money creation is no longer 
fractionally tied to the amount of gold held by a country. Second, the U.S. dollar quickly became 
what Marxist economists term ―world money‖; that is, as the largest economy, the dollar is the 
safest currency to hold, meaning it becomes the de facto currency for international transactions. 
This has numerous negative consequences for economies in the global South; the most important 
being that it creates a new link between U.S. interest rates and foreign debt (Correa, Vidal and 
Marshall 264).  
From 1975 to 1983, Latin American external debt quadrupled from $75 billion to more 
than $300 billion and grew from 26 to 50% of the region‘s total GDP (Rodriguez Mendoza 69). 
Much of this debt was short term debt (turned over every several months) and contracted directly 
by governments from commercial banks. What happens during the 1970s is that the United 
States slowly starts to raise its interest rates, to try to control inflation at home and to maintain 
the hegemony of the U.S. dollar as world money, and consequently this increases the interest 
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rates Mexico and Brazil (as well as many other countries) were paying on their foreign debt. The 
situation comes to a head in 1979 when Paul Volcker takes over the Federal Reserve. In the face 
of the appreciation of the mark and the yen, he allows the federal intra-bank rate to rise from 
10% in 1979 to over 20% in 1981, which raises dramatically the interest rates Mexico and Brazil 
are paying on their short-term debt. By 1982, Mexico is no longer able to roll over its debt and 
Brazil as well is unable to find lenders willing to lend, and the first major, catastrophic, financial 
crisis of the post-war period sweeps through Latin America.  
 The 1982 debt crisis gave rise to a new set of instruments and institutions for attempted 
financial accumulation and new forms of integration into the international financial system. The 
debt crisis dragged on inconclusively throughout most of the 1980s and inflation, especially in 
Brazil where it hit 223.8% in 1983 (Skidmore 254), returned as a critical problem, until a plan 
was hatched to convert the outstanding debt into sovereign debt in the form of bonds. Up until 
this time most state debt in Latin America was contracted directly from foreign banks (as lines of 
credit, etc.), however, after the implementation of the Brady Plans (named after then-U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady) throughout the region, states began to issue their own debt. 
The Brady Plans were debt restructuring plans in which Latin American countries ceded much 
control over their economies for a small measure of debt relief, while having their debt 
restructured into new forms of sovereign debt, allowing U.S. and European banks and financial 
institutions to continue extracting financial rent.
5
 As a part of this new orientation, both capital 
                                                          
5
 Discussions of the Brady Plans can be found in the U.S. House of Representatives proceedings The International 
Debt Crisis: A Review of the Brady Plan. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, 
April 19, 1989, Volume 4 and Third World Debt: Public Reaction to the Brady Plan. Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, 
Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, April 5, 1989. 
Retrospective discussion of the Brady Plans and this period of restructuring can be found in: Ross P. Buckley and 
Douglas W. Arner, From Crisis to Crisis: The Global Financial System and Regulatory Failure (New York: Kluwer 
Law International, 2011); Joseph E. Stiglitz and Daniel Heymann (eds.), Life After Debt: The Origins and 
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accounts and trade are liberalized, in Mexico as part of NAFTA in 1994 and in Brazil under the 
Plano Real (starting in 1993). The conversion of the outstanding debt was also accompanied by 
the creation of a new set of institutions, including stock markets and pension funds, and new 
derivative and securitization instruments, all of which will play key roles in the next round of 
crises. 
 This new architecture of sovereign debt and stock markets sets the stage for the second 
series of financial crises that strike Mexico and Brazil (Mexico in 1994/5 and Brazil in 1999). 
Trade liberalization means that national markets are flooded with consumer goods and industrial 
inputs, and companies begin to absorb hot financial inflows through the stock market and other 
channels. At the time, it was believed that rising primary and assembly exports would allow 
central governments to pay off the negative trade balances generated by trade liberalization. 
Unfortunately, what happened was that imports greatly outnumbered exports and central banks 
began to borrow to cover their currency account imbalance by releasing government bonds into 
the market. Eventually current accounts became so imbalanced that the governments of Mexico 
and Brazil could find no one to buy their bonds in order to roll over their debt. The ―Tequila‖ 
crisis hits in Mexico in 1994-5; Brazil experiences a similar crisis in 1999 in the wake of 
currency crises in East Asia and Russia. 
 If the liberalization of capital accounts and creation of new forms of sovereign debt were 
two keys to the rise of finance in both Mexico and Brazil (both forming part of a much more 
complicated process in each country), after the crashes of the 1990s, both countries have 
intensified the turn to finance but in different ways (which I discuss in more detail in the opening 
to chapters 3 and 4). Here we can point to at least four important similarities and differences to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Resolutions of Debt Crisis (New York: Palgrave, 2014); and Duncan Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise And Crisis 
Of Market Economics In Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995).  
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their internal financial architectures and their world-economy integrations. In Mexico, banks 
became foreign-owned in the wake of the 1994/5 crisis—from 1994 to 2002, the percentage of 
foreign ownership rose from 1% to 80% (Correa 172); while Brazil held onto its state owned 
banks (2 of the 3 largest in the economy today are still state owned). In both Mexico and Brazil, 
new financial instruments (such as derivative, swaps, options) are now regularly used by both 
businesses and governments,
6
 but Brazil depended more heavily on an expansion of consumer 
credit (Mexico turns to mortgages to finance construction, but the market is unstable and wiped 
out by the 2008 financial crash and an additional crisis in 2013).
7
 Moreover, in both Mexico and 
Brazil, starting in the late 1990s, large companies became increasingly financialized. Having 
since the 1980s sought financing in international capital markets instead of through domestic or 
international banks, these large companies enter an intensive processes of borrowing foreign 
capital in order to internationalize themselves (in effect, following the same strategy of multi-
national expansion pioneered by U.S. and European companies in the 1970s and 80s).
8
  
 If Sartre, in 1960, stated that Marxism was the insuperable horizon of that historical 
moment, it would appear that for the Latin American present that horizon is finance (7). It is 
                                                          
6
 For discussions of derivatives usage in Mexico and Brazil see: Annina Kaltenbrunner and Juan Pablo Painceira, 
―Financial Integration Intensifies New Vulnerabilities: Brazil in the Global Financial Crisis,‖ accessed November 1, 
2015, https://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/file55420.pdf; Randall Dodd, ―Exotic Derivatives Losses in 
Emerging Markets: Questions of Suitability, Concerns for Stability,‖ accessed November 1, 2015, 
http://www.financialpolicy.org/kiko.pdf; Donald J. Mathieson, Jorge E. Roldos, Ramana Ramaswamy, and Anna 
llyina, ―Emerging Local Securities and Derivatives Markets,‖ accessed November 1, 2015, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wefs/2004/derivmkts.pdf; Roberto Soto Esquivel, Especulación e innovación 
financiera. Mercados de derivados y consecuencias macroeconómicas en México (México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 
2010); and Antonio Mendoza Hernández, ―Financiarización y ganancias de corporaciones en México,‖ accessed 
July 17, 2015,  http://www.journals.unam.mx/index.php/ROF/article/view/23068. 
7
 See Whitney Eulich and Lauren Villagran, ―In Mexico, low-income homeowners watch their dreams crumble,‖ 
accessed March 17, 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0626/In-Mexico-low-income-
homeowners-watch-their-dreams-crumble and Pan Kwan Yuk, ―Mexican homebuilders: a cautionary tale for EM 
bond investors,‖ accessed March 13, 2015, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/05/31/mexican-homebuilders-a-
cautionary-tale-for-em-bond-investors/. 
8
 A good example of this is the Mexican grupo CEMEX, which during the 2000s, turned itself into the third largest 
cement supplier in the world, with operations in over 50 countries using short term debt financing to effect merges 
and acquisitions in other regional markets. As a result, in 2008 after international credit markets froze in the wake of 
the U.S. financial crisis, CEMEX required a bailout from the Mexican government in order to avoid bankruptcy, 
even though now it realizes only 16% of its sales in Mexico (Mendoza 166).  
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difficult to find an aspect of social life that has not been touched by finance‘s rise, from the 
subject, to social relations, to the shape of power and domination. To understand, however, the 
consequences finance has had for social theory and cultural critique, we need to move from a 
historical plane to a conceptual one and from description to explanation. Beginning to frame the 
social and cultural effects of finance, means taking positions regarding some of the key debates 
surrounding finance, such as: Has finance overtaken, escaped from, or entirely merged with the 
productive economy? Does the rise of finance represent a continuation of capitalist exploitation 
or its obsolescence? Has finance changed the process of subject formation by providing a new 
rationality to be followed, through the dominance of a new power relation expressed in debt, or 
through the proliferation of state violence as a necessary supplement for credit economies? In the 
next section, I give an account of some of the most important, on-going debates concerning 
finance and how this project inserts itself into them.  
 
Building a Conceptual Vocabulary for Finance 
As is probably apparent by now, this project is marked by a deeper engagement with 
political economy than is perhaps common in many current works of cultural, or even social, 
critique. This is due to several reasons. First, while the North Atlantic has seen an explosion of 
interest in finance after the 2008 financial crisis, work on the political economy of finance in 
Latin America operates within a different set of temporalities. In some places, like Brazil, which 
actually has an interesting tradition of thought on finance capital but which was less affected by 
the 2008 crisis, finance is not a topic that has received a great deal of recent sustained attention.
9
 
                                                          
9
 One university location where this does not hold true is amongst geographers and urbanists who have developed 
sophisticated analyses of the role of finance in the real estate and construction boom in the last decade in Brazil. See 
for example Daniel Sanfelici, ―Financeirização e a produção do espaço urbano no Brasil: uma contribuição ao 
debate,‖ EURE: Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Urbano Regionales, 39(118); F. E. S Martins, A (re)produção 
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This has meant that occasionally I have had to do some of the spade work in a particular area. 
Second, even when there is sustained literature, whether in Latin America or the North Atlantic, 
when it comes to finance there is a great deal of debate and very little consensus. For example, 
there are enormous differences—which tend to be consistent internationally—between, to just 
stick with the critical left, post-workerist, heterodox Marxist, and post-Keynesian understandings 
of finance (not to mention debates internal to each of these approaches).
10
 As a result, it is not 
possible—and this is a good thing—when thinking about finance to pull a term off the shelf and 
apply to it a cultural product or social matrix. Thinking about the social and cultural effects of 
finance means first defining what ―finance‖ means in any given moment and this requires 
drilling down into, and occasionally pulling apart, a given political economic configuration. 
Finally, part of the attentiveness to political economy evidenced in this project is due to a 
conviction that after years of focus on the state, one of the tasks of cultural and social theory in 
the present is to test the question of how to bring capital back in. This project attempts to track, 
as the overcoding of the economic by the political characteristic of developmentalist and welfare 
states recedes, aspects of an emergent social formation and the political possibilities it opens up.   
 Attending to the political economy of finance has meant taking up a position on three 
questions: how to name or designate the processes around finance, how or why did they emerge, 
and how new are they? Instead of using a term like financialization or focusing on a single 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
social da escala metropolitana: um estudo sobre a abertura de capitais nas incorporadoras e sobre o 
endividamento imobiliário urbano em São Paulo (Diss. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da 
Universidade de São Paulo, 2010); S. A. Miele, O movimento da economia financeira na dinâmica imobiliária de 
São Paulo (Diss. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo, 2008); L. 
Royer, Financeirização da política habitacional: limites e perspectivas (Diss. Faculdade de Arquitetura e 
Urbanismo da Universidade de São Paulo, 2009); and L. Z. Shimbo, Habitação social, habitação de mercado: a 
confluência entre Estado, empresas construtoras e capital financiero (Diss. Escola de Engenharia de São Carlos, 
2010).  
10
 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term ―heterodox Marxism‖ to name the various lineages of Marxist thought 
which broke with the political, philosophical, and political economic precepts of the Second and Third 
Internationals, the moment in which the position of ―orthodox‖ Marxism (as historical and dialectical materialism) 
was consolidated. The heterodox tradition includes thinkers such as Lukács, Benjamin, and Adorno, as well as Latin 
American writers such as Mariátegui, Marini, and Echevarría. 
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metric like an increasing share of financial profits in a national economy—two common 
approaches across a variety of literatures
11
—in this project I think about the ―rise of finance‖ 
institutionally and systemically, meaning I focus on the emergence and effects of new financial 
institutions, relations, and events in a given historical moment. One event which will be 
discussed at length in the first two chapters is the 1982 debt crisis and its aftermath. Another 
example would be the expansion of personal credit in Brazil in the period after 2003 (which is 
discussed in chapter 3). Moreover, financialization is a word that, now, like globalization, tends 
to obscure more than clarify, and metrics like financial participation in a national economy, 
while important, don‘t allow for thinking about the effects of finance on social life and cultural 
production in a capacious sense. Because I am interested in finding ways to talk about, trace, and 
make visible these effects, I‘m interested in the systemic, in the expansion, composition, and 
changes of the financial system as a whole. My generic term for this throughout the dissertation 
will be ―rise of finance‖—wherein I will always try to specify for a given historical moment 
what the key processes, institutions, and relations are that compose ―finance‖ in that moment.  
In the world of the North Atlantic where I am institutionally located, the importance of 
finance became undeniable after 2007-8. The aftermath of this crisis also witnessed an important 
expansion of work on finance in Latin America, in particular in Mexico—while Brazil has had a 
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 See for instance: Samuel Lichtensztejn, ―Una Aproximación Metodológica al Estudio de la Internacionalización 
Financiera en América Latina,‖ Economía: Teoría y Práctica, March-April 2009, Volume 2, pp. 137-18; Herman 
Minsky, ―Securitization,‖ accessed November 1, 2015, http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_08_2.pdf; Robert 
Guttmann, How Credit-Money Shapes the Economy: The United States in a Global System (New York: M.E. 
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fairly strong, if not always remembered as such, tradition of attention to finance capital in the 
context of development stretching back to the work of Maria da Conceição Tavares. 
Concerning the how and why of the rise of finance and the return of (financial) crisis, there is, as 
is to be expected, little consensus. Liberals tend to see the problem as one of individuals or 
behavior, namely of greedy, speculative Gordon Gekkos wrecking an imperfect, but generally-
raising-all-boats capitalism. Post-Keynesians tend to see the problem as one of deregulation or 
excessive liberalization which can be solved by state intervention. Post-workerists emphasize the 
breakdown of any separation between the real and financial economy. Amongst heterodox 
Marxists there is a debate between two positions: the majority position sees the rise of finance as 
caused by attacks on unions (i.e., neoliberalism) leading to credit provision to supplement wages, 
while the minor position argues that the rise of financial forms of accumulation was fueled by a 
secular declining rate of profit, meaning that since the late 1960s and 70s capital (in the North 
Atlantic and Latin America) has seen profits decline which has led to the expansion of fictitious 
capital and failed attempts at financial accumulation and profit-making.
12
  
I cast my lot with this latter position because it appears to me to be the most accurate 
account but also because it enable us, in the terms of Robert Brenner, to speak of the period 
between, roughly, the end of the 1960s—with the first appearance of complications in the post-
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rate of profit positions. 
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war model of capitalism—and the present day as the ―long downturn.‖
13
 The long downturn is 
defined by the exhaustion of a certain level of technological productivity and the inability of 
capitalists to start a new cycle of accumulation. This approach I find helpful as it allows us to see 
many of the phenomena which have appeared in the intervening years, most notably the 
spatialization of production, internationalization of labor markets, and the rise of finance, as 
attempts to weather this storm of the long downturn by attacking labor, increasing the speed of 
circulation of money and goods, and producing fictitious value. Politically, I find this perspective 
useful as well because it demonstrates that these phenomena, especially those connected to 
finance, cannot be ―solved‖ by regulation or moral bromides—which are the positions one most 
often encounters amongst progressives or self-identified members of the ―Left.‖ The financial 
crises that have lashed Latin America over the last forty years have their roots in a crisis in 
production, in a limit internal to capital. As such, they will not end until either a new cycle of 
accumulation is started or capitalism is abolished.  
However, it is important to locate this long downturn in a longer historical frame, which 
can be done by drawing on the work of Giovanni Arrighi. I find this to be important because 
frequently commentaries on recent financial crises, ―financialization,‖ or ―speculative‖ or 
―finance capitalism,‖ conceive of the present moment of finance‘s expansion as unique or 
singular and, as a result, are infected with a nostalgia for the moment of the welfare or 
developmentalist state (as a kind of Edenic moment before the emergence of bad finance). 
Arrighi‘s pathbreaking work in The Long Twentieth Century (1994) demonstrates how the rise of 
finance in the late twentieth century was not a new phenomenon. Rather, he argues that 
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systematic cycles of accumulation are split into two moments, a productive moment where 
capitalists invest some of their profits in the expansion of the means of production and a second 
stage wherein capitalists in a geographical center are able to realize higher profits by pulling 
their capital out of the productive apparatus and placing it into finance, which then expands. For 
Arrighi, there have been four such waves, the first dominated by Italian city states, the second by 
the Dutch, the third by the British empire, and the last defined by U.S. hegemony in the post-war 
period. The present expansion of the financial sector and proliferation of new financial 
institutions, instruments, and relations is, for Arrighi, a consequence of a ―switching crisis‖ or 
the decline of the last U.S.-led systemic cycle of accumulation.  
Though throughout this project I use the phrase ―rise of finance,‖ I never mean it in the 
sense of ―for the first time,‖ but rather in the sense of the most recent rise or return of finance. As 
I have argued elsewhere,
14
 we can think of the history of capitalism in Latin America from the 
late nineteenth century to the present as defined by three expansionary waves, each accompanied 
by a set of financial flows: a first wave, starting in the 1870s at the beginning of the Porfiriato 
during a global depression as British capital and American investment expand outward sinking 
huge sums of money into railroads and mining and as French and German capital flows into 
early manufacturing industries. The second wave is the post-war boom as American capital pours 
into Mexico and other large countries first in the form of multinational foreign direct investment 
and after as U.S. government aid. The third wave extends from 1973 to the present, the wave of 
financial expansion without an accompanying expansion of production, leading to bubbles, 
crashes, and devaluations: 1976, 1982, 1987, 1994/98, and 2008. To summarize, what we are 
witnessing in the present, the chasing of financial profits and failed forms of financial 
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accumulation, is the result of a secular declining rate of profit or switching crisis or, in plainer 
English, the lack of a new expansionary wave of capital.  
So far perhaps all these debates and position-taking seem disconnected and far from our 
stated objective of investigating how the rise of finance has impacted social and cultural life. 
However, arguments over the why and how of finance‘s emergence underpin the various 
approaches that have been taken to understand finance‘s impact. One way of dividing up the 
social and cultural theory works on finance is to see them as structured around a divide between 
approaches that privilege the ―newness‖ of finance and those that look first to its continuities 
with prior forms of capital or credit. An example of the first approach would be work that 
examines either how finance imposes a new logic, rationality, or ―script‖ which subjects are 
required or invited to take up or how a specific financial innovation, like derivatives, comprises a 
new ―social logic‖ which comes to shape social relations.
15
 These approaches, while not always 
directly basing themselves in historical arguments about political economy, tend to emphasize 
the newness of finance. An example of the second approach which emphasizes continuities 
would be David Graber‘s widely read Debt: The First 5,000 Years, which explains the 
financialized present by rethinking our understanding of the history and social form of debt, or 
Maurizio Lazzarato‘s work on credit and debt, which similarly attempts to define our subjection 
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to debt by scaffolding a genealogy for this form of subjection that stretches back into the 
nineteenth century.  
In this project, I draw heavily on a position, which shades into the second camp, based in 
the work of heterodox Marxist cultural critics of finance Joshua Clover and Annie McClanahan, 
but which proposes a different kind of continuity.
16
 Clover and McClanahan have articulated a 
position which sees finance as a form of temporal arbitrage or as a means of realizing future 
surplus value in the present and, as such, intimately connected (rather than opposed) to 
production.
17
 In this approach, attempted forms of financial accumulation consist in the 
proliferation of claims on future value production. Rather than reading finance as primarily a 
logic or rationality or in continuity with historical forms of credit or debt as a system of 
subjection, I will think about finance, whatever the instrument or institution, as producing a 
claim on future value production. As such, finance produces the conditions for crisis as there is 
always a moment where some of these claims on or promises to deliver value do not materialize. 
The subprime crisis of 2008 is one such moment, as is the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America. I 
primarily deploy this approach to finance in chapter 1, where I track how a crisis of claims on 
future value impacts cultural production, and in chapter 3, where I examine the proliferation of 
personal credit and its consequences for subject formation and social relations. However, this 
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fundamental way of reading or thinking finance structures this dissertation as a whole and 
reappears in different guises in each of the chapters.  
 
Finance in the Field of Latin American Studies 
Within the broadly conceived field of Latin American studies my project dialogues with 
two traditions: dependency theory and the contemporary authors who maintain its critical legacy 
and Latin American subaltern studies and current formations of critical Latin American studies. I 
want to specify in each case what my engagement looks like and what a perspective that focuses 
on finance may or may not have to contribute to each. 
There have been a number of recent returns and re-conceptualizations of dependency 
theory, but, following Cristobal Kay, I would distinguish between two primary currents, reform 
and the revolutionary, within its textual corpus (126). The reform current would be composed of 
authors like Raúl Prebisch and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, or those whose primary focus was 
how to make development possible in Latin America under a given set of international 
conditions. The revolutionary current, comprised of writers like Theotonio dos Santos and Ruy 
Marini, argued that development was impossible in Latin America under current conditions and a 
political solution or event was required to make ―development‖ possible (i.e., a socialist 
revolution). What all dependency authors share, however, is the use of a conceptual device 
aimed at making visible forms of exploitation between global regions or between individual 
countries. In Prebisch, this device took the form of ―declining terms of trade,‖ which meant that 
agricultural producers in the non-industrialized periphery would receive less for their products 
over time (12; 13-14). With Marini, it took the form of the overexploitation of peripheral 
19 
 
proletariat, which made growth and higher living standards possible in the capitalist core (13-
15).  
These conceptual figures for envisioning regional or exploitation that occurs at the 
international level filter forward into authors who, while not directly of the dependency theory 
tradition, are the inheritors—partially at least—of its critical tradition today in Latin America. 
This is especially so when it comes to attempts on the part of heterodox economists and social 
theorists to understand the rise of finance—as, for the most part, the way finance has been 
thought is as a form or device of exploitation between the global North and South.  
It is important to note, however, that on the question of finance the country-specific 
traditions of critical thought in Brazil and Mexico part ways. Because of the way the far right 
seized power during the dictatorship in Brazil, the critiques of the intellectual left of economic 
and social transformations during the dictatorship were frequently more free-ranging than those 
in Mexico, where the work of most critical intellectuals is marked by a support for some version 
of nationalist development. What separates Brazilian from Mexican authors is, in particular, the 
early emphasis of the former on finance.
18
 For example, Maria da Conceição Tavares‘ classic 
1971 book is entitled Da substituição de importações ao capitalismo financeiro and Ruy 
Marini‘s argument for Brazil as a subimperial power (that is, as subjugating other Latin America 
countries) was derived from the way the dictatorship had strengthened and had come to depend 
on finance capital (―Subimperialism‖ 16-17).  
Having said that, after the 1982 debt crisis it became much more common in both Mexico 
and Brazil, and across Latin America, to think about the effects of finance as a new form of 
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domination or a new form of dependency.
19
 This is a perspective that continues to be hegemonic 
today.
20
 To give just one example, the work of Correa et al. on financialization in Mexico argues 
that financialization has been a ―passive and largely external process‖ (9) or a means of 
extracting financial rent and sending it abroad. The rise of finance has certainly been a project of 
reimposing domination, but to see it as primarily or solely an external or process in which Latin 
American countries have not participated actively is to miss an important part of finance‘s rise. 
My project focuses on this other part of the story, on how the rise of finance has internally 
transformed the social and cultural spaces of Mexico and Brazil. While my work acknowledges 
the fundamental insight of dependency theory of the existence of gradients or differentials of 
power internationally, the tendency to not push beyond a merely exogenous explanation—which 
we can find in nuce in Brazilian dependency theory-centric critiques of the dictatorship—misses 
how deeply finance and circulation have altered everyday life.  
The inheritors of dependency theory who have carried on its critical tradition in order to 
make sense of the financial crises of the 1980s and 90s and the transition to neoliberalism are 
mainly located in economics and the social sciences. The formation that has dealt in the most 
detail with the political and cultural consequences of these years of transition has been the Latin 
American Subaltern Studies group, which is the other critical tradition from which my work 
draws. Though the work and legacy of the group remains contested to this day, I want to bring 
out several characteristics of the formation which have been important for my own work.  
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 The Latin American Subaltern Studies group was, as the name implies, inspired by the 
work of the Indian Subaltern Studies group which had used Gramsci‘s notion of the subaltern as 
a means for rewriting colonial Indian history and Gramsci‘s notion of hegemony for explaining 
the peculiar forms of domination of the British occupation (Guha‘s ―dominance without 
hegemony‖). The Latin American group that formed in the early 1990s (disbanding towards the 
end of the decade) emerged from within a slightly different historical context, namely that of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections. As much 
of the world and Latin American intellectual and political scene transitioned to a ―there is no 
alternative‖ position, the Latin American Subaltern Studies group—though a contested set of 




 Much, but far from all, of the work emerging from the group used one of the various 
definitions of subaltern which had emerged (Gramsci, Guha, and Spivak‘s being the most 
common) often in tandem with a notion of hegemony. In the more deconstructive wing of the 
group, the subaltern was thought as that which undoes, breaks from, or marks the constitutive 
limit of the hegemony of the nation-popular state‘s cultural politics. As such, the subaltern-
hegemony tandem was frequently deployed to describe a socio-historical matrix formed by the 
developmentalist state, U.S. state, and/or university discourse as characterized by a high-level of 
administration, consensus, and/or banal empiricism. At the same time, work from within the 
group attempted to grapple with the recent transformations in global capitalism and its effects on 
Latin American nation states and political formations; transformations which were frequently 
described with terms such as finance capitalism, late or global capitalism, or neoliberalism.  
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 The work in this dissertation is, I believe, broadly in line with the goal of maintaining a 
space for theoretical reflection of current critical Latin American studies formations which have 
one of their roots in the Latin American Subaltern Studies group. What this project does 
differently are two things. First, it places more pressure on the political economic terms and 
formulations that we have used to describe the transition from the national popular or 
developmentalist state into the present. Its wager is that there is something to be gained by 
examining in more detail this transition, which my work does by narrowing its focus onto 
finance. Secondly, instead of a conception of state, international, or university order which is 
rooted in or framed by hegemony, my dissertation conceives of order as primarily imposed by 




Putting the Political Back in Political Economy 
 A common critique of work that centers on political economy is that it has no way of, or 
little room for, discussing the state and/or society. As much as this project conceives of itself as 
one of bringing capital back into cultural critique, it recognizes that, when it comes to producing 
the order of Latin American societies, the state still plays a central, if not a determining, role. 
This project thus argues for the need for a dual optic which tracks both finance and the state. The 
perspective on the state developed in this project is to see the post-1973 period as one in which 
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the corporativist infrastructure of the developmental state begins to break down. I use two 
theoretical lenses to think about shifts within and to this infrastructure. In part one, departing 
from the work of Gareth Williams in The Other Side of the Popular, I track the declining force of 
the national popular state‘s primary technology for social integration, the racialized management 
of representation. In the second half of the dissertation, I draw on a Foucault-inspired approach 
to the developmental state and argue that it secured social order via a series of individualizing 
and collectivizing processes, which atomized individuals and then pooled them into non-
revolutionary collectivities. I conceive of each of these lenses as different, yet complementary, 
points of view into the same infrastructural machinery, each of which helps to bring forth a 
different aspect of its operation. 
 In each case, however, and throughout this dissertation, what I am interested in, on the 
level of state and society, is how these corporativist, collectivizing, and representational 
infrastructures, after the beginning of the long downturn, are no longer able to do the work they 
once did. There are two linked reasons why this is so. The first is that the long downturn has 
meant, in part, that the productivist system which scaffolded the corporativist measures of social 
integration during the developmental state no longer exist, or least not to the same extent.
23
 The 
second is that, again as a result of the dismantling and decline of a certain system of capitalist 
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 In the 1980s and 90s most mainstream academic work in Latin America shifted away from the concepts of 
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production, there has been, since the end of the 1970s, an explosion of surplus populations.
24
 In 
Mexico, for example, it is estimated that roughly 60% of the economically active population are 
in the informal economy (INEGI, 2014). In Rio de Janeiro, as Janice Perlman notes, from ―1980 
to 1990, when the overall city growth rate dropped to 8%...favela populations surged by 41%‖ 
(2003). These surplus populations are crowded into informal settlements and into the informal 
economy where they are subjected to precarious, highly exploitative labor regimes—as such, 
surplus populations exist outside both the traditional forms of capitalist and state integration, in 
particular the corporativist bodies used in Mexico and Brazil to secure social stability during the 
boom years of the developmentalist state.  
 The fact that these populations can no longer be reached through the old corporativist 
measures has had two consequences, which I trace in each of the chapters of this dissertation as 
consequences of and alongside the rise of finance. First, the explosion of individuals outside of 
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We of course have to keep in mind that harsh terms such as ―redundant‖ or ―surplus population‖ do not 
express Marx‘s own judgment about people, but he uses these terms to describe a mechanism in the deep 
structure of capitalism by which people are turned into a ―population surplus in relation to capital‘s average 
requirements for valorization‖ (Marx 1976, 786)—that is, they are rendered ―superfluous‖ from the 
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most traditional mechanisms of ordering has meant that states have turned to policing, public 
security, and state violence as a means of controlling these surplus populations. In Mexico, just 
after 2006, the defense budget has increased from 2 billion to 9.3 billion in 2009 (Paley 127), and 
as we know a large number of the dead in the so-called ―drug war‖ have been ordinary, 
marginalized, or politicized citizens. As Jorge Zaverucha and others have argued, rather than a 
transition from dictatorship to democracy, Brazil has witnessed the continuation of the 
dictatorship‘s National Security Laws paired with a ―militarization of public security‖ (88). 
Second, unable to control surplus populations through traditional corporativist machinery, states 
have attempted to construct new corporativist infrastructures, which they have frequently done 
through finance. This occurs with particular intensity in Brazil, where, since 2003, the total 
amount of credit to individuals has grown from R$ 84,792 million to 789,428 million as of May 
2015 (Banco Central 2003; Banco Central 2015a) and where the state has played a direct and 
important role in the expansion of personal credit.  
 
Cultures of Finance and Cultural Critique 
With respect to the problem of how to connect political economy and cultural critique, 
this dissertation takes an approach that is both naïve and non-dogmatic. Its naivety is to say that 
after forty years of financial crises the import of finance or the economic really cannot be 
ignored. It is non-dogmatic in that it leaves behind all of the literature on base-superstructure.
25
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Because it assumes that political economy and culture are somehow related it loses little sleep 
over theorizing their relation with respect to the Marxist tradition (or the critics thereof) and 
proposes to itself the task of searching out where those sites and forms of relation and 
conditioning might lie. I do so by dividing the rise of finance in Mexico and Brazil into two 
parts, each covering a different historical moment (the first, the moment of crisis roughly 1976-
1998/9 and the second, the moment of recomposition around export, finance-led accumulation, 
and circulation 2000/1-present). Each part has a chapter on Mexico and one on Brazil and all of 
the chapters start by unfolding a figure or instrument of financial political economy (instability, 
hyperinflation, credit, and circulation, respectively) which is critical to the particular historical 
moment and national space under discussion. The chapters then trace the complicated, non-
deterministic relations that exist between finance, cultural production, and (racial) order 
(primarily chapters 1 and 2) and between finance, state violence, and subjects and collectivities 
(primarily chapter 3 and 4).  
Thus, the first two chapters of this dissertation are dedicated to examining how cultural 
production reacts in the aftermath of the 1982 debt crisis and the process of state and capital 
restructuring which follows. I turn to this task in my first chapter, ―Crisis, Ontology, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for organized labor and revolutionary groups, see for example Marta Harnecker‘s Los conceptos elementales del 
materialismo histórico (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1968), which was used to teach thousands of students and workers the 
fundamentals of ―socialist‖ thought. The weight of trying to think beyond this ―metaphor‖ can still be felt in recent 
works such as Kojin Karatani‘s The Structure of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of Exchange 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014). Most of the work from the new Left and May 68 moments, in my 
opinion, attempts to break with the metaphor but without actually leaving it behind. Even in works that argue for its 
obsolesce or overturning, such as Deleuze and Guattari‘s Anti-Oedipus or Baudrillard‘s The Mirror of Production, 
the base/superstructure metaphor is still present, as what motivates the argument or as what must be disproven. In 
this project, I have decided to take a different approach, which is to ignore the distinction. While certainly in the pre- 
and post-68 generation it served as a spur to very creative, interesting work, I think in the main forcing thought to 
continually reference an idea that most agree is untenable and frankly dogmatic is not part of the Marxist tradition 
that we need to hold onto. Thus, instead of once again cutting through all the thickets of the literature to possibly 
develop a more refined version of the metaphor or to attempt to leave it behind completely—which ultimately 
reanimates its corpse—I‘ve decided in the chapters that follow to see what happens if we simply take a more 
materialist approach of actually attempting to trace how, in this case, financial phenomena come to impact and be 
expressed and mediated in cultural production, subjectivity, and social life.  
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Saltos of Finance in Jorge Volpe‘s En Busca de Klingsor‖ and argue that the way that the 
financial crisis of 1982 was mediated was, as Claudio Lomnitz has noted, through the 
generalized category of la crisis. In the first half of the chapter, I trace how Jorge Volpi‘s En 
busca de Klingsor, in the face of financial indeterminacy, reconstitutes the racialized imaginary 
of the national popular through a turn to ontology. Volpi‘s ontological turn, which has been 
mirrored in many zones of cultural and social thought, is accompanied by a turn from a 
biological or cultural subject of mestizaje to one defined by a mobile, ontological divide, which 
has become popularized under the name of the delincuente. Positioning Volpi‘s work amidst the 
breakdown of the national popular state and the leaps or saltos of finance, I demonstrate how it 
registers and is structured by figures of indeterminacy that emerge from the new regimes of 
finance that predominate in post-82 Mexico. In the second half of the chapter, I develop how 
Volpi elaborates a theory of time as catastrophe which is complementary to this new ontological 
division. Volpi‘s notion of catastrophe is different than those found in the global North, which 
focus on black swans and unforeseeable events, as crisis is not a ―singularity‖ but rather 
repetition, not majestic and dreadful black swans, but rather simply fizzled hopes and ongoing 
crisis. I show how this notion of catastrophe comes to structure the subjects of Volpi‘s novel and 
also argue that Volpi‘s catastrophe allows us to make visible a temporal figure that circulated 
more broadly in Mexican popular discourse under the terms desmadre and chaos.  
The second chapter, ―The Failures of Finance: Urban Peripheries, Hyperinflation and 
Real Abstraction,‖ examines roughly the same time period in Brazil (from 1982 to the early 
2000s) and argues that the mediation of the post-82 period in Brazil was not that of crisis (as in 
the Mexican case) but rather hyperinflation. As a result, the recomposition of the national 
popular form of order which cultural production participates in takes a different form: not a turn 
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to ontology, but one into real abstraction. I argue, through readings of sociological texts on 
public security (such as Luiz Eduardo Soares) and novels such as Paulo Lins‘ Cidade de Deus 
(City of God), that it is the production of the ―favela‖ as a real abstraction, as a quasi-objective 
category which shapes social relations, which comes to do the work of race and on which social 
control of surplus populations is founded in the post-1982 moment in Brazil. Much like the 
category of delincuente, the production of an absolute division between the formal and informal 
spaces of the cities serves as a new means of division of the human community in the face of an 
expanding surplus population and under the conditions of hyperinflation or the breakdown of the 
social synthesis of money and exchange. In the second half of the chapter, I examine how it 
might be possible for cultural products to work against the real abstraction of the favela. In a 
discussion of a 2013 film shot in Brasilia, A cidade é uma só?, I trace how the film pushes 
against the discursive formation of the favela and maintains an anticipatory distance from its 
fields of strange force. 
While the first two chapters of the dissertation focus on how the crumbling 
infrastructures of racialized ordering inherited from the national popular state were reinforced by 
a turn to ontology (Mexico) and the real abstraction of the favela (Brazil), the chapters in part 2 
argue that the post-2001 moment is marked by, in Brazil, failed forms of financial corporativism 
and, in Mexico, the inability of the state and capital to provide inhabitable lifeworlds. While part 
1 examined the reinforcement of national popular infrastructures of social control in the period of 
on-going financial crisis, part 2 examines how in the post-2001 moment states either attempt to 
restart or completely abandon their machinery of the production of subjectivities (and 
collectivities). In Brazil this machinery, first created during the developmentalist period, no 
longer is able to secure the successful production of individuals and groups, while in Mexico, 
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where it is abandoned, we witness the emergence of new forms of collectivity, attempting to 
produce inhabitable lifeworlds amidst death and destruction.  
In chapter 3, ―Subject of Credit: Credit Democracy, Projection, and State Violence in 
Financialized Brazil,‖ I trace three transformations that the massive entry of finance into Brazil 
after 2003 has wrought: a form of (failed) financial corporativism, a projective structure of 
feeling, and shift in the production of subjects. In each case, my aim is to be attentive to 
finance‘s fragility or instability: finance-led booms last only as long as the financial flows do. 
Thus, part of what this chapter traces is how once the financial boom begins to fade, the state 
turns more and more to violence and policing in order to seize assets, control unruly populations, 
and supplement a failing corporatist machinery. In the opening section, I chart the expansion of 
personal credit as a form of financial corporativism during the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 
governments in Brazil since 2003. As well, I examine some of the principle cultural mediations 
of credit and the role of Rio de Janeiro as the site of the production of these mediations, in 
particular the transition from discourses of racial democracy to credit democracy elaborated in 
the 2012 novela Cheias de Charme. In the second part of the chapter, drawing on the work of 
Raymond Williams and Deleuze and Guatarri, I turn my attention to finance‘s projective 
affective structure and how the mental act of projection has secured legitimacy or acquiescence 
to the spread of finance across different social situations and shaped new social relations of 
credit. In the final section, I examine the kind of subjects that the personal credit expansion has 
produced. Here I argue that credit expansion has produced a form of the subject as a pass-thru or 
gateway in which the state is less concerned with subjects‘ interiority and more with facilitating 
the seizure of assets or income. This seizure requires a concomitant expansion of militarization 
and the threat of state violence which further hollows out the subject. I conclude by returning to 
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Rio de Janeiro to ask what imbrications between new public security strategies (the UPPs) and 
finance might tell us about coming political formations in Brazil.  
In chapter 4, ―Cultures of Circulation in Contemporary Mexico: Beyond Interiority and 
Voided Collectivities,‖ I argue that Mexico after 2001 has been marked by, not just an expansion 
of finance, but rather a turn to ―circulation‖—understood as a turn away from the sphere of 
production to the sphere of circulation. This turn to circulation has taken many forms including 
the drug trade, out migration, and various forms of finance. The turn away from production has 
meant, unlike in Brazil where there is an attempt to re-start the production of de-politicized 
subjectivities and collectivities, in Mexico there has been an almost complete dissipation of this 
infrastructure. Thus, part of what I consider in this chapter is how, in Mexico, the military-
policing apparatus replaces the corporativist structures of the developmental state. I argue that 
cultural works in the period before, but most intensively after 2006, register and respond to this 
shift and they do so along two main lines. First, by focusing on the ―drug war‖ film, El Infierno, 
and the poetry of Dolores Dorantes, I trace the transformation of two key sites for producing 
collectivity during the developmentalist period, labor and death. I then turn to cultural objects 
that directly address the conditions of surplus population in a moment of circulation to 
demonstrate how they turn around the production of new forms of relation between the 
individual and the collective. In films like Norteado (2009), Jaula de Oro (2013), and Heli 
(2013) we can see the elaboration of a new system for the production of subjects and 
collectivities that does not first produce discrete individuals and then sum them into groups, but 
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Crisis, Ontology, and the Saltos of Finance in Jorge Volpe’s En Busca de Klingsor 
 
 
The new political economic thinking paving the way for the Financial Revolution was grounded in a radically 
transformed worldview that drew extensively on developments in natural philosophy and political theory. Leaving 
behind the traditional notion that mankind exists in a material, social and economic world that is finite, static and 
knowable, mid 17
th
 century political economists embraced the ideas of infinite worlds, nature‘s perfectibility, and 
probabilistic knowledge. With these component parts, they constructed a new worldview in which mankind‘s 
purpose was to ceaselessly pursue new methods for the infinite improvement of nature, society, and mankind. For 





In the course of a single decade, before NAFTA and the currency crisis of 1994, Mexico 
passed through a series of three major finance-related crises: the currency devaluation of 1976, 
the debt crisis of 1982, and the fall out associated with the U.S. stock market crash in 1987. 
While 1976 was dismissed as a bump in the road of ever-expanding growth, the debt crisis of 
1982 signaled the definitive end of the national popular state and that the financial restructuring 
that had engulfed Mexico was not one more storm to be weathered by counter-cyclical policies, 
but in fact marked the implementation of a new global financial architecture. These two events 
however were closely linked: the closing of the window of national development as a viable 
political economy strategy, overtaken by the massive indebtedness of the Mexican state after the 
Echeverría era, was, in many ways, a consequence of the rise of a new financial architecture 
driven by the overaccumulation of capital and a global falling rate of profit.
 26
 On the one hand, 
                                                          
26
 The positions and debates on why finance has become so central to the global economy since 1973 are 
proliferating at a such a rate that it would impossible to describe them succinctly. Significant works from left 
positions that represent different flavors of approaches include: Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: 
Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (Verso, 1994); Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of 
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the national popular state is deterritorialized and its system of fixed or pegged exchange rates 
flowing into sectoral production incentives rendered a brittle hold on the new fluxes of capital 
seeking investment, the exposure of floating exchange rates, and loss of internal control over 
monetary policy. On the other, the new financial integration of Mexico—its need for debt, its 
need for foreign investment, its inability to keep upper and middle class Mexicans from moving 
their money out of the country once the debt crisis became apparent—is what puts an end to the 
strategies, tactics, and geopolitics of development that had called forth and held in position Latin 
American national popular formations before and after the Second World War.  
 Accounts of the last thirty years of Mexican cultural production that focus on 
neoliberalism tend to overlook both this long pre-history of financial crisis and to de-emphasize 
the new financial architectonics and integration of Mexico into the world economy. Neoliberal 
cultural critique normally focuses on the state and, as such, misses the ways in which new 
financial architectures and instruments set off a chain of deterritorializations of the national 
popular state form. We might say that cultural critique that takes neoliberalism as a key term has 
tended to misread changes in state form as synomous with changes in the economy. Even if we 
concide the point that neoliberalism marks a definitive change in the state, the state, even a 
developmentalist one, is not isomorphic with the economy—and what I will argue is that our 
analysis needs to make space for accounting for both changes in the state and capital. By placing 
neoliberalism at the center of cultural analysis, critics have often elided key economic 
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transformations across this period, of which the rise of finance is one.
27
 In so doing, the systemic 
conditions which drive this reconstitution of the Mexican state and Latin American states more 
generally are relegated to the background.
28
  
In this chapter, I take a different tack into the post-82 historical period in Mexico as 
decades of financial crisis and instability. This approach does not overlook the profound changes 
in the Mexican state and its attendant cultural imaginaries, but rather reads these changes 
alongside and as conditioned by the rise of finance in Mexico. I grapple, then, with the newness 
of finance and how cultural production in Mexico has responded to it, been influenced by, and 
has produced meaning for it and its effects on the Mexican state form. As finance begins to 
displace production in importance the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America, new events (financial 
crises, for example) and figures (hyperinflation, which is examined in Chapter 2) appear on the 
social scene. However, finance does not become legible or become an object of cultural 
discussion through the same events or figures in all countries in Latin America. In Mexico, as I 
argue in the first part of this chapter, finance, or the results of its rise, first became legible and 
condensed into the figure of crisis or instability. At the same time, the events and figures through 
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which finance‘s rise becomes legible, because of their newness, come into the world almost 
without meaning; that is, meaning has to be produced around them. Cultural works, as well as 
other discursive productions, play an important role in making sense of finance‘s 
consequences—which, in the case of Mexico, include the spread of instability and the 
breakdown of the national popular formation.  
I chart this process of creating of meaning for the consequences of finance through 
detailed discussions of a single text, Jorge Volpi‘s En Busca de Klingsor (1999). I approach the 
problem in this way because a close, careful reading of Volpi‘s novel is a means to track the 
production of new figures and categories—which are frequently more ephemeral in other forms 
of more popular discourse and therefore more difficult to pin down—for interpreting Mexican 
social and cultural life in the aftermath of finance. My readings attempt, then, to establish lines 
of response to the twin crises of state and finance in Volpi and then open out from there onto the 
larger sphere of Mexican popular discourse. In particular, I examine how Volpi‘s work responds 
to new forms of indeterminacy and instability put into circulation by the widening gap between 
the real and the fictitious of finance with a turn towards ontology—which I understand in very 
baseline terms as a concern with the nature of being or the structure and existence of the material 
world. Volpi‘s novel, faced with the breakdown of the structures of the national popular, 
regrounds social control in ontology and ontological division, which is opposed, I will argue, to 
the play of representation that founds the imaginary of the national popular moment. In the 
second half of the chapter, I argue that in Volpi‘s work we can also see the elaboration of a new 
theory of history, one that responds to the specific form of subaltern financial crisis that unfolds 
in Mexico. By way of conclusion, I turn out from Volpi to left academic social theory more 
generally to argue that Volpi‘s turn to ontology—rather than an isolated instance—has been a 
42 
 
common move across many versions of social theory since the 1980s and 90s where ontology 
has also been used as a solution to the new forms of indeterminacy produced by the rise of 
finance. 
 
Instability, or What Finance Makes Possible 
Within U.S. and Latin American theoretical circles today, the two most common 
explanatory frameworks for the turn to finance, post-Keynsianism and post-workerism, both read 
finance as predatory or speculative with respect to the ―real‖ or productive economy.
29
 Instead of 
seeing this turn to finance as merely speculative, I see finance, following the work of Joshua 
Clover and Annie McClanahan, as a form of temporal arbitrage or as a means of realizing future 
surplus value in the present and, as such, intimately connected (rather than opposed) to 
production. Reading finance and production together, as opposed to seeing finance as parasitical 
on the ―real‖ economy, is necessary if our goal is to grasp the turn to finance materially, that is as 
a specific form of accumulation, as opposed to explaining it away as a kind of mania, lack of 
regulation, or set of bad behaviors engaged in by irresponsible actors. To grasp how finance has 
changed the landscape of Mexican cultural and social life, we have to see finance not as coming 
from outside to corrupt good forms of production, but rather as emerging from within production 
itself to solve problems of declining profitability and as part of the quest for new forms of 
accumulation. 
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This approach of reading finance and production together remits back to Marx‘s 
fragmentary work on credit and finance capital in the three volumes of Capital. Generally 
speaking for Marx, finance and credit are important in simple production processes because they 
enable the immediate or precipitous realization of a commodity‘s value. To take a basic example, 
imagine a factory producing blue jeans. A capitalist sinks several million dollars into materials 
and labor for production. However, instead of waiting to have to sell each and every pair of jeans 
to then reinvest that money in the business, the capitalist is able to borrow money against the 
eventual sale of his commodities to continue the production of jeans without having to wait for 
their actual sale. Thus, credit or finance are not, by nature, supplementary to or predatory upon 
processes of production but rather, at a certain level of capitalist development, essential, 
necessary to keep production flowing smoothly.  
What the presence of finance in production makes possible, however, is new forms of 
crisis or instability and their possible expansion. Credit, in our example of blue jeans, intervenes 
in accumulation by shortening the temporal distance between the production of a commodity and 
the realization of its value. It is precisely in this way that finance nurtures new possibilities for 
instability, speculation, and crisis in accumulation. Kojin Karatani has recently re-read Marx‘s 
critique of capital, privileging both credit and, what he terms, its salto mortale and linking them 
to crisis. He writes: 
Classical economists believe that a commodity is a synthesis between use value and 
exchange value. But this is only an ex post facto recognition. Lurking behind this 
synthesis as event is a ―fatal leap‖ [salto mortale]. Kierkegaard saw the human being as a 
synthesis between finity and infinity, reminding us that what is at stake in this synthesis is 
inevitable ‗faith.‘ In commodity exchange, the equivalent religious moment appears as 
‗credit.‘ Credit, the treaty of presuming that a commodity can be sold in advance, is an 
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institutionalization of postponing the critical moment of selling a commodity. And the 




Finance, speculation, and credit—which all accompany commodity production in some form—
are all leaps into the unknown because they are claims on future value that may or may not be 
realized. I can loan you 1,000 dollars to produce jeans anticipating your business will continue to 
grow (that is, anticipating my claim on your future production will be able to be paid in full), but 
if your workers go on strike or if a new technology revolutionizes textile production, then I 
might not get my money back. Thus, in the salto mortale between commodity production and 
selling, a salto covered by credit, lies the potential for finance to generate special kinds of 
instability. In the 1970s, Mexico borrowed heavily against anticipated oil production revenues 
and this same form of potential instability was introduced, but on a massive scale across many 
actors and national spaces. When Mexico declared a moratorium on debt payments in 1982, the 
potential instability became a true interruption, a real crisis. 
The turn to financial forms of accumulation in the 1970s, via means such as foreign debt, 
currency arbitrage, business and personal lending, seeded, in a mass way, this kind of instability 
across all levels of the global economy and national social formations. Finance can result in 
speculation and predation, but its instability is not the result of behaviors or lack of regulation 
but rather is structural to finance itself and embryonic within capitalist production. That is, 
finance is the rise of new ways and means of exploiting (through shortening or elongating) the 
gap between the moment of a production of a commodity and the moment of the realization of its 
value. And because finance involves not the production of value, but rather a claim on future 
value, it generates instability in two ways. First, as a claim upon future value, credit or financial 
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instruments are always subject to potential non-repayment. Second, financial instruments, 
because of their degree of remove from the commodities or values that underlie them, frequently 
result in the creation of fictitious value, in bubbles or booms, or a widening gap between the real 
value of assets and what people are willing to imagine they might be worth in the future or 
present. Indeed, all of the most important new financial instruments that are created in the post-
73 period (securitization, derivatives, options, swaps, etc.) as well as the new financial dispositifs 
(exchange rate arbitrage, cross-currency lending, global bonds, etc.) end up producing massive 
amounts of fictitious value and result in the booms and bubbles that have populated this period 
both in the global North and South. The turn to finance, globally, amplifies the potential for 
instability, interrupted accumulation, and crisis.
31
  
The potential for instability and crisis is, therefore, inherent in finance. But in Mexico, 
the figure of crisis itself became the primary discursive figure around which meaning of 
finance‘s rise was produced. Crisis or instability became a central category through which the 
post-1982 world was lived; indeed, as Claudio Lomnitz notes, the period after 1982 came to be 
known in popular discourse in Mexico simply as la crisis. La crisis serves as a polysemic figure 
that names all the effects of finance‘s rise: declining wages, government corruption, mass 
unemployment, as well as the experiential forms of shock and uncertainty the pervade the 1980s 
and 1990s in Mexico. Lomnitz‘s work on this period demonstrates the newness of this type of 
(financial) crisis but also the depth to which this figure spread as a lens for understanding the 
events of 1982: 
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Until the events of 1982, the term crisis was most often used by journalists and 
intellectuals, usually in the restricted sense of, for instance, ―the crisis of agriculture‖ or 
―the cyclical crises of capitalism.‖ After 1982, however, when the Mexican government 
could not meet its debt payments, the use of the term became so widespread that this 
whole era, together with its concomitant situations, practices, and sentiments, became 
known as la crisis. (133) 
 
Lomnitz tracks, in ―Times of Crisis‖ and Death and the Idea of Mexico, the impact of la crisis on 
Mexican popular culture. In particular, in ―Times of Crisis,‖ he examines how the ―present 
saturation‖ of the crisis—characterized by a ―reluctance to socialize viable and desirable images 
of a future‖—gave rise to a breakdown in the temporalities of progress of the national popular. I 
argue that la crisis had another impact on the national popular formation: it was both a sign and 
cause of the national popular‘s breakdown, its material and symbolic inability to do the work of 
fusing subjects into the nation. Jorge Volpi‘s En busca de Klingsor is an exemplary text, first, 
because it deeply engages the figure of crisis in the form of a sustained meditation on 
indeterminacy and, second, because it is a site where we can see one way in which the form of 
social control exercised by the national popular was reworked—in this case, in a move from 
representation to ontology.  
 
Klingsor, Hard Indeterminacy, and Moralism 
Klingsor is the novel, after it was selected for the Biblioteca Breve prize that established 
Volpi and the Crack generation as a Mexican and international literary phenomenon. Criticism of 
Volpi‘s work more generally, and of the novel itself, has primarily take place within the larger 
debate in the field of Latin American literary studies of the limits and/or end of autonomous 
literary practice, or what Carlos J. Alonso has called ―the novel without literature‖ (―The Novel 
Without Literature‖ 3). Within these debates, some readers such as Ignacio Sánchez Prado see in 
Volpi a potential opening to a literary cosmopolitanism and/or site for reimagining the nation 
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from the position of literary autonomy (Naciones Intelectuales 245). Others, such as Cristobal 
Pera, have stressed the post-national aspects of Volpi‘s literary production, while Wilfrido H. 
Corral and Lidia Santos have questioned the political horizons of Volpi‘s notion of the literary.
32
 
Instead of focusing on the novel‘s possible or improbable politics of cosmopolitanism I 
locate Klingsor‘s political intervention on another level; namely, in its concern with 
indeterminacy, uncertainty, and chance, as it is here that the novel engages with and presents its 
own articulation of the discursive figures emerging from Mexico‘s on-going financial crises. 
Klingsor develops what I term a ―hard indeterminist‖ vision of the natural and social worlds, 
wherein chance and uncertainty are foundational and overcome any attempt to construct a stable 
world. However, for all its emphasis on a kind of totalizing indeterminism, I argue that Klingsor, 
in key moments, reintroduces forms of determinism, in particular as a means of conditioning the 
political.  
I forward a reading of Klingsor not in the ambit of the transformation of the literary by 
―globalization,‖ but rather as a laboratory for the rearticulation of state power and its discursive 
supports. The twin crisis of the state and finance dealt serious blows to the state imaginary 
derived from the Mexican Revolution and its institutionalization. As Nicola Miller and others 
have noted, the literary has played an important role in Latin America through the twentieth 
century as a site for the elaboration of state forms of ideology or the elaboration of forms of 
thought within a state-defined field of literary autonomy.
33
 It is no surprise that it is in the literary 
field in Mexico in the 1990s where we find serious engagements with and attempts at 
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rearticulating and refounding the national popular imaginary. In Volpi, this rearticulation will 
occur in a transition from a system of control based in representation, the sin qua non of the 
national popular, to one based in ontology, understood in a very general way as a concern with 
the nature of being or the structure and existence of the material world. The novel‘s ontological 
principles give rise to its thinking of the political; namely, as a division between those who 
respect the indeterminacy in the heart of the natural world and those who attempt to overcome it 
and fall into madness, evil, and moral wrong.  
En busca de Klingsor (1999) recounts the imbrication of two events: the scientific 
debates concerning chance and causality after the discovery of relativity and the last days of the 
Nazi regime. The novel opens with a young physicist Francis P. Bacon, whom we first encounter 
as a graduate student studying in Princeton at the Institute for Advanced Study. Bacon, while 
brilliant, is a melancholic figure and due to a series of failed relationships which spill over into 
his professional life, he takes a leave of absence and joins a special U.S. military mission at the 
end of the Second World War. The mission is to track down Nazi physicists, but it quickly turns 
into a much more personal and ambiguous task. Once Bacon encounters the German 
mathematician and narrator of the novel, Gustav Links, the novel turns into a search for 
Klingsor, a mythical figure who may or may not have been in charge of a series of secret Nazi 
science programs. The catch is that neither Bacon nor Links know if Klingsor actually existed or 
not and, moreover, it is possible that Links is playing a double game either leading Bacon on a 
wild-goose chase or actually concealing his identity as the real Klingsor. Famously, the novel 
ends without revealing the identity of Klingsor, leaving readers to dwell on their doubts as to his 
existence and their suspicions as to his person.  
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Klingsor draws both on the genres of the detective novel and the novel of ideas and it is 
the ideas, namely the discovery of chance, indeterminacy, and uncertainty by twentieth century 
physics, that create the conditions of possibility for the detective novel as the indeterminate and 
impossible search for Klingsor. A good part of the novel is concerned with presenting the 
opinions of famous early twentieth-century physicists such as Max Planck, Johannes Stark, 
Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, and Neils Bohr, as to the meaning of quantum theory. 
Volpi‘s presentation of their views, as we will see below, turns around the implications of 
relativity, Heisenberg‘s uncertainty, and Gödel‘s incompleteness theorem for human morality. 
Klingsor, as a novel of ideas, spends much time on discussions of what we might call natural 
philosophy or in more modern parlance, ontology. While on one textual level Klingsor walks the 
reader through various modern perspectives on indeterminacy, on another level it illustrates them 
in a detective story of a failed and impossible search for a shadowy figure whose very existence 
no one can even confirm. 
 Indeterminacy, understood as the breakdown of causality and thus of human inability to 
produce knowledge about the natural and social world, is foregrounded from the very beginning 
of Klingsor. In the preface the novel‘s narrator Gustav Links, a German mathematician, opens by 
discussing a failed assassination attempt against Hitler in which he participated and for which he 
was consequently tried. Links, however, was saved from a sure sentence of death when an Allied 
bombing raid caused a wall to fall on and kill the judge presiding at his trial. A stroke of fate also 
saved Hitler from being killed by Links and his compatriots‘ plan and, as Link notes, ―On the 
morning of February 3, 1945, a similar kind of luck saved my own life‖ (6). Links reveals 
himself to be obsessed with fate and the connection between these two seemingly random events: 
―Why do I insist, so many years after the fact, to connect these two unrelated incidents? Why do 
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I continue to present them as one, as if they were manifestations of one single act of will?‖ (6) 
The novel sets up here the peculiar tension between indeterminacy and determinacy, or between 
chance and causality, which it consequently seeks to develop. On the one hand Links, as an early 
twentieth century mathematician with close connections to the modern physics community, is a 
proponent of uncertainty and chance as a foundational part of the natural world. On the other, 
Links also clearly demonstrates a desire or belief that events are not just random, but that there is 
a hand (―a single act of will‖) guiding the movement of the world, of history, and of our lives. It 
is this tension, which we might call Klingsor‘s paradox, or a desire for determinism in a fully 
indeterminate world that I will trace below.  
The following paragraph takes this tension and explicitly turns it into a frame for the 
novel itself; into the very reason why Links has decided to write it, to recount this history: 
Perhaps because other unforeseeable circumstances, no less terrible than these, have 
forced me to write these words. Perhaps I string together these seemingly unrelated 
events—Hitler‘s salvation and my own—because this is the first time that humanity has 
been such a close witness to such catastrophic destruction. And our era, unlike other 
historical moments, has been largely determined by such twists of fate, those little signs 
that remind us of the ungovernable, chaotic nature of the realm in which we live. I 
propose, then, to tell the story of the century. My century. My version of how fate [azar] 
has ruled the world, and of how we men of science try in vain to domesticate its fury. (6) 
The history of the twentieth century, then, is that of azar, which the translator has chosen to 
render as ―fate‖ instead of the perhaps closer English translation of ―chance.‖ But the choice of 
fate, I think does capture something about Volpi approach to the concept of chance or azar 
throughout Klingsor. What fate captures is, on the one hand, a sense of chance occurrence, that 
is, of events linked by neither rhyme nor reason. But on the other, there is fate as the sense of a 
divinely pre-ordained plan. This is reflected in how the novel positions indeterminacy as a 
fundamental ontology (―nobody was safe in a world that was suddenly dominated by 
uncertainty‖ [72]), while at the same time it registers a longing for, and, as we will see, 
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 Perhaps readers whose ears are attuned to the debates in twentieth century physics or 
philosophy have started to pick up on a certain slippage in terms. Do not uncertainty, chance, and 
indeterminacy derive from different sites of intellectual production and pitch themselves at 
different conceptual registers? They do, in fact. But this is a conflation that is essential to the 
novel‘s presentation of its full indeterminate ―world‖ as a result of the early twentieth century 
discoveries of relativity and quantum physics. To explain why this conflation is so critical to the 
novel, we should turn to a key passage in the opening chapter of the book‘s final part, ―Laws of 
Traitorous Motion‖: 
If, as stated by Gödel‘s theorem, every axiomatic system contains undecidable 
propositions; if, as stated by Einstein‘s relativity, absolute time and space do not exist; if, 
as postulated by the rules of quantum physics and as a consequence of the uncertainty 
principle, science can offer only vague and random approximations of the cosmos—then 
we can no longer rely on causality as an accurate predictor of the future. And if specific 
individuals possess only specific truths, then all of us—made up of the same material of 
which atoms are made—are the result of paradox and impossibility. Our convictions can 
only be considered half-truths. (314) 
This passage collapses a number of different kinds of uncertainty and indeterminacy: logical, in 
the case of Gödel; macroscopic, that is, occurring in significant forms only in special cases near 
the speed of light, in the case of Einstein; and microscopic, in the case of the uncertainty 
principle. In so doing this passage overpowers the local constraints of any of these individual 
theories and constructs a sweeping vision of the natural and social worlds as radically 
indeterminate, as a place where knowledge is not just uncertain or improbable, but, in fact, 
impossible.  
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In order to demonstrate how this is an over-interpretation of the individual theories at 
hand, I will focus just on the uncertainty principle. Heisenberg‘s uncertainty principle in its 
classic form states that it is not possible to know exactly both the position and momentum of a 
particle. It is a localized statement, as Heisenberg and Bohr very clearly explained, regarding the 
limits of the accuracy of observational knowledge on the quantum level. Moreover, it is a 
statement which only has any sense when read against Newtonian mechanics. In classical 
Newtonian mechanics, if one knows the position and velocity of an object/particle one can 
predict the objects‘ position and velocity at any future moment (assuming a closed system). 
What the uncertainty principle says is merely that this kind of total knowledge is no longer 
possible once we are on the quantum level. There are two key caveats here. First, as most early 
twentieth century quantum theorists argued, classical mechanics and tools of observation 
continued to function just fine in the large-scale macro world. Second, the uncertainty principle, 
on the quantum level, does not mean that no predication is possible. What holds on the quantum 
level is not the mechanical causality of Newtonian physics but statistical probability. Thus, the 
uncertainty principle does not mean either that there is no causality nor that we can have no 
knowledge of quantum particles, but rather that the causality operative on this level and our 
knowledge of it do not take the form of classical mechanics. 
The novel‘s presentation of the uncertainty principle and of the way it is collapsed with 
other forms of indeterminacy takes the results of Gödel, Einstein, and Heisenberg far beyond 
their logical conclusions. As we can see in the above quote, the novel‘s vision of the natural 
world is of a universe in which neither causality nor knowledge are possible. This is a vision of 
ontology we might describe as ―hard indeterminist‖. Hard indeterminacy would be a position 
which believes that any micro form of uncertainty or indeterminacy implies the total cancelation 
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of any form of causality and the casting into doubt of any possibility of knowledge. Klingsor‘s 
vision is hard indeterminist in this respect: since the quantum world possesses some degree of 
indeterminacy then the whole of the natural, human, and social worlds are radically, 
irredeemably indeterminate.  
Having said this, however, what makes the novel a complex literary text is that while it is 
on the one hand a novel of ideas that advances, or is motivated by, a hard indeterminist vision of 
the natural world, it is also a novel that is very concerned with parsing and delimiting boundaries 
between good and evil. Thus, while the novel advances an ontology of savage indeterminacy it 
also attempts to find grounds if not for the securing of moral certainties, then at least for 
preventing the slide into totalitarianism and madness. In short, Klingsor is a novel that postulates 
a world of hard indeterminacy and then attempts to locate bases from which to construct a moral 
and political order. However, and it is important to emphasize this point: while the novel 
constructs a moral and political order out of its fundamental ontology it does so in a tendential 
way. That is, the novel does not posit that disrespecting hard indeterminism always outs as 
totalitarian but rather that that it tends to. The novel does not propose a hard-wired structure 
between its ontology and political order (that would be too obviously deterministic and a 
contradiction too easily refuted). Klingsor‘s method of securing moral order is to reintroduce 
determinism via the backdoor while always providing an escape hatch of plausible deniability 
that the novel is in itself not deterministic.
35
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 The most important escape hatch is, of course, the novel‘s ending where the question of who is Klingsor is left 
unresolved. This means of conclusion gives the author (or any other critic for that matter) the ability to negate or 
invert any critical judgment of the novel by simply saying the ending shows that the novel, in fact, either questions 
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actually occurs in the novel (and its over 400+ pages of content), and that is where we have to examine the issue of 
the relation between ontology and moral order. Thus, when I say there is not a hard-wired connection between 
ontology and politics in the novel it means that there is, indeed, textual evidence for certain characters who avoid the 
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While not all characters who defy indeterminacy end up in totalitarianism, many do and 
throughout the novel, much of the textual conversation around how ontology and politics are 
linked is concerned with how a refusal to recognize the indeterminacy at the heart of the natural 
world opens the door to illiberalism. In one example of this, sticking with the same section of the 
novel that we discussed above, we read: 
LAW I: All men are weak 
Why are we weak? For a very simple reason: We cannot predict the future. We live in an 
eternal present, obsessed with deciphering the future….Amid this perpetual state of 
confusion, there is always someone ready and waiting to take advantage of everyone 
else‘s blindness to assuage his own fears….Fully convinced of his purpose, he toils for 
the good of his people, his race, his friends, his family, or his lovers (as the case may be), 
imposing his own faith upon the prevailing uncertainty. All the truth he proclaims is an 
act of violence, pretense, chicanery. And how does a weak man become strong? Very 
simple. Any man who can convince other people—other weak people—that he knows 
what the future holds is a man who will be able to rise above and control his peers. (313) 
This, then, is one version of Klingsor‘s tendential linking of its ontological vision with a political 
horizon. As we saw above, modern physics‘ discovery of uncertainty at the heart of the natural 
world has cancelled all causality. Politics enters—since it is the failure to obey or acknowledge 
this cancellation that has created totalitarian political regimes—led by men who convince others 
that they can overcome the fundamental indeterminacy of the natural world by leading human 
communities toward a goal, a better land, etc. But in its very gesture of making this connection 
the novel violates its own principle: in making the point that totalitarianism arises from the 
failure to obey indeterminacy Klingsor, in this moment, surreptitiously reintroduces a form of 
determinism in the form of a conditioning of the political by the ontological. Thus, as much as 
the novel advances or derives its worldview from a hard, radical, or all-encompassing 
indeterminism, it reintroduces, at key moments, deterministic or causal linkages between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
slide into totalitarianism even though they do not fully respect the mandates of indeterminacy. However, if one looks 
at the majority of the textual conversation around the politics and ontology connection and the general framing of 
these conversations, the novel intimates and tendentially links a refusal of indeterminacy with the potential for 
illiberalism. One of key moves of the novel is that it actively tries to cover its tracks while doing this. 
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natural world and the political in the form of a regulating, moral shorthand. As such, the novel 
reintroduces determinism and order after having banished them, and it does so by having the 
ontological condition and limit the political, or what is possible or acceptable, in the political 
field.  
In Klingsor, only by respecting not our inability to know but, rather, the ontological 
barrier that means we can know nothing can we avoid a slide into totalitarianism. In the world of 
the novel we cannot overcome this desire because it is conditioned by the facticity of the world 
as such; thus, we can only resist the temptation. Politics in the novel is then transmuted into a 
moral struggle to resist the temptation to counter ontology. Bacon‘s interview of Edwin 
Schrödinger is another point wherein the novel weakly distends ontological uncertainty into a 
catastrophic political tendency: 
―In that case Professor, do you think that the uncertainty established by quantum 
mechanics was Heisenberg‘s way of celebrating free will somehow?‖ asked Bacon, 
suddenly philosophical. 
―That was what Pascual Jordan, one of his colleagues, believed. And Jordan, 
you‘ll recall, was an ardent admirer of the Nazis for many, many years. Jordan thought 
that given the indeterminate quality of the natural world, it was man‘s obligation to go 
around filling in the holes that nature left empty. How, you might ask? Through the force 
of will. It is an ancient and, I‘m afraid, rather tyrannical notion. Since the universe is 
vague and unclear, truth is on the side of the fittest. The difference between good and 
evil, right and wrong, should be determined by those who have the power to do so—that 
is, men who possess an iron will.‖ 
―Let me see if I understand this, Professor,‖ Bacon said, taking a deep breath. 
―According to this philosophy, the origins of free will can be found in the randomness of 
the quantum, relativistic universe.‖ 
―That‘s what they believed. That the cosmos is made complete by our acts of 
will.‖ 
 ―You don‘t agree, do you?‖ 
―Absolutely not!‖ Erwin exclaimed, horrified… (245-6) 
 
 The Nazi sympathizers who accept the indeterminacy of modern physics represent the 
opposite position to the one that is, generally speaking, positively coded by the novel. They 
believe in a radical indeterminacy but they think that this means that the moral order has been 
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voided, that the distinction between good and evil should be decided by superior individuals who 
possess an ―iron will.‖ They, much like the weak man who becomes strong, believe that 
indeterminacy means that the strong should rule, that ―the cosmos is made complete by our acts 
of will.‖ In this way, Klingsor constructs a division between those who respect the indeterminacy 
in the heart of the natural world and those who attempt to overcome it. Those who fall into the 
latter category are pushed outside the human community, and fall into madness, evil, and 
totalitarianism. The failure to respect the indeterminacy that founds Volpi‘s ontology creates an 
ontological division in the human, marked by an absolute divide.  
 
From Representation to Ontology: The Breakdown of the National Popular 
Frequently, the period of the 1980s and 90s is read under the sign of neoliberalism, in 
which neoliberalism signals both the restructuring of the Mexican state and the process of 
―opening‖ or ―liberalizing‖ the economy. However, the decades of the 1980s and 90s were not 
only the decades of liberalization but also the decades of a global turn towards finance and, in 
Mexico, of on-going financial crisis. The historical argument that I want to advance is that we 
have to see this period as, on the one hand, the moment of neoliberalism (or the decomposition 
of the national popular state) but at the same time as the moment of the global rise of finance 
which is what sets off the national popular‘s final breakdown.
36
 Klingsor represents, in the face 
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 My approach to reading the transformations in the Mexican state-form in the 1980s and 90s will be to discuss 
these changes through the language of the breakdown of the national popular state. I use this language here instead 
of the language of neoliberalism, simply because for my particular argument I need to be able to discuss a longer 
historical transformation of the state and the language of national popular breakdown enables me to do this—in 
particular it allows me, in the following section, to track a shift in technologies of the state and cultural production 
from representation to ontology. Frequently, neoliberalism is a process whose primary historical moment is seen as 
being located in the early to late 1990s in Mexico (some accounts would go back to the late 1980s but no further). 
Part of my theoretical intervention in using the language of national popular breakdown is to indicate that the 
temporality of the transformation of the state is actually of a much longer durée. It would not be impossible to get 
the language of neoliberalism to do this work but I have chosen to foreground its limits in the hopes of generating a 
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of decades of financial crisis and the breakdown in the national popular state form, an attempt to 
create a new technology of social regulation. The turn to ontology, or what we might call the 
construction of worlds, that we can see in Klingsor responds to the breakdown of the primary 
technology of social integration of the national popular state, the management of representation. 
Gareth Williams, in Other Side of the Popular, has described the form of the national-
popular as, in part, a regime of management of ―fictive ethnicity‖ (a term he takes from Étienne 
Balibar). The national popular manages the play of representations and images, the construction 
of the state‘s fictive, although by no means less real, unity. Williams writes: 
Indeed, it is through populism‘s repeated attempts to convey an image of national 
community, and therefore through the modernizing elite‘s attempts to convey the nation 
as a utopic commonality thought and negotiated from above, that language and race (as 
―the most natural of origins‖ of identity [96]) become foundational protagonists in the 
construction of the people as a recognizably autonomous group and as the embodiment of 
the ideal (national) community. (36) 
 
We might take Octavio Paz‘s Labyrinth of Solitude (1950) as a quintessential work of social 
integration via the management of representations. Labyrinth famously opens with the other, the 
pachuco, who Paz presents as one of the ―extremes‖ of any potential Mexican identity. In 
Labyrinth, written during the Alemán presidency and during the first turn away from the national 
popular and toward international multinational and finance capital, we have an attempt to repair 
and reintegrate the social imaginary of the national popular.
37
 The fissures, the non-modern 
indigenous others and the outliers, the pachucos and pelados, are registered at the essay‘s 
beginning, and Labyrinth then moves on to construct a presumptive people not through a turn to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
productive conversation around them; my aim is not to close off conversation around what we mean by the term, but 
rather to open it up. 
37
 To a much greater extent than other works on Mexican national identity, such as Samuel Ramos‘ Profile of Man 
and Culture in Mexico, the cracks in national identity are central, we might even say that they motivate, Paz‘s 
account: ―My thoughts are not concerned with the total population of our country, but rather with a specific group 
made up of those who are conscious of themselves, for one reason or another, as Mexican…. Our territory is 
inhabited by a number of races speaking different languages and living on different historical levels‖ (11). 
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ontology but by managing the play of representations, by caulking, subsuming, or excluding 
marginal groups into or from the national imaginary.   
From the very first paragraphs of the Crack generation‘s central polemical text, the 
Manifiesto Crack (2000), the breakdown of the national popular machinery of representation is 
foregrounded. After the destabilizing financial crises of the 1980s and 90s the question of cracks 
and the people returns, but in an entirely new form. What the Crack manifesto registers is that 
the primary threat is no longer of splits internal to national popular subjectivity, splits which 
might undo its coherence, but rather a threat from outside that destabilizes the entire environment 
of the national popular state and subject. The Manifiesto registers this new destabilization of the 
environment of the nation through a discussion of technologies of cultural production. The old 
technologies of fictive ethnicity (the written word) are being overtaken not just in terms of 
market share, but in terms of their fundamental technology—they are two-dimensional, 
occurring on the plane of representation, while the newest technologies create worlds: 
Italo Calvino, I believe, in Six Memos for the Next Millennium, was the one to accurately 
point out the challenges facing the Crack novels. In those pages, Calvino reflected on 
how literature and, above all, narrative have been losing their potential readers to 
technology developed for entertainment: video games, mass media, and, most recently, 
for those who can afford them, virtual reality games through which—oh, paradoxes of 
development—someone with a very modern helmet and anatomical gloves can see, hear, 
and even touch the adventures offered on compact discs. (1) 
 
How to solve this problem? One obvious solution would be to leave behind the technology of the 
book.  But the Crack writers will take another: to move from writing that works from 
identification to writing that constructs worlds: 
It is obvious to point out reality itself is multiple, it comes to us as multifaceted, eternal. 
We need books in which a whole world is revealed to the reader, and can trap them. This 
word has a unique use here. It is not about identification, but the superpositioning of 
worlds which are being talked about. Using all the metaphorical potential of the literary 




This is how I suggest we read En busca de Klingsor: as a proposal to move away from the 
management of the play of representations internal to the national popular, to the structuring of 
worlds and thereby to the political; as a move from fictive ethnicity or representation to 
ontology. This move occurs while the environment of the national popular is being destabilized 
by new forms of predatory financial crises, and as technologies of social integration are being 
rendered unviable from within the switch to a neoliberal state form. No longer able to build a 
national popular subject through a technocracy of images, Volpi moves to ontology, to 
establishing a fundamental structure of the world in order to produce a vision of social and 
political order. In place of a technology of images, or of representation management, we have a 
structuralist functionalism; in place of the bond we have natural philosophy; in place of a 
decision of whether to participate in the nation subjects have a decision to obey the deep 
ontological structure of the social and political field. Those who choose not to obey collapse into 
totalitarianism, violence, and madness opening themselves up to the full measure of the state‘s 
sovereign force. In place of a management of representations we have, then, a morality play, but 
one whose guidelines are not determined by the fully divine, but rather by its weak theological 
substitute: the ontological.  
 
From the Boom to the Crack 
Tracking macroeconomic transformations can help us as literary critics to make sense, as 
well, of the Crack writers‘ complicated relationship to the Boom, which they see as a welcome 
antecedent and ghostly competitor. The Boom, or literatura profunda (―deep literature‖), is both 
what Crack wants to return to (against the debased magical realism of the market), but also, to 
the extent that the Boom is implicated in a post-Cuban revolution pan-Latin Americanism, it is 
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something with which they want to break. It is this pan-Latin American imaginary that subtends 
García Marquez‘s statement on the Boom, ―The group is writing one great novel. We‘re writing 
the first great novel of Latin American man.‖ Perhaps none of the Crack writers has done more 
than Volpi to attack this imaginary, and by proxy the national popular and dependency theories 
that lie behind it.
38
 
As Volpi says in one interview, ―Cuando nací, el boom estaba allí‖ (―When I was born, 
the Boom was there.‖). The Boom was always there—that is, its pan-Latin American imaginary 
and the specific form of national popular politics attached to it, and the specific form of 
integration into the world economy underlying it, already existed. However, by the mid-1970s 
the crisis of world capitalism had already begun and it would soon bring dictatorships, populists, 
and pan-Latin Americanists equally to heel. The brief oil boom starting in earnest in 1976 
enabled the Mexican state to continue patronage of labor and to support key commodity prices. 
But finally, after the U.S. Treasury raised interest rates (the famed Volker shock), the crisis of 
accumulation came home to roost in 1982. A stark choice had to be made: to make the turn to 
finance (monetarizar as it was known then) and socialize the debt onto the working classes and 
poor, or go against the new grain of the IMF and capitalist restructuring. We know the results of 
that decision nationally, but what is not often remarked is how this moment is also the end in 
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 Solidifying this critique and extending it into the moment of the marea rosada is one subject of Volpi‘s El 
Insomnio de Bolívar (2009). No story in the book is more indicative of this complicated relationship than Volpi‘s 
narration of the reception of Klingsor after changing the nationality of the main character from Mexican to US 
American. Volpi writes: 
 
At the end of 1998 I realized that there was something ridiculous that a Mexican, and what‘s more a 
physicist, dedicated himself to hunting Nazis in Germany. Only then I decided, as a simple matter of 
verisimilitude, to change the nationality of my character, who became American and is now called Francis 
Bacon, after the Elizabethan philosopher. In April of 1999 this book, already renamed by Guillermo 
Cabrera Infante as In Search of Klingsor won the Premio Biblioteca Breve, which in its first period had 
been an emblematic point of union between the two shores of the Atlantic, and the press hastened to point 
out that this time it was given to a book by a Mexican who didn‘t seem like a Mexican, a Latin American 
that—strangely enough—did not write about Latin America. That pragmatic decision to transform a 




Mexico of the pan-Latin American imaginary created in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution 
and with the help of the Boom novels. The declining rate of profit forces an Aufhebung, a 
moment of Schumpeter‘s creative destruction, and a new regime of integration into the world 
market destroys a fictitious (criollista) continental unity. As the Boom fades, as the cracks 
multiply, and as the crisis can longer be put off, the imaginary of pan-Latin American unity and 
its national popular figures crumble. If it is the case that ―when I was born, the Boom was 
already there,‖ then when Volpi and Crack came of age the Boom had been backed into la crisis 
of finance.  
The Crack generation and the Boom are both literary movements directly tied to English-
language economic vocabulary and, by means of this anchor, to particular historical regimes, 
moments of accumulation, and geopolitical imaginaries. The Boom references both the good 
years and in Spanish also a suspicion that underlies their effervescence. This is even more the 
case than in the English, for the reappropriation of the word into Spanish carries a fatal realism 
that booms are more often than not bubbles. The Crack, the English loan word used in Spanish to 
denote stock market crashes, such as that of 1987, refers to not a crisis of production but of 
finance: ―One speaks of the crisis in the Anglo-Saxon terms which have taken over the greater 
part of the economic science, as the crack‖ (Mexico ante la crisis, 13). As the Boom fades, the 
Crack surges. From the fading of the structure of accumulation that gave rise to booms in 
production to failed accumulation based in government borrowing and financial crisis—that is, 
crack—the imaginary subtending these moments changes as well.  
These imaginaries are marked, at their root, by two different approaches to worlds. In 
perhaps his most famous essay, ―On the Marvelous Real in America,‖ Alejo Carpentier writes, 
―Because of the virginity of the land, our upbringing, our ontology, the Faustian presence of the 
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Indian and the black man, the revelation constituted by its recent discovery, its fecund racial 
mixing [mestizaje], America is far from using up its wealth of mythologies. After all, what is the 
entire history of America if not a chronicle of the marvelous real?‖ (1995, 88). In the Boom, the 
stable structure of national popular mestizaje (which forms a stable, recognizable ―ontology‖) 
produces a politics of representation and the opening for the exploration of the (potentially) 
utopian difference of the ―marvelous real.‖ The worlds of the Boom are spaces in which the play 
of representation occurs, where the logic of mestizaje plays itself out and where the ontology of 
the space is not in question. But in the Crack generation, as the very foundation of the national 
popular world becomes unstable, cultural production moves to the construction of worlds 
themselves as a counter to the instability of financial forms of accumulation and crisis. As in 
Volpi‘s Klingsor, the human community is thought not through figures of hybridity or 
representational mixing and management but rather through an absolute divide.  
 
Finance, Race, and Division 
On the level of the nation, Klingsor charts and participates in a larger cultural shift away 
from fictive ethnicity and representation to a concern with restablizing ontologies and worlds. As 
Joshua Lund has shown, the apparatus of fictive ethnicity, that of mestizaje in the case of 
Mexico, is at root a racial theory of the nation, even though it is not often recognized as one. If 
Klingsor charts a shift between two regimes of control, what happens to race as the racial 
structure of mestizaje is left behind as a foundational fiction? The literature on shifting forms of 
racialization in Mexico has seen the 1980s and 90s as marked by the rise of important new 
indigenous movements and also as a shift in the state ideology of race, from mestizaje to a 
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neoliberal multiculturalism or pluriculturalism.
39
 Klingsor represents a different, but equally 
important, response to the breakdown of the system of racialized control which had theories of 
mestizaje and lo mexicano at its heart.  
We have seen that the system of control we find in Klinsgor is one in which subjects face 
a choice to obey the ontological structuring of the world—if they do not they are marked or 
tagged as being outside the human community (such as the Nazi sympathizers). However, it is 
important to note that this tagging is tendential—that is, it comes not from the sphere of law 
(concerned with acts and actions, right and wrong) but from the sphere of security, concerned, as 
Foucault has noted, with probability, not with prohibiting but with keeping outcomes within a 
certain acceptable range (Security, Territory, Population 21). In Klingsor, one is not 
unequivocally pushed out of the human community for trespassing on the belief in a radical 
indeterminacy at the heart of the world—rather this distinction is always hovering, like a threat, 
waiting to be applied. An ontological distinction between groups and the threat of potential 
exclusion are what mark one part of the new infrastructure of control in Mexico that emerges out 
of the financial crises and national popular breakdown of the 1980s and 90s.  
Certainly to some readers‘ ears a form of control based in an ontological division 
between two worlds will be a familiar form, as it has served as the basis for a long tradition of 
crude popular and state understanding of the relationship between indigenous and mestizo/ladino 
communities in Latin America.
40
 This then is the racial recoding Volpi‘s novel performs: in a 
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 Key works on this period in Mexico include Rebecca Overmyer-Velázquez‘s Folkloric Poverty Neoliberal 
Multiculturalism in Mexico (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010) and Marilyn 
Grace Miller, Rise and Fall of the Cosmic Race: the Cult of Mestizaje in Latin America (Austin, TX: University of 
Texas Press, 2004). For an influential theorization of neoliberal multiculturalism which many others have drawn on 
see Charles Hale, Más Que Un Indio: Racial Ambivalence and the Paradox of Neoliberal Multiculturalism in 
Guatemala (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2006). 
40
 In The Inner Life of Mestizo Nationalism Estelle Tarica has demonstrated how mestizo nationalism has at its heart 
a form of indigenismo which has served to critique some forms of racial and economic injustice while also 
perpetuating myths and dogmas about indigenous communities. What happens in the security moment I am arguing 
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moment of the decaying of the state racial formation grounded in mestizaje, his novel draws 
upon the other racial formation in circulation and elevates it to the level of a social theory. In the 




In Volpi‘s text we can register the emergence of a new form of thinking the community 
of the nation, one based in the construction of a mobile ontological divide. This is the imaginary 
that begins to concretize, in the popular discursive sphere, around the same time as Volpi‘s novel 
into the figure of the delincuente. A key moment of public visibility of this new racializing 
formation was seen on September 27, 2004, when the NGO México Unido Contra la 
Delincuencia, in association with the conservative business groups Copramex and Canacintra, 
brought out over 350,000 upper and middle class residents of Mexico City, all dressed in white, 
to protest ―insecurity‖ and ―delincuencia.‖
42
 Unlike previous racializing formations that of 
delincuencia is detached from both biology (a phenotypical definition of ―race‖) and culture (a 
concept of ―race‖ based in ethnicity or cultural markers). For who is the delincuente? No one, but 
also everyone. It is a mobile category that can be applied to anyone found dead in the street or 
anyone accused of organizing against the state. It is a category that then morphs in the present 
into the figure of delincuencia organizada, a phrase that dropped so casually and frequently from 
ex-Presidente Felipe Calderón‘s lips as he launched his ―war on los narcos.‖ As we have seen on 
numerous occasions, such as the Masacre de Villas de Salvárcar, where 16 schoolchildren, 
between the ages of 15 and 20, who were brutally murdered at a party, were accused of being 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
is a similar (isomorphic) shift: a decaying mestizaje appropriates not a literary discourse of indigeneity but a brutal 
popular racist one to transform and breathe new life into itself.    
41
 This is not to try to argue, of course, that racial formations and discourses of indigenity disappear, nor to elide the 
lives and experiences of indigenous communities that continue to live under them. Nor the important work that is 
being done tracking shifting relations between indigenous and non-indigenous communities in Mexico. See for 
example Emiko Saldívar ―‘It‘s Not Race, Its Culture‘: Untangling Racial Politics in Mexico‖ (2014). 
42
 México Unido Contra la Delincuencia was founded in 1998 making its emergence co-terminus with the 
publication of Volpi‘s novel, see http://www.mucd.org.mx/  
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This is not to say, of course, that there is still no longer a relevant discourse about 
indigeneity or that racism based on aspirational whiteness has disappeared in Mexico. Moreover, 
this is not to ignore the important changes in the state position towards indigenous communities, 
such as the inclusion of pluricultural language in the Mexican constitution (1992) and allowing 
for forms of indigenous self-governance (2001 for the majority of states).
44
 What we can see in 
the construction of the figure of the delincuente is, rather, another form of adaptation, wherein 
the form that racist discourse took in its popular, vulgar version in the twentieth century has been 
extracted and generalized, but also rendered post-racial. Which is, again, not to say that this 
vulgar racist form is still not in circulation, but rather the state and the far right parts of civil 
society are, especially since the end of the 1990s, relying more on more on the delicuencia 
discourse as a preferred discourse of social control against the poor, marginalized, and 
politicized. At the same time, it is important to note that this shift to a ―post-racial‖ formation is 
without a doubt driven in part by the success of attacks by indigenous groups in the late 1980s 
and 1990s in forcing open the sphere of representational politics whose closure had been justified 
by or explained away with the national popular racial formation.  
Is delicuencia and Volpi‘s ontological divide, then, a racial structure? Is it to the extent 
that it does the work of race or that it is used to police communities and bodies that were marked 
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 Interestingly, this runs somewhat parallel to what happens in the United States where prior versions of either 
biological or culturally sourced versions of ―race‖ are re-coded as race neutral through discourses of ―national 
security threats,‖ ―illegal immigration,‖ and ―urban crime.‖ In this case de-racialized categories are used to do 
similar work as prior racialized ones. What we see in this case in Mexico is the ascendancy of a new set of 
categories which function to mark a potentially even broader set of bodies and populations and in a relatively new 
fashion. Another corollary in the U.S. context would perhaps be the construction post-9/11 of the category of 
―brownness‖ and the way it interpellates new sets of previously unconnected individuals and populations. 
44
 Reforms concerning indigenous self-governance were left by the federal government to individual states. Reforms 




first by biologically or culturally racist discourses. In the twentieth century, the two primary 
racial formations in Mexico, mestizaje and popular racist indigenity, fused some into the nation, 
into certain labor markets and capital flows and excluded many others. Delincuencia does this 
work now but it does so, we might say, without explicit reference to a racialized ―content,‖ by 
other means. Those means are an ontological divide which is mobile, no longer tied to biology, 
culture or territory and governed by an imputed spatial and cultural division between the urban 
and rural, modern and pre-modern. One result is the delincuente names an almost unlimited 
population—having detached itself from biology and culture, this distinction now roams free 
across every potential body and space. Volpi‘s work is not the only source or the most developed 
elaboration these new formations that do the work of racialization, his work participates in their 
construction and is a site where we can register their appearance and, most importantly, grasp 
how a shift to ontology is a necessary condition of their elaboration. 
 
Eschatology and Ontology 
In Volpi‘s work we can register not just a new natural philosophy in the turn to ontology 
but a new theory of history and temporality which, as well, grapples with the historical 
conditions of la crisis and finance‘s rise. Volpi‘s contribution to the Manifesto Crack is titled 
―Donde quedó el fin del mundo?‖ (―Where is the end of the world?‖) In it Volpi offers 
interpretations of the main Crack novels through the lens he variously calls eschatology, chaos, 
or ―el fin del mundo‖:   
The end of the world can be believed and praised, as in Memoria de los dias; can be 
reached by car or train, as in Las Remoras; can be recalled and rebuilt in childhood and in 
the past, as in La conspiración idiota; can be cultivated inside oneself to the point of 
madness, as in Si volviesen sus majestades; and can also be granted to others as an 
infamous Pandora‘s box like in El temperamento melancólico. Be that as it may, in any 
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one of these cases, nobody is free from this last illness, this fifth rider, this plague, and 
this entertainment: this last state of the heart. (8) 
 
What is the connection between what we have been calling ontology and ―the end of the world‖? 
If we return to Klingsor we can rephrase this question as: what happens when history becomes, 
instead of progress, modernization, even as a false horizon, perpetual crisis, a series of false 
starts, a set of uncontrollable events that leads not nowhere—for eschatology is not the end of 
history but its culmination and its horizon—but to unsettled endings, non-knowledge, 
paralysation? In a world of unoperative indeterminacy, like that of Klingsor, history becomes 
catastrophe, the novel becomes eschatological, and the subject becomes structured not by the 
other as in Paz but by the experience of catastrophe. When events have no causes, when every 
event is a golpe, history is not over but rather can only be experienced as catastrophe. 
We need to specify what we mean by catastrophe, particularly because Volpi‘s sense of 
catastrophe is one of the central moments of a transmission of a new conceptual figure of finance 
into the novel. In the twentieth century, there have been two important loci for the thinking of 
catastrophe. In the first, moving out of the work of Heidegger and post-Holocaust philosophers 
like Jean Améry, catastrophe serves as a synonym for the depredations of modernity, technology, 
and the way they can combine to produce events like the Holocaust. The second is based in the 
work of Walter Benjamin: ―The concept of progress must be grounded in the idea of catastrophe. 
That things continue to ‗go on‘ is the catastrophe‖ (Arcades 473, trans mod). For Benjamin, 
whose notion of catastrophe was elaborated under the conditions of German hyperinflation, or a 
moment of early twentieth century financial crisis, the catastrophe is the relentlessness of time 
continuing to move forward, the angel with its back turned with the debris of modernity pilling 
up against its wings, the fact that no one has yet pulled the emergency break.  
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Starting in the 1980s in the global North, catastrophe was rearticulated in a new context: 
the financialized economy. New senses of catastrophe emerged out of two parallel financialized 
shifts that began in the 1970s at the end of the post-war boom. The first is the shift from the 
large-scale pooling of risks common to the welfare state to neoliberal forms of individualized 
risk such as 401ks, personal health plans, and adjustable rate mortgages.
45
 The second is the turn 
to finance as a means of compensating for failing accumulation. With these forms of 
financialization, a new theorization of catastrophe emerges and spreads into popular cultural life 
in the global North: the catastrophic risk of the near future, the black swan.
46
 
―Black swan‖ was a term used in 2001 by Nassim Nicholas Taleb to describe catastrophic 
events—particularly financial ones—that occur without warning and partake in a characteristic 
particular to fields involving organic and non-organic matter (e.g. economics, biology, history), 
namely, that of extreme discontinuity.
47
 Simply put, black swans are events that are nearly 
impossible to predict based upon known conditions; they exist, then, neither in the present nor 
the future, but rather in the ever-receding horizon of the near future. Taleb‘s theory circulated 
widely and served both as an explanation of financial crises and as an analysis of the emergence 
of this new form of financialized risk. Indeed, many of the innovations underpinning the post-73 
regime of finance-led accumulation, such as derivatives, swaps, and options, attempt to profit 
from or protect against near-future events, thus turning this temporal space into an important 
object of knowledge. The problem, of course, for both accumulation and prediction is that the 
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 The pace and form of the spread of these new instruments of finance is much different in 
Mexico, however. The dismantling of the pension system doesn‘t begin until 1997, and, while 
derivatives and securitization play a major role directly before the 1994 crisis, they are not 
widely discussed or theorized in the popular press. The forms of catastrophe that works like 
Klingsor meditate upon and mediate are those resulting not from near-future risk, but on-going 
financial crisis, such as those seen in 1982, 1987, and 1994, and this gives the elaboration of 
catastrophe as a theory of history in Mexican popular and high culture its special form and 
feeling. If the rise of the finance in the global North is associated with the figure of the near 
future and cataclysm, in Mexico catastrophe is less heroic, less singular—instead of majestic 
black swans we have fizzled ugly ducklings, instead of cataclysm breakdown, we have perpetual 
crisis with no endpoint in sight. 
 Examples of catastrophe proliferate across Klingsor, from Bacon‘ love life to the actual 
building of the atomic bomb, but one of the most interesting is the scene that opens the novel, in 
the novel‘s preface which brings together the thematics of catastrophe, indeterminacy, and the 
slide into totalitarian will. The preface takes the form of a letter by the novel‘s narrator Gustav 
Links, but the preface is structured as a short story, rather than a letter, and opens with a voice 
saying ―Basta de luz!‖ (―Cut the light!‖) That voice is Hitler‘s and the preface recounts, from not 
a first-person perspective, but rather an omniscient one, Hitler, as his regime crumbles around 
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him, watching and rewatching films made especially for him of the torture of the enemies of his 
regime.  
The opening set up of this scene links together political violence (as the antithesis of 
liberalism, of Volpi‘s vision of civil society) with fanatical, excessive pleasure and repetition: 
―With the enthusiasm of a child who listens again to his favorite story, Hitler savored for the 
umpteenth time the show‖ (11).The fall of the Reich is imminent; Hitler is ―obsessed with the 
irreality of cinema.‖ What is Hitler‘s mistake, why does he live in an ―irreality‖? Hitler still 
believes in determinism, in cause and effect, and this is the source of his pleasure in the 
repetition of this cinematic irreality: ―The succession of causes and effects began their ritual 
cycle, celebrating again and again this feeling that was provoked in him by news coming from 
the front…‖ (12).Causes and effects, preceding and proceeding from each other: this is irreality. 
What instead is the true nature of history? Links illustrates it as he moves from recounting the 
perverse repetition of Hitler‘s illiberalism based in the irreality of determinism to history as 
chance, catastrophe, and ―golpes de suerte‖ (―blows of fate‖). 
The first narrative of chance is a failed assassination attempt against Hitler. The attempt 
fails because of ―a minimal error of calculation—a triviality: one of the bombs could not be 
activated or perhaps the briefcase was too far from the place where Hitler was sitting—sinking 
the plan‖ (13). Links, as a member of the cabal that planned the attack, is captured. However, on 
the day of his trial, Allied forces launch their most intensive bomb attack on Berlin yet, and the 
trial judge is killed when part of the wall collapses and falls on him. Links brings these two 
events together under the sign of chance: ―The afternoon of July 20, 1944, a stroke of luck saved 
Hitler... the morning of February 3, another stroke of luck saved me‖ (18). This presents not just 
the problem of chance, of the end of determinism as ontology for Links, but a problem of an 
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imaginary as well, of the inability to sustain a symbolic, to give meaning: ―Still I don‘t know to 
what extent it is possible to establish a relationship between these two facts. Why do I persist 
then, so many years after those events, in connecting movements of chance which in the 
beginning have nothing to do with each other?‖(18). Here we have another version of the novel‘s 
ontology: reality is indeterminate, believing in determinism tendentially leads to illiberalism. 
Moreover, we have to struggle with our desire to make these kinds of deterministic connections 
between what are random occurrences, mere golpes or blows.   
 Here in the preface as narrated by Links, Volpi connects this ontology of indeterminacy 
to a new figure: catastrophe. If history is nothing but a series of ―blows of fate‖ of unpredictable, 
chance events that occur without warning, then all history is catastrophe. All events are 
catastrophic events, as they occur without warning: even the positive ones, such as being 
liberated from a certain death penalty by the chance collapse of a wall (the connection to the fact 
that Gustav‘s introductory letter to the novel is dated November 10, 1989, the day of the ―fall of 
the Wall‖ should not be missed here): 
Perhaps because other coincidences, no less terrible, have forced me to write these pages, 
if I dare to join facts apparently unconnected, as the salvation of Hitler and my own 
salvation, it is because mankind has never before known so closely forms of disaster. 
Unlike other times, ours has been decided with greater strength than ever by these winks, 
by these demonstrations of the ungovernable Kingdom of chaos. I intend to tell, then, the 
plot of the century. Of my century. My version of how random has ruled the world and 
about how the bombers of science try in vain to tame its fury. (18-9)  
 
The history of the twentieth century, in Volpi‘s version, is the discovery of chance at the 
heart of ontology—and the failure to ―domesticate‖ it. As a result, we have not exactly the end of 
history, but the reign of catastrophe. In the same way that chance as the heart of the ontological 
conditions politics in Volpi, it gives rise to a philosophy of history: one in which all events are 
catastrophic, because they are chance events, they occur without foresight, without rhyme or 
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reason. An ontology of chance gives rise to an obsession with eschatology because it implies the 
end of the symbolic, the end of an ability to see systematicity, that is those larger structures, as 
Elizabeth Wingrove has argued (―Ontology‖ 91), that determine the position of individuals and 
condition at least parts of or at least indirectly individual consciousness and experience. For a 
thinking of systematicity as a structuring of historical experience, Volpi substitutes its negation, 
chaos, repetition, catastrophe, and ―the end of the world.‖
49
 
Thus in Volpi there is only crisis, which first appears similar to the way near-future 
catastrophe comes to be thought in global North discourses, as a singularity. There is, however, a 
key difference; namely, instead of a strictly financialized catastrophe, Volpi‘s catastrophe is a 
subaltern financial one, because the temporality of crisis is different. Crisis or catastrophe is not 
the singularity as it comes to be thought in the North, as what irrupts, rather it is the horizon of 
all experience—in Volpi there is only the zero time or the repetition of catastrophe; that is, there 
are no intermittent long waves of accumulation between the singularities of crises as in the 
financialized conceptions. In Volpi‘s novelistic imaginary, crisis is perpetual, failure is assured, 
and melancholy and paralysation the dominant affective categories (not terror and trauma, which 
is a crucial distinction). While in global North financialization, crisis is a category to be defended 
against, a moment of creative destruction that makes possible a new cycle of accumulation, and, 
as such, it is viewed as sublime, a terror, what leaves traumatic traces deep in the somatic 
subject, and as something to be both dreaded and awed. In Klingsor, instead of majestic and 
dreadful black swans, we have simply fizzled hopes, ongoing crisis, gestures that fail 
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beforehand, searches and investigations that end in frustration, betrayal, giving up. This is the 
affective specificity of financial catastrophe in the periphery. 
We might say that the subjective category of disaster or catastrophe the novel presents is 
unique in these two features: first it is generalized, it sits on the horizon of any social situation 
and second it structures subjectivity turning subjects into paralyzed figures incapable of acting, 
who are only thrown forward by the golpes de suerte that uncertainty rains down upon them. The 
characters of Links and Bacon are structured, to a great extent, by their inability to act, by their 
paralyzation in the face of catastrophe. For them, especially in the case of Bacon, it is not a 
conscious decision, to act or not, to indulge in individual will, he simply is unable to move, to set 
course in a direction. We might say that Bacon and Links are classic figures of the periphery, of 
the melancholy Roger Bartra has so perceptively analyzed, of underdevelopment: they are not 
only always paralyzed before the world, they always lose.  
At the end of Klingsor, after the end of the war, the Soviets have decided that Links is 
Klingsor; Bacon decides not to save him. These are Bacon‘ last words as reported by Links: ―In 
this game we all have lost—were the last words which he said to me. They had been like the kiss 
of Judas. Sorry or not, Bacon had turned me in‖ (440). And so the novel ends, echoing the classic 
figuration of Mexican dependency (so far from God, so close to…): ―...far from God, our 
wounds continue festering for all of eternity‖ (440). Eternal wounds, eternal losers. No matter 
how much the novel appears to subscribe to a ―globalized‖ world (i.e., as a ―Mexican‖ novel 
which does not take place in Mexico), the structures of feeling of dependency return. We can 
only wonder if their permanence is simply a sign of how little has changed between a post-WWII 
moment and the brave new era of globalization‘s level playing field.  
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In Klingsor catastrophe comes to structure the subject—the repeated experience of the 
non-connection of events generates this ―final state of the heart.‖ Klingsor then contains two 
different structures of subjectivity, both of which have at their source the ontology of 
indeterminacy: first, we have the subject‘s struggle against its totalitarian, illiberal desires, its 
desire to see some form of systematicity other than chance behind the world‘s waxing and 
waning and, second, the subjectivity of weariness (a Hegelian term Padilla deploys in the 
Manifesto), of paralysation, created by the repeated experience of history as crisis, which now 
has no narrative, no potential causal structure, which is not quite trauma or traumatic, not quite 
something like shock or terror, but catastrophe and thorough failure. As a register of the 
historical moment of la crisis and its aftermath, Volpi‘s notion of catastrophe captures the new 
disconnections, instabilities, and indeterminism that follow in finance‘s wake, as well as 
something of the abstract, depersonal level that finance operates on.  
I have dwelt on this part of Klingsor because it is here we can register a popular 
conception of historical time which has circulated widely in Mexico. While the ―end of history‖ 
has been widely proclaimed (and critiqued) in the global North, the end of the belief of promises 
of progress and modernity occurred within a different context in Mexico, that of almost twenty 
years of financial crisis. Instead of a sense of history as overcome, we have history as a 
catastrophic and unending series of shocks—ones that occur without rhyme or reason. This 
figure has circulated in popular discourse under the terms desmadre and chaos as descriptors of 
the social situation in Mexico, in particular in urban environments where individuals and the 
material infrastructure of everyday life are very exposed to the consequences of financial 
crises.
50
 Reading Klingsor allows us to register this specific sense of the end of history in its 
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context of peripheral financial crisis. It also allows us to ask a follow up question to Volpi‘s 
proposed solution: that is, whether the only path through these new indeterminisms and 
abstractions is to accept their most extreme versions and make a turn to ontology.  
 
The Long Tail of Catastrophe and Ontology 
 Subjects structured by catastrophe and the concern with ontology do not end with the 
work of Jorge Volpi; rather they have filtered forward into later cultural work and in particular 
into the period of the drug war, where neither the catastrophes nor the instabilities have 
diminished.
51
 For example, Sergio González Rodríguez‘s Mal de Origen (2011) is a kalidescopic 
non-fiction work which turns around notions of the present as catastrophe, lack of the sacred, 
urban disintegration and the potential for culture to be preserving force. The subject we find in 
Mal is one structured, much like Volpi‘s, by catastrophe: 
En otras palabras, el lastre diario de la catástrofe, ese cortocircuito de los vínculos entre 
lo humano y lo inhumano que describe Annie Le Brun: en el fondo de cada persona, 
reside un sentimiento obsesivo de la catástrofe, como un eco lejano de pulsiones de largo 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long Sixties (2013) highlights a student radical desmadre subculture 
which ―stressed extreme short-term hedonism, masculine aggression, disdain of work, spontaneity, and excitement 
performed as an end in itself‖ (76). We can see one example of the word‘s evolution into a metonym for Mexican 
social reality in the aftermath of the 1982 and 1994 crises in Roger Bartra‘s Blood, Ink, and Culture: Miseries and 
Splendors of the Post-Mexican Condition (2002) when he writes: ―We can no longer critique Mexican culture in the 
name of modernity, of a liberal-inspired modernity that raised up the banner of ‗progress.‘ We have to critique 
modernity from the standpoint I call dismodernity, or better yet—taking a cue from desmadre, Mexican slang for 
disorder—dismothernity‖ (9). 
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The issue with this work would be that it conceives of the financial crisis as the result of individual behavior and is 
unable to see how this crisis was the result of on-going crises in production, a situation that will not be solved by re-
regulating the financial sector, restoring production‘s rightful primacy, or castigating the poorly behaving 
speculative financiers and politicians. 
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While in Heriberto Yépez‘s El imperio de la Neomemoria (2007), a book concerned with the 
links between imperialistic U.S. culture and memory, gives its final pages to ontological 
speculation; the universe, as Yépez writes, ―is not‖: 
The world is an archipelago in time. Each universe is a macro-island that in its own 
consistency, pulses. But space-time mutates, and its information is lost forever and where 
before was its body, there is now another obeying different laws, and between universe 
and universe, the illusion of fixity. If synchronically there are parallel universes—each 
ruled by its own laws—also diachronically heteroclite chaosmoses disappear and appear, 
separated from each other by an uncrossable abyss, by a pulsating irregularity. Science 
becomes an absurdity, if it doesn‘t heed that principles discovered today will serve only 
for a certain, indeterminate, perishing space-time, because life is a life always inside 
another death. All memory is temporal. All laws will perish. All history has limits. All 
texture, loses its plot. (251) 
 
Whereas Klingsor grounds its ontology in indeterminacy, Yépez‘s vision of indeterminacy is 
distinct: it is not that there are no rules but rather that the rules can change at any time, that is, 
―all laws perish.‖ Yépez‘s vision both converges and diverges with that of Volpi: it is possible 
that there could be moments of stability (a given set of laws), but it is equally possible that the 
universe could be subject to an even more savage version of indeterminacy with its ontology (its 
―laws‖) transforming every minute or even every second, all without warning or without reason. 
What a reading of Volpi‘s work demonstrates is the deep roots of the tropes of ontology 
and catastrophe within a response to financial and state crisis and their continuing importance, in 
both literary and popular discursive spheres, in the present. As long as capitalists and states 
continue to attempt to solve the long downturn that began in the 1970s with (failed) finance-led 
accumulation, it appears in Mexican cultural production that catastrophe will continue to serve as 
                                                          
52
 Translation: In other words, the daily burden of catastrophe, that shortcircuit between the human and the inhuman 
describe by Annie Le Brun: at the bottom of every person lies an obsessive sense of catastrophe, like a distant echo 




the site of subject formation while ontology will continue to serve as a fraught waystation in the 
storm of the national popular‘s demise and unending financial crisis. 
 
Ontology in its Historicity 
 What we have been calling in this chapter, following Volpi, indeterminacy is a question 
that goes to the very heart of the historical formation of capitalist finance, which has always been 
linked both to states and their war machines and to the science of probability underpinning them 
and problems of belief and decision those sciences and states give rise to. While this is not the 
place for a full discussion of these relations, we can make a few brief gestures towards a 
historical account. Probability, as Ian Hacking has argued, underwent the first of many modern 
revolutions around 1640 as part of a shift to new financial instruments to fund colonial trade and 
exploitation and the military apparatus to support it (Emergence of Probability xx). One way of 
understanding modern probability theory is as the science of limiting chance or as the 
mathematics of the non-deterministic world which finance and financial speculation require. 
 That is, moments of finance-led accumulation requires at least in thought that is engaged 
in supporting this accumulation—or in thought overtaken by its historical conditions—a  
recognition of some form of indeterminacy as a component of the natural, economic, and social 
worlds. This recognition, however, frequently leads to crises of belief (of despair over non-
determination and human‘s inability to parse and predict the future) and a turn to decisionism, as 
states and state reason prefer if not tightly welded, then delimited intellectual formations. This 
despair, so palpable in any moment of finance, is the antechamber of decisionism, and Blaise 
Pascal is perhaps first figure to embody this contradiction between a recognition of 
indeterminacy and a turn back against it that we have been tracing so far in the much later work 
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of Volpi. Pascal, a mathematician who used his theory of probability to prove the existence of 
God before leaving science behind completely. It is perhaps not surprising then that Pascal‘s 
materialist theory of belief (roughly summed up as ―get on your knees and you will eventually 
believe‖) is marshaled by Althusser in the 1970s to describe why proletarian subjectivity has not 
changed more in the moment of the proliferation of instabilities and the breakdown of post-war 
welfare states. Pascal was not the only site for this kind of working through of these new 
conditions; as we have been arguing ontology was another.   
In the preface to the second edition of their Hegmony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and 
Mouffe narrate the theoretical impasse of Marxism in the 1970s. In the face of the ongoing 
restructuring driven by finance‘s rise, there was an increasing gap between capitalist realities and 
what the theory could describe. This gave rise, in their account, to two options: retreat into the 
orthodox bunker or give an ad hoc descriptive account of the new conditions. Laclau and Mouffe 
describe their approach as third, more rigorous option: they seek the preconditions of Marxian 
categories and new possibilities for their use. Their approach however is not just a rethinking but 
rather is cast in terms of renewing the ontological paradigm that underpins Marxist categories:  
There is one aspect in particular that we want to underline at this point. Any substantial 
change in the ontic content of a field of research leads also to a new ontological 
paradigm. Althusser used to say that behind Plato‘s philosophy, there was Greek 
mathematics; behind seventeenth-century rationalism, Galilean physics; and behind 
Kant‘s philosophy, Newtonian theory. To put the argument in a transcendental fashion: 
the strictly ontological question asks how entities have to be, so that the objectivity of a 
particular field is possible. There is a process of mutual feedback between the 
incorporation of new fields of objects and the general ontological categories governing, at 
a certain time, what is thinkable within the general field of objectivity. The ontology 
implicit in Freudianism, for instance, is different and incompatible with a biologist 
paradigm. From this point of view, it is our conviction that in the transition from 
Marxism to post-Marxism, the change is not only ontic but also ontological. The 
problems of a globalized and information led society are unthinkable within the two 
ontological paradigms governing the field of Marxist discursivity: first the Hegelian, and 




What motivates the need for this change of ontological paradigm in Laclau and Mouffe is the 
discovery of chance: ―If as shown in the work of Derrida, undecidables permeate the field which 
had previously been seen as governed by structural determination, one can see hegemony as a 
theory of the decision taken in an undecidable terrain. Deeper levels of contingency require 
hegemonic—that is, contingent—articulations‖ (xi).  
The turn of Laclau and Mouffe to ontology has not been an isolated event. All across the 
realm of social theory, the last thirty years have witnessed with different inflections and 
temporalities versions of this same ontological turn. In the field of political theory, Stephen 
White has noted how the work of well-known anti-foundationalists, such as Judith Butler, 
William Connolly, George Kateb, and Charles Taylor, do not sustain that anti-foundationalism 
when it comes to describing the political. White argues that these theorists have recourse to 
―weak ontology,‖ in a way that is perhaps similar, as we have seen above, to Volpi.
53
 As Carsten 
Strathausen has noted Hardt and Negri, Badiou, Agamben, and Zizek have all turned in different 
ways to ontology: 
The term ―ontology‖ occupies an increasingly prominent place in current politico-
philosophical discourse. ―Political philosophy forces us to enter the terrain of ontology,‖ 
declare Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Empire 354). Ernesto Laclau recently said that 
he has ―concentrated on the ontological dimension of social theory‖.... Giorgio 
Agamben‘s critique of the state of exception and of today's concentration camps is 
intimately tied to his ontological reflections regarding our potential existence beyond 
sovereign power: ―Until a new and coherent ontology of potentiality‖ has been found, he 
argues, ―a political theory freed from the aporias of sovereignty remains unthinkable‖ 
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(Homo Sacer 44). Likewise, Alain Badiou‘s political writings are intertwined with his 
mathematical ontology of set-theory, and Slavoj Zizek‘s exhortation to return to the 
legacy of Lenin in order to combat global capitalism remains inseparable from his 
ontological determination of capital as the real.  (n.p.) 
 
As Strathausen also notes it is perhaps a little strange to see so many critical theorists 
grounding their work in ontology; ontology which was for a good part of the twentieth century, 
due to the connection between Heidegger and German fascism, considered an entirely 
conservative discourse, anathema to any left, anti-capitalist thought (n.p.). While not all of these 
ontological turns engage in the same direct way as Laclau and Mouffe with chance and 
―undecidability,‖ what we can see in each is a search for a new ground for critique after the 
decline of the global socialist imaginary—in the face of the long downturn and rise of finance—
in the form of a turn to ontology. Much as in Volpi, left academic social theory faced with the 
uncertainties of a moment of failed finance-led accumulation and on-going crisis has had 
recourse to the waystation of ontology. There is then a limitation to these new forms of social 
theory: the force which has shaped their conditions of possibility and against which their turns to 
ontology occur, i.e., the rise of finance, is—to a great extent—nowhere addressed in their 
theoretical interventions.  
If we pull back for a second from Laclau and Mouffe‘s self-presentation, we can locate 
their work in a longer tradition of philosophical Marxism that intensifies in the 1970s, which, 
starting from the work of Althusser (but stretching back to Lukács), represented a turn away 
from political economy, away from thinking what we might call following Elizabeth Wingrove 
the systematicity of capitalism (―patterns of economic, social, symbolic, etc. regularity that make 
‗individuality‘ legible to us as a category of human existence‖ [―Ontology‖ 91]) and a turn to 
philosophy, specifically to, as Laclau and Mouffe point out, ontology. Without a doubt there is a 
crisis of Marxist critique in the 1970s, both in the West and in Latin America as dependency and 
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neo-colonial relations are restructured. Their work, however, doesn‘t produce an analysis of the 
political economy of these changes in ―a globalized and information led society‖ but rather an 
ontological account of a potential politics. Their use of the word society here and not capitalism 
is a tell: no longer are we talking about the temporal process of the circulation and production of 




As Gareth Williams has recently argued, Laclau and Mouffe‘s theory of the political is 
ultimately decisionist: one has to decide on the indeterminacies, which ones to value in the field 
because the field does not supply any criteria (―Decontainment‖ 165). As a result, we are no 
longer talking about anti-capitalism or the link, fraught, impossible, or otherwise, between a 
diagnosis of capitalism and the state and that of a political subject. In this way, Laclau and 
Mouffe‘s account is symptomatic of other versions of the ontological turn in the university Left: 
it renders a change in political economic structure (rise of finance) and state formation (in 
Mexico‘s case, the national popular) as a historical shift in the nature of ontology. This then is 
the crux of ontology in both Volpi, Laclau and Mouffe, and other versions of the ontological turn 
that draw on ontology‘s weak ecclesiastical force: ontologists want to believe the connection 
between a political subject and the social has not been irreparably severed and that a version of 
the political can be restored, in the case of Volpi through the probabilistic or tendential 
structuring of world and, in the case of Laclau and Mouffe, through the articulation of 
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 It was the Spanish exile and Mexican philosopher Aldolfo Sánchez Vázquez who most clearly diagnosed the 
problematic return of ontology. Sánchez Vázquez‘s term for it was ―envoltura ontologizante.‖ In a summary of his 
position (―La filosofía de la praxis como nueva práctica de la filosofía‖) written for Cuadernos Politicos in 1977, 
Sanchez Vazquez argues that a philosophy of praxis has to reject three interpretations of Marxism: ―ontologizante 
(según la cual el problema filosófico fundamental es el de lasrelaciones entre el espíritu y la materia),‖ 
―epistemológica (según la cual el marxismo se reduce a una nueva práctica teórica),‖ and ―antropológico-humanista 
(según la cual el marxismo como proyecto de emancipación se enraíza en un concepto abstracto de hombre).‖ What 
Sanchez Vazquez aims to put in their place is a philosophy of praxis, which is a way of thinking that both recognizes 
its limits as thought (what is thought cannot be completed in thought itself) and, second, thinks itself as not a 
reflection on but rather as an insertion into a particular world. 
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indeterminate political identities. However, the turn to ontology at the service of state reason or 
as a progressive reading of the field of political action respond to the effects of finance (spread of 
instability) and not to finance itself and its problematic rise. What results is ontology as 
waystation, a postdating of the problem of indeterminacy and crisis in a moment of finance. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I argued that the presence of finance in production 
makes possible new forms of crisis or instability and discussed the work of Kojin Karatani who 
has used the figure of a leap of faith or salto mortale to describe these forms of instability, 
uncertainty, or indeterminacy that finance generates. As finance comes to dominate post-73, as it 
becomes an increasingly necessary component for and supplement to production, the leaps, the 
saltos become more and more risky, the temporality between production and realization of a 
commodity‘s value more and more disjunct, and the circuits between the production and 
speculative economy more and more torturous, uncertain, and involved. As finance increasingly 
extends the temporal distance between production and the realization of value, making possible 
new forms of speculation, the turn to decisionism and ontology as a safe ground, intensifies in 
depth and desire. However, indeterminacy in the post-73 period is neither as hopeful nor as 
barren as Laclau and Mouffe and Volpi, respectively make it out to be. To resist these 
ontological turns, we will have to see that the salto is a specific figure of finance‘s rise, and, to 
contest this rise, we will have to leave behind the new forms of faith or eschatology, as 
decisionist leaps or ontological turns, and think, not how to resolve or postpone the destabilizing 
indeterminacies that now populate our social and personal worlds, but rather how to address the 
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The Failures of Finance: Urban Peripheries, Hyperinflation, and Real Abstraction 
 
Gil has slipped into a more African current, more identified with modern international black music, but he 
isn‘t understood by the public, nor by me… Now with his crazy howling, even while seeking liberty and 
disorder, he does not offend anyone, he does not enchant anyone, he does not move anyone, he does not 
overturn anything… He only irritates. In compensation, when Gil sings his admirable ―a falencia do café‖ 
in which he ―oswaldandrandialy‖ ridicules the Paulista coffee aristocracy conquered by industry…everyone 
likes it, he crystalizes a very relevant form of expression. 
 --Nelson Motta, quoted in Christopher Dunn‘s Brutality Garden 
 
--You said before that you didn‘t steal anything, you just ―carried a few things home.‖ But if you 
take something that isn‘t yours, isn‘t that stealing? 
--Well, those things weren‘t exactly mine, no. But let me tell you something. About a year ago 
when that store opened, everyone in the neighborhood bought stuff—on the ―easy credit plan,‖ they called 
it. I bought a blender because my wife wanted one real bad. She‘d seen some ads and really liked them. I 
also bought a TV so we could have a little entertainment at home. And then comes this problem of the bad 
unemployment we‘re in. I still got no job. So, anyway, I missed two monthly payments and I went down 
there to explain why. But they didn‘t want to hear about it, they came and took the television and the 
blender and everything. And they didn‘t even give back the eight payments I made. No job and no TV. So I 
figured they owed me something, and I was just being, like, compensated. But I only took what I thought 
was fair. 
 
--Ignácio de Loyola Brandão, Zero p. 161 (completed 1969, pub. 1974) 
 
 
 Though divided by the historical experience of formal dictatorship, what Mexico and 
Brazil share in the moment after the debt crisis of 1982 is a breakdown of systems of social and 
racial control, and turns in intellectual and cultural production that are marked by this 
experience. In the national space of Brazil, the debt crisis moment is lived less as a moment of 
systemic crisis and more as one of the breakdown of the fiction of money (hyperinflation) and 
accelerated state violence, applied with a true brutality in the peripheral zones of large 
metropolitan areas. These breakdowns led not to meditations on indeterminacy but rather to an 
explosion of intellectual and cultural production that remake racial ideologies and discursive 
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formations aimed at the peripheral areas of Brazil‘s primary megalopolises, Rio de Janeiro and 
São Paulo. In Volpi we register the fraught leaps finance makes possible, while in Brazilian 
cultural and intellectual production on the urban periphery we are faced with the violence that 
follows upon finance‘s failures and new forms of abstraction that spring up in its wake. This 
chapter traces how the breakdown of money‘s fiction and the myth of racial democracy leads to a 
new discursive formation of public security wherein the object known as the ―favela‖ comes to 
take on a strange, almost supernatural force and power in shaping social relations and 
knowledge. After discussing the historical background of hyperinflation and rising state 
violence, I turn to social scientific literatures on public security and cultural productions on 
peripheral urban spaces to trace how hyperinflation undoes both the social synthesis of money 
and the ideology of racial democracy. I then show how the discursive formation of the favela in 
this period becomes something more than just a discourse or ideology, how it becomes a thought 
that has become a thing, a real abstraction, and the consequences of this for the cultural 
production of the period and our criticism of it.  
 
National Popular Decay: State Violence and Hyperinflation 
The classically national popular moment in Brazil hit its high point during the 
dictatorship of Getulio Vargas (1930-45). Starting in 1964, the state apparatus in Brazil was 
taken over by a junta of military leaders, instituting the southern cone‘s first and longest running 
dictatorship. The Brazilian dictatorship purged ―nationalists,‖ especially those on the left, which 
represented at least formally a break with national popular politics. However, in terms of 
economics, the dictatorship largely steered a path between then-IMF recommended ―shock 
stabilization‖ and a national development framework. For example, instead of orthodox wage 
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controls, the military government opted for an, at first ad hoc, indexing strategy to control 
inflation while at the same time softening the blow of inflation on workers‘ wages. Though the 
military government attacked leftists and populists who supported national development 
strategies, the dictatorship did not move to dismantle large state run enterprises. Rather they 
reorganized them and outlined a new ―tripod‖ development strategy based on attracting foreign 
capital and channeling it to private Brazilian capital and state enterprises. Thus, in Brazil the 
years leading up to the debt crisis of 1982 were marked by an extension of state-led development 




 In the late 1970s, as the country was hit with waves of illegal strikes and the military 
government had difficulty winning popular elections in key states, it was clear that the 
dictatorship, after the economic boom years of the early 1970s was beginning to lose control, 
both in economic and political terms. Much like Mexico, after a period of explosive growth from 
1968 to 1973 (in Brazil, GDP grows 7.9% per year), Brazil went in heavy on foreign debt, 
attempting to grow its way out of the global economic slowdown and local impact of rising oil 
prices after 1973. Contracting debt at an extraordinary rate, Brazil became the largest debtor 
nation in the world: in 1981, its foreign debt totaled 61.4 billion with a debt service per year of 7 
billion or 65.6% of total exports (Skidmore 231). While inflation was also a problem in Mexico 
during the 1980s, the fact that Mexico was ground zero of the debt crisis tended to push the 
category of crisis forward as the mediator of this historical moment in terms of popular 
                                                          
55
 This had been the case in some ways since the 1950s. Clearly, Mexico being ground zero of the 1982 debt crisis 
leads it to be felt with particular intensity there, but it is worth noting that Brazil has had a deep relation with 
international finance capital in the postwar period. Indeed, Brazil had been renegotiating its debt in moments of 
crisis with the IMF and Paris Club since the 1950s.  
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experience. In Brazil, it was inflation that became the key mediating category of social 
experience in this moment of crisis.   
Another key difference between the dictatorship and the strictly national popular period 
in Brazil was with respect to state violence. While Vargas, once the Prestes rebellion was put 
down in 1936, employed primarily corporatist methods and nationalist cultural projections to 
control labor and integrate dissent, the dictatorship relied on a terrifying apparatus of state 
violence and repression, as both Maria Helena Moreira Alves and Caco Bracellos have 
demonstrated. Moreira Alves notes that even before the dictatorship took power it had amassed 
files on 400,000 Brazilian citizens (8). In Rota 66, Bracellos demonstrates how in São Paulo the 
military apparatus that was constructed to defeat the urban guerrilla was transferred to policing 
the marginal populations of the urban periphery with deadly results. In 1981, four years before 
the official end of the dictatorship, there were 2000 killings in Rio‘s Baixada Fluminense which 
were pinned on the state or state-sanctioned forces; many were buried in a cemetery whose gates 
bore the symbol of the BOPE, Rio‘s elite special operations unit, leading to speculation that the 
cemetery was a dumping ground for the illegally executed (―O Rio‖ 14). The expansion of state-
directed and state-permitted violence used to control peripheral populations in the large 
metropolises is a distinguishing feature of the dictatorship. While the dictatorship continued to 
deploy (and contest with left nationalist elements for dominance of) a national popular cultural 
imaginary, it also replaced the national popular emphasis on national culture as the unifying 
element of the nation with state violence.
56
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 The movement from the motto ―Order and Progress‖ to ―Love it or Leave it‖ marks this partial shift from national 
culture to state violence. However, throughout this period ―national culture‖ remains a contested terrain between the 
dictatorship and left cultural formations. National popular cultural arguments are made by Left artists throughout the 
dictatorship from Glauber Rocha to Carlos Diegues and come to structure many of the key critical debates of the 
period, including that over Tropicalia and MPB.  
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Moreover, the poorly named ―transition to democracy‖ is not marked by the dismantling 
of these systems of state violence. Political scientist and specialist in the legacy of Brazil‘s 
military government, Jorge Zaverucha has argued that sociologists and politicians who claim that 
Brazil has completely exited its authoritarian moment and ―consolidated‖ its democracy are quite 
mistaken: 
 
Certainly, these authors have forgotten that the National Security Law, the Penal Codes 
and Military Processing, the decree stipulating that the reserve forces of the Military 
Police [policia militar] are part of the information network of the army, the Law of the 
Press, the Statue on Foreigners, and the Decree that regulates the saving of data, 
information, documents and materials obtained by covert means in the interests of the 
security of society and the state, all continue on the books. And if there hasn‘t been a 
military takeover, it is because the civil authorities have bowed before military pressure 






While there are attempts in the 1980s in the large metropolitan centers of Rio and São Paulo to 
liberalize or restrain police, by the end of the 1980s these attempts are soundly defeated. 
As Zaverucha argues, rather than a repeal of the dictatorship‘s National Security Law, in the 
―democratic‖ era we have its continuation which is then paired with a ―militarization of public 
security‖ (88). 
 When the debt crisis hits in 1982, inflation spikes and the populations hardest hit by the 
weakened buying power of their wages and by unemployment begin to rebel. On April 13, 1983, 
a march against unemployment sets off a week of looting around São Paolo, including one spree 
of 3,500 persons in the center of São Paulo who attacked almost 200 commercial establishments 
(―Negros Dias‖ 26). In September, a month of looting occurs in Rio—the majority in peripheral 
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 The police force in Brazil is divided into two parts. The Military Police is responsible for the day-to-day 
patrolling, interventions into neighborhoods, and policing of the city. The Civil Police, who are plainclothes, 
investigate and report on crimes.  
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areas, as opposed to the wealthy Zona Sur (―Septembro Quente‖ 14).
58
 After the descent into the 
debt crisis and the recession that follows, the state will be concerned with both these dynamics: 
putting an end to inflation and controlling the civil unrest in the poor urban areas resulting from 
the devastating unemployment that the debt crisis caused and the erosion of real wages 




The Fiction of Money 
 As numerous articles in the popular and academic press attest, the intensification of 
inflation after the debt crisis in 1982 laid bare the fungibility and instability of money.
60
 In 1988, 
the money that in 1986 would have bought a car, would not have been enough to purchase a set 
of tires. By early 1990, inflation was peaking at 2,700% per year (Rohter 142). Supermarkets 
                                                          
58
 Some academic work does exist on the transportation riots in the 1970s: CEDEC Contradições urbanas e 
movimentos sociais (1977) and CEDEC Cidade, povo e poder (1981). The saques of the 1980s, and before, have 
received notice primarily in the periodical literature (and occasionally in the novelistic, such as Ignácio de Loyola 
Brandão‘s Zero, which serves as the epigraph to this chapter). However, saques were very common throughout the 
late 70s and 80s. Frequently attributed to ―nordestinos,‖ a search in the AcervoFolha reveals hundreds of hits for the 
term saque during these decades. What is important to note is that saques were an incredibly wide-spread lower 
class survival tactic during the period of hyperinflation—and were the object of so much public concern that several 
large saques were covered by the New York Times. 
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 Although the indexing of wages is maintained until 1986, indexation is attacked in a variety of indirect and not-
so-indirect ways. The prices of food stuff are allowed to rise, subsidies are cancelled, and export crops put additional 
pressure on basic commodity prices. 
60
 Debates on the etiology of inflation in (or caused by) Latin America date back to the work of the School of 
Salamanca‘s attempts to understand why the possession of more silver was not making Spain more ―rich‖ but rather 
causing price increases—thus discussions of inflation are intertwined with the very beginning of colonial history in 
Latin America. This specific period in Brazil receives important treatments in both Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira 
Desenvolvimento e crise no Brasil: história, economia e política de Getúlio Vargas a Lula (2003) and Werner Baer 
Economia brasileira (2002, see the extended discussion of inflation during 1974-86 in chapter 7). During the late 
1970s and 1980s numerous works were produced that attempted to understand why inflation, always a problem in 
many Latin American countries, was so bad in this period; Anibal Pinto‘s A Inflação recente no Brasil e na América 
Latina (1978) positions Brazil in the wider continental context. The best register of the popular concern with 
hyperinflation, beyond the numerous articles in the popular press on strategies for dealing with inflation, is that in 
1986 as part of his Plano Cruzado—an attempt to deal with hyperinflation—President Sarney asked housewives to 
become as fiscais do Sarney (Sarney‘s price police) to enforce the price freeze in supermarkets and other stores that 
this plan called for. Thousands of homemakers across Brazil signed up—with some reporting directly to the 
president—to do their part against hyperinflation by policing prices in their local stores (this story is told in the 
context of Minas Gerais in Mauro Amado‘s thesis As Fiscais do Sarney: A participação do Movimento das Donas 




began changing prices every week in order to not lose money simply due to inflation. Consumers 
invented numerous ingenious strategies for attempting to avoid having their money lose value 
just by holding onto it. While credit cards had penetrated into the Brazilian upper classes by the 
end of the 1970s, it was during the period of hyperinflation that they came to be used as an end-
around on paper money. Items purchased at the beginning of the month would not come due for 
another 40 days, meaning consumers would be able to buy when items were priced lower and 
then actually pay in money (up to 40 days later) that was technically worth less. This, of course, 
was a strategy available only to those earning solidly middle class and above salaries.  
 In Karl Marx‘s theorization, money is a paradoxical object. On the one hand, it serves as 
the universal equivalent: it is coinage, pieces of paper, bits of data that are used to exchange 
commodities. At the same time, money is itself a commodity; that is, it can be bought and sold, 
and this is where exchange rates and currency speculation come from. In the first volume of 
Capital, Marx outlines how there is a certain type of capitalist crisis (what today we would call a 
liquidity crisis) that turns on the paradoxical nature of money. In a normally functioning 
economy, capitalists pursue money as if it was their only desire—in these moments money is 
seen as a real representation and holder of value. However, there are moments when the fiction 
of money is revealed and money suddenly transforms from an agreed-upon holder of value to 
merely worthless pieces of paper.
61
 Hyperinflation and currency crises are two such moments 
where the fiction of money as a holder and measure of value is exposed and anyone who can 
trade their worthless paper for something that appears to be a more stable form of value does: 
another currency, commodities, or precious metals such as gold. Crises in which the fiction of 
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 ―The bourgeois, drunk with prosperity and arrogantly certain of himself, has just declared that money is a purely 
imaginary creation. ‗Commodities alone are money,‘ he said. But now the opposite cry resounds over the markets of 
the world: only money is a commodity. As the hart pants after fresh water, so pants his soul after money, the only 
wealth.‖ Capital, vol 1, p. 236  
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money is revealed are both cyclical and disturbing. Without this fiction, the simple, repetitive 
exchanges that are constitutive of sociality (buying groceries, being paid by one‘s job, taking out 
credit to make educational or commodity purchases to improve quality of life) and horizons of 
stability that make these exchanges possible breakdown.  
 The hyperinflation of the 1980s and 1990s in Brazil was a prolonged moment of the 
denaturalization of money‘s fiction. An interesting aspect of this moment in Brazil is that the 
basis of this crisis of the real of money came to form part of the solution. That is, if money was 
an agreed-upon fiction, what was necessary was a currency that people would believe would be 
stable (in addition to macro-economic conditions that would enable it to be). As a result, starting 
with the Sarney government‘s Cruzado Plan in 1986, Brazilian governments banked on the idea 
that creating a new currency along with other appropriate measures would restore confidence in 
the fiction of money. The Sarney Cruzado Plan blended a freeze on wages, retail, rental, and 
mortgage payments with the introduction of a new currency, the cruzado. By mid-1986, it was 
clear that the plan had failed. The following year, 1987, saw the floating of the Bresser Plan, and 
when the Collor government came into power in 1990 it launched its own plan: the Plano Collar, 
which in addition to implementing another freeze on prices and wages, also froze every bank 
account in the country for 8 months. Besides infuriating the general population for having frozen 
their assets, the plan failed to control inflation. The government of Itamar Franco, under the 
guidance of then-finance minister Federico Henrique Cardoso, launched in 1994 yet another 
inflation-stabilization program, introducing yet another currency, the Real. This currency, 
pegged to the dollar, and with another strenuous set of measures to reduce the money supply, 
was finally able to control inflation and remains Brazil‘s currency to date.  
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 In the aftermath of the debt crisis, then, there is a breakdown in the reality and stability of 
the currency, the creation of a day-to-day wondering at the failure of exchange, at the fungability 
of a fundamental building block of commerce and social interaction. Inflation meant for those 
who were formally employed that their wages, despite indexing, were worth less and less. For 
those who were in the swelling ranks of the unemployed or those in the informal economy, the 
basic commodities needed to survive were increasingly out of reach. These twin dynamics of 
violence and inflation are usually kept separate in disciplinary literatures—traditionally, violence 
is the province of the humanistic social sciences and inflation that of economics.
62
 This 
separation has led researchers to read the problems of rising violence in the post-1982 period in 
peripheral urban areas in Brazil as being largely the result of drug trafficking and (as such, 
legitimate) state responses to drug trafficking and gang control of territory.  
 However, my argument here is that the instability of finance, particularly of money in this 
period (as caused by hyperinflation), should be an essential part of any reading of the causes or 
underlying factors of a ―rise in violence.‖ Without oversimplifying, we might say that the 
superprofits of the drug trade are to peripheral communities what credit cards and dollar 
dominated accounts are to the rich and upper middle class: anti-inflationary monetary 
strategies.
63
 The need for increased state violence in the urban periphery is highly connected with 
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 There is only one piece of social science literature which I have been able to find which discusses violence and 
hyperinflation in connection with the urban periphery. It is by Zaluar, the anthropologist Lins would work for while 
he gathered the materials used in City of God. Zalur‘s piece ―Hiperinflação e (é) violência‖ in Condomínio do Diabo 
(1981) notes that inflation is an issue, but argues that more important than inflation is a ―revolution in patterns of 
consumption.‖ This has led young people to fall into the pursuit of ―dinheiro facil.‖ i.e., the drug trade. Instead of 
1000% per year inflation and unemployment making survival complicated at best, Zaluar seems to imply that these 
young peripheral dwellers should learn to love the poverty of working class life: ―explicam a permanente 
insatisfação com o ‗passar mal‘ dos trabalhadores honestos‖ (119). Interestingly, City of God blends both thematics: 
the need for money, found primarily in super-profits in the drug trade, and an absolute divide between the favela and 
the outside world.  
 
63
 These comments are not meant to stand in for an actual account of the rise of Brazil as a node in the global 
logistical structure of drug transport. That is, this is not an account of the drug trade as if it were a simple 
consequence of economics, a view that many, including Paul Amar, have productively questioned. My aim here is 
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the post-debt crisis phenomena of inflation and unemployment and the decline of the social 
synthesis performed by exchange and money. Moreover, the rise of the drug trade, while 
important, does not exhaust the explanation for state violence in the periphery; that is, much 
more of this violence than is frequently allowed in certain social science literatures is directed at 
simply terrorizing rebellious populations, who by 1983 were rioting frequently, into submission. 
If in the last chapter, we focused on the increasingly elongated saltos between production and 
consumption that finance makes available, in Brazil in the post 1982 period we are confronted 
with the violence that appears when these saltos miss their mark and fail, or when people make 
their own leaps and simply seize what capitalism can no longer provide. 
 
The ―Favela,‖ Race, and Real Abstraction 
With the expansion of instability in the urban periphery and intensification of state 
violence in the 1980s, the field of anthropological and sociological work on the favela and 
peripheral urban areas exploded. As Licia do Prado Valladares notes, from under 10 studies per 
year during the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s consistently see social science studies on the favela 
being published at the rate of 20, 30, even 50 per year. The key authors in this new wave of work 
range from the politically progressive, such as Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva, to more 
conservative, such as Roberto Kant de Lima. This is the moment of the rise of ―public security‖ 
as an area of intellectual expertise. It is a moment in which anthropologist Luiz Eduardo Soares 
becomes, briefly before being dismissed, part of the Ministério Público in an attempt to reform 
Rio‘s police system. At the end of the 1990s, this new wave of intellectual production 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
only to establish the turn to the informal economy of the drug trade as linked to inflation (and thus as the Janus face 
of the rise of credit amongst the middle and upper classes) and, most importantly, as an insufficient justification for 




concerning public security and the favela, which we will examine in greater detail below, arrived 
in the cultural sphere. The key years are 1997-1999 which saw the publication of Paolo Lins‘ 
Cidade de Deus (City of God, 1999) and Ferrez‘s Capão Pecado, which appeared in 2000. These 
works, which famously represent the violence of everyday life in the peripheries of Rio and São 
Paulo respectively, were the beginnings of an explosion in cultural production (from novels and 
films to telenovelas and popular music) centered on the favela and the urban periphery. 
It is important to note how these new discourses on public security, and the imaginary of 
a divided city that it draws on, are an extension and updating of prior Brazilian national 
mythologies and ideologies of race. During the 1930s and 40s, the Vargas dictatorship, like 
many Latin American states at the time, incorporated a theory of mestizaje into the formation of 
a national popular culture.
64
 While the Vargas state incorporated elements of black culture 
(samba, carnival, futebol, malandragem) into the foundation of Brazilian national culture, 
intellectuals elaborated a theory of ―racial democracy,‖ which celebrated Brazil as a country 
without racial discrimination. Peripheral urban areas (in particular those of Rio, the then national 
capital) occupied a contradictory place in national popular culture: as sites of racialized 
proletarian exclusion but also as the cradle of national culture.  
During the military dictatorship, militant black intellectuals began to question the myth of 
racial democracy, arguing that it was more a technique of social control used to mystify and 
pacify peripheral populations than an ideal that the Brazilian state was committed to realizing. 
As Paulina Alberto notes, in the early 1980s, black intellectuals broke decisively with 
―excessively conciliatory‖ positions on Brazil as a land of ―racial harmony‖ (17). In the 1980s 
this questioning of prior racial mythologies combined with rioting and social unrest in peripheral 
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 See Alberto, Terms of Inclusion: Black Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century Brazil (Raleigh: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011):  9-11; Telles, Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race and Color in Latin America (Raleigh: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2014): 3-8.  
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urban areas, including Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The explosion of new intellectual 
production around public security appears precisely at the moment of the decline of this primary 
state ideology for controlling peripheral, racially othered populations, riots, and the expansion of 
the drug trade. My argument is that these discourses of public security (and the cultural texts that 
follow in their wake) re-elaborate the material and cultural systems of race, but at the same time, 
they produce a quasi-objective object, the ―favela,‖ which both makes possible this re-
elaboration and which comes to take on a life of its own: more than a simple category, it 
becomes a force, an abstraction that spectralizes and comes to structure urban space and the 
social relations found therein.  
We cannot understand the strange force that the ―favela‖ takes on in this period without 
attempting to account for its relation to both a crisis of race and finance, first as the period of 
hyperinflation and then, after 1998, the year of the Brazilian currency crisis,
65
 as a moment when 
both exchange and money as forms of social synthesis break down. The work that this corpus of 
social scientific literature and cultural production does is multiple, and in the following I will 
track three levels. The first is an ideological level where the criminalization of poverty and 
exclusion serves as a very real cover for the creation of a new police infrastructure and 
justification for state violence directed at brown and black bodies. The second is the production 
of a new discursive formation of public security, which I understand as the exclusions and will to 
truth, internal rules, and rituals that organize the relations between disciplines, institutions, and 
enunciations. However, neither of these levels of analysis will enable us to capture the strange 
force the ―favela‖ has taken on in the urban life of Brazilian megalopolis at the turn of the 
century. I argue thus for a need to establish an additional third level, one that accounts for the 
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 While the introduction of the Plano Real in 1994 stabilized the currency and inflation, it lead to an overvaluation 
of the currency, which then lead to speculative attacks on it and a forced devaluation in 1998. This devaluation is 
frequently seen as contagion from the Asian currency crisis that began with speculative attacks on the Thai baht.  
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favela as a ―real abstraction‖ and that would complement the discursive and ideological analyses 
which follow. 
In ―The Order of Discourse‖ (L’ordre du discours), Foucault argues that Western 
philosophy has regulated itself by denying the ―specific reality of discourse in general‖ (65). He 
continues:  
 
Ever since the sophists‘ tricks and influence were excluded and since their paradoxes 
have been more or less safely muzzled, it seems that Western thought has taken care to 
ensure that discourse should occupy the smallest possible space between thought and 
speech. Western thought seems to have made sure that the act of discoursing should 
appear to be no more than a certain bridging between thinking and speaking—a thought 
dressed in its signs and made visible by means of words. (65) 
 
What Foucault is proposing here is that neither thought nor speech are as transparent as they 
might seem and that there are forces that shape them (in Foucault‘s case, epistemic regulation 
and genealogical need). What I propose is that in this non-transparent gap between words and 
thoughts we make room for another force: capital. My argument is not that this level is 
necessarily more important than the discursive or ideological, but that it does get thrust to the 
forefront as the Brazilian state reconfigures, shifting from mediation between capital and labor to 
repressive and security functions, and as, in a moment of on-going financial crisis, the social 
structures derived directly from capitalistic synthesis fray. While orthodox theories of the 
relation between capitalism and knowledge (unrefined ideology critique and reflection theory) 
have well known problems, there are in the heterodox Marxist tradition a number of thinkers 
who have attempted more sophisticated accounts of how capitalism acts as an invisible, spectral 
force on thought, space, and social relations.
66
 In particular, in the heterodox Marxist tradition 
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 Althusser‘s work on epistemology, and Jameson‘s subsequent use of this work to examine cultural production in a 
moment of financialized capitalism, is motivated by a critique of orthodox Marxist reflection theory. Reflection 
theory also received a salutary critique in Raymond Williams‘ Marxism and Literature (1977), but it was contested 
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there is a name for a ―thought becoming a thing‖ (Virno) or a quasi-objective force that comes to 




 We tend to think of abstraction, in popular parlance, as the opposite of the concrete, and, 
as a result, as somehow less ―real‖ and potentially more illusory. This usage carries over into 
certain philosophical discourses, where abstraction is frequently understood as the process by 
which discrete objects are recognized as sharing a common property or trait (redness, roundness, 
etc); in this register abstraction names the movement from empirical real to concept. Marx and 
the heterodox Marxian tradition, however, have understood abstraction differently; not as an 
illusion, but rather as a force in the world. This perspective was developed in Marx‘s 1857 A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, a text in which he first elaborated the 
methodology he would later follow in the writing of Capital. The critical passage occurs as Marx 
meditates on the work of past political economy and how his own will proceed: 
 
The economists of the seventeenth century, e.g., always begin with the living whole, with 
population, nation, state, several states, etc.; but they always conclude by discovering 
through analysis a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations such as 
division of labour, money, value, etc. As soon as these individual moments had been 
more or less firmly established and abstracted, there began the economic systems, which 
ascended from the simple relations, such as labour, division of labour, need, exchange 
value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market. The latter 
is obviously the scientifically correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the 
concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the 
process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of 
departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
as early as Georg Lukács‘ History and Class Consciousness in the opening chapter titled ―What is Orthodox 
Marxism?‖Althusser and Zizek‘s reformulations of ideology are both critiques of this same body of work, which 
received an influential systematization in Stalin‘s Dialectical and Historical Materialism (1938).  
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 In the social sciences a frequent division is made between two forms or understandings of impersonal domination: 
one going back to Weber and bureaucracy and the other to Marx and the market (see New Spirit of Capitalism for a 
version of the Marx tradition). What we are talking about here is not ―impersonal domination of the market‖ or that 





departure for observation [Anschauung] and conception. Along the first path the full 
conception was evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the second, the 
abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought. In 
this way Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought 
concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, 
whereas the method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in 
which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. (205-
6; trans. slightly modified) 
 
Early political economy began with ―living wholes‖ (like population) and broke these down into 
a few ―determinant, abstract, general relations‖ (such as the division of labor). His own critique 
of political economy, Marx argues, works from these abstract determinations and then ―ascends‖ 
to the concrete. Marx, as Alberto Toscano notes, effects here ―a theoretical break with an 
empiricist or neopositivist usage of the terms ‗abstract‘ and ‗concrete‘‖ (―Open Secret‖ 274). 
Rather than arguing for a turn to an empirical real or the concrete against the abstract or concept, 
Marx is developing a more completed methodology, one that would involve not taking a position 
in the empirical and non-arbitrary real but would rather start from the ―abstract,‖ from concepts 
composed of multiple determinations, and move towards the ―concrete.‖ Thus, Marx argues that 
the concrete is not the starting point of analysis, but rather it is what is arrived at at the end of 
analysis: the process of thought while it starts with abstractions is an attempt to move towards, to 
grasp, to ascend to the concrete. 
 This perhaps counter-intuitive perspective on the nature of abstraction is at the heart of 
Marx‘s analysis and understanding of capitalism, because capitalism produces such real 
abstractions. As Alberto Toscano has argued, ―a particular modality of social abstraction can 
thus be identified as the differentia specifica of capitalism vis-à-vis other modes of production‖: 
 
Whether we are concerned with the unmasking of commodity fetishism, the formalization 
of surplus value, or the discourse on alienation, it is difficult to ignore that much of the 
force of the Marxian matrix—when compared to contemporary discourses of abstraction 
with their frequent reliance on notions of complexity and information—is based on its 
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depiction of capitalism as the culture of abstraction par excellence, as a society that, pace 
many of the more humanist denunciations of the dominant ideology, is really driven, in 
many respects, by abstract entities, traversed by powers of abstraction. A particular 
modality of social abstraction can thus be identified as the differentia specifica of 
capitalism vis-à-vis other modes of production. As the Italian Marxist phenomenologist 
Enzo Paci wrote, ―The fundamental character of capitalism… is revealed in the tendency 
to make abstraction categories live as though they were concrete…‖ (273) 
 
This insight into capitalism as defined by a particular tendency for abstractions to have material 
effects on social life, and the idea that capitalism produces cultural and social formations and 
processes defined by concrete or real abstraction, have been developed in many different ways 
by Marx and in the Marxian tradition. One influential vein in this tradition is the work of German 
theorist Alfred Sohn-Rethel, who coined and popularized the term real abstraction in his work 
Intellectual and Manual Labor (begun during the Weimer period of hyperinflation, but only 
finished in exile in 1951 and finally published in Germany in 1972). Sohn-Rethel‘s argument is 
that the capacity for abstract thought and thus the ability to abstract scientific laws, to reason 
mathematically from non-empirical sources, all have their origins in what he calls ―the exchange 
abstraction‖ or the specific form of universality that money makes possible. When two 
commodities are exchanged, their use values are made equivalent, and this process Sohn-Rethel 
terms abstraction. The exchange abstraction is ―real‖ in that it is not merely a mental category 
but rather a pervasive concrete social process that then regulates and shapes the categories of 
human thought and social life.
68
 In particular, Sohn-Rethel argues that the equivalence produced 
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 In a recent essay Sianne Ngai (2015) has nicely brought out this side of Sohn Rethel‘s work:  
 
In societies where producers do not explicitly coordinate their acts of production, this mediation happens 
only when their products are exchanged. But although the mediations of exchange have the ―formal ability 
to weave a web of social coherence among the mass of private individuals all acting independently of 
another,‖ as Alfred Sohn-Rethel notes, the socializing effects of their activities also come to appear to them 
as an independent force not of their own making, one that oppositionally confronts them as a ―second 
nature.‖ As Marx puts it, referring to the rise of the world market, what appears is not just the ―connection 




by exchange and money are needed before philosophers such as Kant can postulate time and 
space as homogenous, independent categories of experience. Sohn-Rethel was an important 
influence on Adorno; and Foucault, as we have seen, arrives at a similar place with his theory of 
discourse. Sohn-Rethel‘s real abstraction also served as the basis of Zizek‘s perhaps most 
celebrated book, The Sublime Object of Ideology. 
 In Latin American cultural studies, the work of Sohn-Rethel and the idea of capitalism‘s 
differentia specifica being the production of real abstractions have had little influence.
69
 In part, 
because there are many points that a cultural theorist might want clarified about real abstraction 
as an account of social domination. First, in much of this heterodox or esoteric work it is never 
clear if there is just one form of real abstraction or potentially many. Second, if there are multiple 
forms of real abstraction, it is unclear what abstraction would mean in each, or if the process of 
abstraction that one finds in each form is the same. Thirdly, since most theorists of the value 
form or real abstraction are working at a very macro level, there is usually little interest in the 
details of how these forms or abstraction actually function in social life. And finally, for theorists 
who work on the periphery or in moments of financial crisis where the informal sector is large 
and the mediations of the value form or monetary value form are imperilled, it is unknown how 
these conditions might change a theorization of capital as a form of indirect domination.
70
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
69
 There has been a lot of sustained attention given to abstraction in cultural work, of which Fredric Jameson‘s ―The 
Brick and the Balloon‖ might be the most well-known contemporary example. The difference between what I am 
proposing here and work such as Jameson‘s is that we are not trying to read for linkages between cultural form and 
economic process tied to a periodization (i.e., late capitalism). Once we let go of the base/superstructure division, it 
is no longer a question of how cultural objects register, express, or reflect (even of an absent cause). Rather my aim 
is to show how cultural and intellectual productions are not merely keyed to the abstraction of finance but produce a 
world alongside it. See also Leigh Claire Le Berge‘s excellent critique of how humanities discourses mishandle the 
―abstraction‖ of finance, ―Rule of Abstraction: Methods and Discourses of Finance.‖  
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 Frequently, in value theoretical works the theory of value, real abstraction, or reification is also a theory of real 
subsumption, which is a theoretical linkage that does not hold in Latin America.  
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In what follows, I attempt to answer these questions while providing an account of both 
the emergence of new textual production on the favela, and the strange, objective form that the 
notion of the ―favela‖ comes to take on in these years. I will attempt to track two processes that 
have produced the favela as a hovering, quasi-objective social form: the first, emerging from 
social science literature, is the abstraction of equivalence which is accomplished via the 
conceptual structure of integration, and the second is a presumptive absolute divide, which 
defines the social relation between the formal and informal urban spaces, and which then comes 
to structure, press upon, and condition individuals‘ experience of the urban. My argument is that 
the breakdown of money‘s fiction and the myth of racial democracy creates an opening for the 
production of a real abstraction and for a new form of impersonal domination that is not routed 
through money, exchange, or the traditional paradigms of race. Thus, alongside the proliferation 
of state violence, the favela as real abstraction plays an important role in shoring up crumbling 
systems of racial domination.
71
 It does not come to replace discourses of race, but, as we saw in 
the previous chapter with Volpi‘s ontological divide, real abstraction comes to do the work of 
race. 
 
The Abstraction of the Favela 
During the dictatorship, a key part of the ideology of national security that underpinned 
the intellectual structure of the regime was the notion of ―internal enemies‖ (Moreira Alves 15). 
A second key characteristic was a state policy of favela removal (particularly in Rio). In Rio, 
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 It is important to reiterate here that my argument is not that ―race‖ somehow disappears in this moment. Rather 
what I am arguing is that due to push back by black intellectuals and a shift from corporativism to police violence as 
the primary state apparatus (a process which begins during the dictatorship) the ideology of ―racial democracy‖ is no 
longer at the center of a statist, conservative discursive strategy and becomes supplemented in this moment by a 
―color-blind‖ and spatialized one, the distinction between the ―favela‖ and the formal city. I am also arguing that 
this distinction becomes something more than discursive, in its popular sense, becoming a structuring ―force‖—
which is what becoming a real abstraction means.  
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between 1962 and 1974, an ―estimated 139,218 residents from 80 favelas were forced to abandon 
their homes for publicly financed housing projects on the outskirts of the city‖ (Gay 19). 
Generally, these removals were of favelas in the wealthy Zona Sur and they formed a part of a 
system of accumulation via land speculation and real estate development.
72
 During the 1980s and 
90s, as violence that was once contained within the favelas and peripheral urban zones began to 
spill out into middle and upper class neighborhoods there was an explosion of popular 
journalistic and academic work and interest on the favela. Intellectuals and popular writers 
stepped in to supply the information and theoretical positions necessary for the renovating of 
state strategies, whether of the hard-line, reformist, or progressive varieties, in a body of work 
centered around ―public security.‖
73
 
 In Licia do Prado Valladares‘ account, there have been three moments of intellectual 
production concerning the favela: from the late nineteenth century to the 1940s, from the 1940s 
to mid-1960s, and from the 1960s to the present.
74
 To her periodization, I will make one slight 
inflection which is the intensification of intellectual production immediately after 1982 and then 
again in the mid-1990s. The first wave of work outlined by Valladares is represented by 
occasional and very limited numbers of publications. In the second wave of organized 
intellectual production, sponsored by foundations, Catholic institutions, and the government 
beginning in the 1950s, is when the favela first becomes a Cold War ―social‖ problem. The third 
wave is marked by the favela becoming an object of social scientific research and a centerpiece 
of work valorizing informal architecture (represented by the work of John Turner) and informal 
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 In one well-known case, the favela of Vidigal successfully defeated, in 1976 and again in 1977, attempts to 
displacement them. Their land, before their attempted removal, had already been sold to real estate developers Rio 
Towers and Sincorpa. However, generally speaking, success stories like this were outnumbered by Zona Sur 
displacements.  
73
 The relationship that I am positing between the dictatorship and public security period is that the latter period 
represents an intensification of, rather than a major break with, the former. 
74
 I follow her periodization but the account that follows should not be taken as her own. I focus more on the content 
of the writing and the political context.  
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urbanity, represented in Brazil by Anthony and Elizabeth Leeds‘s work on the favelas of Rio. 
The Leeds, as Valladares notes, brought Chicago School-style anthropology to Brazil and to 
research on the favela.  Their semnario trained many of the authors who would produce 
important work in the contemporary moment, including Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva and 
Gilberto Velho (121). What each of these waves has in common, however, is their production of 
the ―favela‖ as a legitimate object of study and form of abstraction: an equivalence amongst 
disparate social spaces with radically different historical trajectories.  
For example, the classic text of the second wave of social scientific work on peripheral 
communities is Janice Perlman‘s The Myth of Marginality (1976), although it is important to 
note the work of the Leeds reached many of the same conclusions at an earlier date (Valladares 
129). Perlman‘s work deconstructs the central concept of knowledge production to that date on 
the favela, namely that of marginality: ―The common belief…[is] that in postwar years of rapid 
urbanization, the city has been invaded by hordes of rural peasants. These migrants are seen as 
arriving lonely and rootless from the country-side, unprepared and unable to adapt fully to urban 
life, and perpetually anxious to return to their villages‖ (1). The myth was that these urban 
migrants chose their isolation in marginal communities instead of integrating themselves into the 
city. Marginality was the first ideology constructed to control those on the margins, to strip them 
of not just their rights to citizenship but also to obscure their critical role within the urban and 
national economy. But while Perlman‘s book made an important intervention and systematically 
demonstrated that the marginality thesis was false, her work participated in another project of the 
favela as an abstraction, as an equivalence for any area that, in the past or present, was either 
squatted, outside the formal layout and infrastructure of the city, or a territory of the poor.
75
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 Perlman‘s definition follows what is a familiar pattern: note differentiation in the category but then define the 
category through a single aspect. For her, this aspect is the juridical status of the land:  
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In the years after the end of the dictatorship, the myth of marginality has made a 
comeback, but in an importantly different form. For examples which fall in our post-82 time 
period, we can look at Rio in the 1990s. Two spectacular events marked the early 1990s in Rio 
and both were events in which the violence previously confined to peripheral zones impinged on 
the upper and middle classes.
76
 The first was the ―arrastão‖ in Ipanema beach in 1992, where 
supposed youth gangs from two different peripheral communities fought amongst themselves 
and then robbed beach goers in the ensuing confusion.
77
 The second were the twin massacres in 
1993 of 8 street children in Candelaria and of 21 residents in the favela of Vigário Geral by 
elements of the military police. These two sets of events marked the beginning of the return of 
marginality as a popular discourse in the form of the ―cidade partida‖ (―divided city‖) thesis, 
which was popularized by Zuenir Ventura‘s 1994 book of the same name. These events were 
also important because they marked the beginning of a new wave of political projects based in a 
theorization of ―inclusion,‖ primarily in the form of internationally-sponsored NGO activity in 
the favelas: both Viva Rio, an organization that has partnered with international foundations and 
corporations, as well as the state, and Afro-Reggae as an NGO project emerged from these 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Actually, there are all types of favelas; some are spread out rather than overcrowded; some have orderly 
street patterns and open spaces (such as those in Lima which were planned with the aid of university 
architecture students); and many of them have been vastly improved over time in terms of construction 
materials and urban services. What ultimately distinguishes a favela, then, from many otherwise similar 
lower-class communities is its illegal status in terms of land use. (13) 
 
76
 The equivalent event in Sao Paulo is the Carandiru massacre where 111 prisoners were brutally executed by 
military police in 1992 after a prison uprising.  
77
 This was during the height of the campaign for mayor in which a black woman, Benedita da Silva, from the 
periphery was the PT candidate and appeared to have an excellent chance at winning. See Francisco ―Arrastão 
mediático e racismo no Rio de Janeiro‖ (2003) for an account of how the media‘s amplification of this ―incident‖ 
served to form white Rio into a racist voting bloc against da Silva.  
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tragedies. To this day, this type of inclusion-based NGO organizing remains the most visible 
political form of urban anti-racist organizing.
78
 
These events also mark an inflection in the third wave of intellectual production 
concerning the favela. With the expansion of instability in the urban periphery and the 
intensification of state violence in the 1980s, the field of anthropological and sociological work 
on the favela and peripheral urban areas explodes. As we noted before, the 1980s and 1990s 
consistently see social science studies on the favela being published at the rate of 20, 30, even 50 
per year (Valladares 137). Much of this new social scientific work was concerned with analyzing 
failures of ―public security‖ and has recourse to a social apartheid, exclusionary, or ―divided 
city‖ analytic to do so. The ―divided city‖ heuristic sees the primary issue in peripheral areas 
after 1982 as one of lack of integration: residents of the favela need services (the integration of 
their communities into state infrastructures) and they need access to actual, not merely formal, 
citizenship (the end to social ―exclusion‖).  
However, integration serves another role as well: in public security discourse its lack is 
the form of equivalence producing the abstraction of a coherent object of the ―favela.‖ This 
equivalence occurs, perhaps ironically, in the moment of the greatest differentiation and change 
in urban space in Brazil. For example, using a conservative methodology, there are around 750 
―favelas‖ in Rio, some of these with histories stretching back into the early twentieth century and 
demonstrating all manners of variation (size, consolidation, inter-urban relation, culture, etc).
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The ―favela‖ of Rocinha comprises a sizable portion of the southern edge of the central part of 
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 Black NGO formations begin to emerge nationally in the late 1980s, see Dos Santos ―Black NGOs and 
‗Conscious Rap‘‖ for an account. It is worth noting that some of these more visible NGO organizations have become 
involved in offering financial services and in providing marketing information to companies wanting to sell products 
to ―favela‖ dwellers. See for instance the projects linked to CUFA - Central Única das Favelas: Data Favela 
(http://datafavela.com.br/) and Favela Holding (http://www.fholding.com.br/).  
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 In the 2010 census, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) put the number of favelas in Rio at 
763. It is common to see other estimates that range between 1300 and 1500.  
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Rio and contains within it sizable differentiation, as some parts of the bairro have been standing 
for more than 30 years (Jaguaribe 178-9). The Favela-Bairro program (started in 1995) added 
infrastructure and urban planning elements to 73 different communities and in some land 
ownership and legal titles have been normalized (―Social Science‖ 23). How did this one term 
come to sublimate all these variations? Valladares points to two trends: first, 19 ―favelas‖ have 
served as the site of 41% of all published studies on Rio and, second, there is ―frequent recourse 
to statistical comparisons between on the one hand all favelas taken together, and on the other 
the rest of the city‖ (―Social Science‖ 22). Each of these tendencies is a different form of 
equivalence: a handful of spaces come to stand in for hundreds and for the urban periphery or 
territory of the poor as a whole, while statistical aggregates are used to define a line or difference 
between the formal city and its other. If once Perlman argued against the myth of marginality 
while reproducing the favela as an equivalence, as a process of abstraction, the social scientific 
and journalistic work produced in the moment of the emergence of public security discourse has 
managed to replicate both. What I am interested in, then, is how integration performs a dual role 
in the social scientific and journalistic work of the period: as a political imaginary of integration 
forms the content or the ideological import of these discourses, but also the means by which 
equivalence is established, the form by which the abstraction of the favela is produced. 
 We can see these dual functions in particular in recent social science literature that has 
attempted to begin to question the integration/exclusion imaginary. A 2009 publication from the 
Observatorio das Favelas, O que é a favela, afinal? opens by criticizing the common definitions 





Presentes em diferentes sítios geográficos—em planícies, em morros, às margens de rios  
e lagoas—e reunindo algumas centenas de moradores até alguns milhares, possuindo 
diferentes equipamentos e mobiliários urbanos, sendo constituídas por casas e/ou 
apartamentos, com diferentes níveis de violência e presença do poder público, com  
variadas características socioambientais, as favelas constituem-se  como territórios que se 




In the end, however, the question of the book‘s title contains its own answer: what the favela is is 
a favela, an abstraction, an equivalence, and while the authors give an alternate series of 
definitions (the favela not as lack), these nonetheless operate as different forms of equivalence. 
 Much like Perlman once did, we could argue against the ideology of the perception of the 
favela as lacking integration and demonstrate how the problem with the ―divided city‖ approach 
is that it tends to reinscribe a myth of marginality: not that the poor choose to live in substandard 
portions of the city, but rather that these peripheral areas are not already incorporated into the 
city and what is needed is less exclusion and more incorporation. Integration-exclusion positions 
are a rehashing of the myth of marginality precisely to the extent that they ignore the critically 
important ways that peripheral areas are integrated into the larger city: as the site of land for 
future housing construction (and thus land speculation and financialized accumulation) and as 




 However, we also have to account for the effects of the production of the favela as an 
object, and specifically the force of abstraction that integration as a means of equivalence 
performs (i.e., both making diverse spaces similar and imposing an absolute, unwavering line 
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 Translation: ―Present in different geographical sites in plains, on hills, on the banks of rivers and ponds and 
gathering a few hundred residents to a few thousand, having different equipment and buildings, and consisting of 
houses and/or apartments, with different levels of violence and the presence of the government, with varying socio-
environmental characteristics, favelas constitute themselves as territories that are expressed in considerably diverse 
landscapes.‖ 
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 This is not to deny the differential inclusion of these populations into citizenship and state-maintained 
infrastructures; rather I only want to hold off on the elevation of inclusion as the privileged site of explanation.  
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between the formal and informal city). For it is here that the ―favela‖ becomes something more 
than a sign or name, it is becoming a force, a form that both mediates how the geographical and 
social space of the urban is perceived and lived, and conditions the social relations that are found 
there. There is no magical moment in which one of the thousands of abstractions warehoused in 
the vaults of post-Enlightenment science becomes ―real,‖ where it starts to dance, to pull its own 
strings and ours. Its real-ness, its force, can rather only be seen in its imprint of an obscure 
morphology, as it expands to colonize and warp more and more of a particular social field. In 
this case, it is only with the on-going failure of the integration of surplus populations into 
capital‘s productive apparatus (and process of valorization), and the breakdown of money‘s 
fiction and the myth of racial democracy that this particular abstraction takes on a life of its own. 
To see this thought truly become a thing, we must turn to the cultural texts that follow quick 
upon the heels of the new social science and journalistic literature. If science produces the 
abstraction, it is in the cultural texts where we can see it dance.  
 
The Becoming Absolute of Abstraction 
At the end of the 1990s, this new wave of intellectual production concerning public 
security and the favela, which we will examine in greater detail below, emerged in the cultural 
sphere. The key year is 1997, which saw the publication of Paolo Lins‘ Cidade de Deus (City of 
God), and 2000, the date of Ferrez‘s first major work, Capão Pecado (Sinful Hill). These works, 
which famously represent the violence of everyday life in the peripheries of Rio and São Paulo 
respectively, were the beginnings of an explosion in cultural production (from novels and films 
to telenovelas and popular music) centered on the favela and the urban periphery. In what 
follows, I will take an in depth look at two different cultural objects, both of which have very 
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determinate connections to the matrix of social scientific work, Lins‘ Cidade de Deus, a novel, 
and the 2007 film Tropa de Elite, to examine how in each we can see the force of the favela as 
real abstraction operating. With Cidade de Deus, I will show how the reified split between the 
formal and informal city comes to shape the field of social relations, and in Tropa de Elite how 
the real abstraction of the favela produces the only possible conditions for knowledge of the 
informal city as singularity. 
In terms of aesthetics, there are two broad traditions for treating peripheral urban areas, 
with two different centers of dominance. In film, the key aesthetic genre is the favela romance, 
which extends from films such as Orpheu Negro (1959) to Carlos Diegues‘ 1999 remake entitled 
Orpheu. These are films that participate, passionately and perhaps critically, in some of the main 
ideological narratives of peripheral communities, that of the happy poor and the favela as the site 
of carnival and samba, and thus of a mestizo/black inflected national culture. In literature, the 
dominant tradition has been that of the denouncement as a form of critical naturalism or 
realism.
82
 This tradition stretches back to the end of the nineteenth century with novels such as 
Aluísio de Azevedo‘s O Cortiço (1890), while Rubem Foncesa‘s limpid, harsh short stories 
published during the dictatorship refashions the genre into what Alfred Bosi has called 
―brutalismo.‖ 
When the new literary productions on the favela, such as Paulo Lins‘ Cidade de Deus 
(City of God) and Ferrez‘s Capão Pecado (Sinful Hill), began to appear in the late 1990s two 
characteristics separated them from these prior representational modes: first, these works were 
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category of realism. Both Flora Sussekind Tal brasil, qual romance (Rio de Janeiro: Achiamé, 1984) and Tânia 





marketed and circulated as written by authors ―from the favela,‖ that is by authors who, it is 
claimed, have access to the ―real‖ of the favela. Second, all of these works assume the favela as 
their object,
83
 that is they take place only or almost completely in the favela and are concerned 
primarily with the representation of drug violence, criminal activity, and police brutality there. 
As such, they touch frequently very little on the lives of women or working class people and the 
number of scenes that take place outside the favela or the number of characters from outside the 
favela (other than the police) are few. They thus participate in the process of equivalence, but 
they add to it a phenomenological dimension, the outlining of an absolute divide between the 
formal and informal cities. This divide comes to structure the social and spatial relations between 
the formal and informal urban spaces of these novels, and it is in how this divide serves as the 
unquestioned reference for narrative possibility that we can see the force of the favela as real 
abstraction, as the absolute divide takes on a quasi-objective form, structuring, pressing upon and 
conditioning the social field of urban space. 
 In Paulo Lin‘s City of God, except for very brief trips to the beach, hospital, and prison, 
the action of the novel takes place entirely in the favela. More than this, the characters of the 
novel are figures who, if they do indeed have links (social, familial, otherwise) or insertions 
(laboral, intellectual, otherwise) outside of the space of the favela, are portrayed as if those 
linkages had little to do with their essence as characters. Indeed, the only outside linkages that 
have a structural position in the novel are the arrival of various trucks (gas, beer, etc) which are 
then robbed and the arrival of police who kill, rob, terrorize and are occasionally killed 
themselves.  
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 If one examines the approach to the favela in Cinema Novo, in which it was a featured space of an aesthetics 
focused on the lumpen proletariat, one quickly notices, first, how the spatial cordoning on sees in later works does 
not apply (the space of the informal city is permeable and permeated) and, second how, across these works, the 
favela functions on a conceptual level always in tandem with the quilombo—marking it as haunted by the memory 
of liberated slave communities.  
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 The narrative of City of God is divided into three parts, with each part covering a section 
of time ranging from the 1960s to the early 1980s and featuring an overlapping cast of 
characters. The final section, ―Tiny‘s Story, The Late 1970s and Early 1980s,‖ narrates a gang 
war that irrupts when Tiny, a drug kingpin, rapes the girlfriend of former military parachutist 
Jose, or Knockout, in front of him. This scene sets off a chain of events that leads to Knockout‘s 
transformation from a hardworking, low profile member of the favela into the leader of a rival 
armed force engaged in a fight to the death against Tiny‘s gang. Knockout is one of the few 
characters in the novel that undergoes a transformation; unlike many others, he is not presented 
as a flat, directionless cypher for pure, violent desire unchecked by any superego. Moreover, 
Knockout is one of the few characters who are presented as having experience outside the favela: 
―Jose worked as a bus conductor, was finishing high school at night in a state college on Seca 
Square and played soccer every Saturday afternoon—the only time he was ever around people 
his own age, because he wasn‘t really the chummy type‖ (324). 
 Knockout is then one of the few characters whose development references the classical 
novelistic tradition. The majority of characters in the novel are rendered without a past or future, 
and therefore without the set of drives and restraints that would allow them to engage in 
―rational‖ future-oriented interaction. The novel, for example, opens with two young boys, 
Stringy and Rocket, smoking a joint together and Stringy recounting his dreams of becoming a 
lifeguard. These are dreams that will not come to pass, as the novel consistently negates at every 
turn its characters‘ attempts to connect their present with a desired future and with an exit from 
the favela‘s violence. Tiny is another example of this lack of depth or lack of future. After raping 
Knockout‘s girlfriend, he comes looking for Knockout. His motivation: ―He‘d kill Knockout so 
that what had happened to Sparrow wouldn‘t happen to him‖ (328). In Tiny‘s reaction there is 
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only a brutal flatness, not the complex interior depth of the classical novel; not future orientation, 
but rather only conditioned response.  
 Knockout as a character is different because he leaves behind the path of a quiet, if not 
successful, life that bridges the morro (informal city) and asphalto (formal city) for one that 
reconstitutes itself within the violent banal flatness of Tiny‘s world. Once Knockout‘s 
grandfather and brother are killed by Tiny‘s gang, Knockout enters into an all out war with Tiny, 
building a sizable army of youths and engaging in multiple, long-running clashes with Tiny‘s 
forces. In the process Knockout is wounded multiple times and hospitalized, only to come back 
to the favela to try to finish off Tiny. This is how he is described before the final series of battles 
that leads to his death: 
 
His eyes stung, but that‘s all—the tears did not come, and what good were tears anyway? 
Crying didn‘t change a thing. All he could do was allow his desire for revenge to well up. 
He had flashbacks of the sheet covering Grandpa Nel stained red, Steak-and-Fries with 
his head blown off, his darling being abused, the wall of his house riddled with bullet 
holes, his dog full of lead, and now the image of a blood-stained Antunes was about to be 
embedded in his memory. He reached Miguel Salazar Street, where the morning breeze 
was stronger, but fuck the breeze and the sun burning his face! What he really wanted 
was for it all to be an illusion, for his brother to be alive. He caught sight of the crowd. 
Blood ran down his pants leg and made the inside of his sneakers slippery. (392) 
 
This scene and the opening scene of the novel are critical—they are the two moments in which 
those who dream or those who bridge the gap between favela and the outside are brutally forced 
back inside it. In this scene, the possible narrative path set up for Knockout at the beginning, a 
path of transformation, possibly leading him to rising social status, is foreclosed.  
 Merely pointing to the inability to represent and sustain attention on the linkages between 
the formal and informal cities in this novel and the other cultural objects of the period would 
perhaps be enough to show how the abstraction of the favela has come to life, structuring the 
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field of social relations through an absolute divide. However, I think there is an additional layer 
of interpretation that we can advance. The flatness of the characters in City of God results from 
the inability of anyone to shield themselves from violence and thus to be sucked into the cycle of 
retribution that structures the novel (and its social world). As the novel presents it, the tragedy of 
Knockout‘s character is that he had a chance to exit, but in terms of the narrative the reason why 
he cannot is because he is not a fully realized individual in the classical novelistic tradition—that 
is, presented as having psychological depth and complexity. Rather, Knockout is susceptible to 
the flatness that inflects the novel‘s other subjects. Perhaps this flatness is artistic critique—I am 
not arguing for or against that. What I am interested in is the mechanism: that full subjecthood, 
as conveyed by the narrative code of classic realist literature, is possible in only certain spaces of 
the urban. As a result, the ―favela‖ is unable to contain subjects who are not potentially sliding 
back into flatness, much like it is unable to contain multiple forms of social relation (such as 
intra-peripheral class differentiation or familial spatial distribution) or determined linkages with 
any space outside it. The way the real abstraction of the favela comes to weigh and press upon 
urban social relations is as an invisible iron wall, wherein the phenomenology of this real 
abstraction as a lived experience can only be tragedy. What we can see in the character of 
Knockout is how the absolute divide between the formal and informal city produced in social 
scientific and journalistic literature takes on an objective force, how it comes to be an 
unquestionable structure of the narratives of novels like City of God and provides the 
narratological justification for their tragedies.
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because modern political spaces emerged as a response to a challenge, they have configured themselves in 
very precarious and contingent terms….but because those same spaces are also capable of housing within 
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It is important to make sure there are no misunderstandings. My argument is not that 
there are no distinctions between the lifeworlds of the morro and the asphalto or between the 
peripheral areas and middle and upper class areas of urban areas in Brazil. Nor is it that in City of 
God there is not something tragic about how the characters get pulled back into the favela. What 
is at stake is that presumption that this is all there is—that the divide, the gap, is taken to be the 
full structuring of the situation. What I am interested in pointing to is how this gap takes on a 
quasi-objective form in the novel; it is both unremarked on but constantly present. As such, what 
I am describing here is how representations (such as the  novel) can participate in a process of 
the production of a real abstraction (in this case, the favela) which, through the cumulative effect 
of such representations, become something more than just a representation; the category 
becomes a force, a thing structuring social relations. 
 
A Singular Knowledge 
We can see another version of the favela‘s force as a real abstraction—this time as 
creating the conditions for the possibility of knowledge and a will to truth—if we turn to one of 
the last decade‘s most discussed films, Tropa de Elite (2007). The film draws upon one of the 
centerpieces of intellectual production on public security and the favela: a series of books written 
by Luiz Eduardo Soares, former Secretary of Public Security for the Lula administration and a 
well-known, left-leaning sociologist and political theorist, which have circulated as forms of 
intellectual knowledge about the favela, as middle class bestsellers, and as the basis for Tropa de 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
themselves the mobilizing forces of subjective and social liberty it is necessary to confront the great crisis 
of globalization—the fulfillment of the modern contradiction—with a new spatializing intent. (xx) 
 
The way that the real abstraction of the favela hypostasizes an absolute division between the formal and informal 
city functions as a form of respatialization; however, instead of mobilizing new forces of liberty this spatialization 




Elite and Tropa de Elite 2. Soares‘s work, along with that of his co-authors Andre Batista and 
Rodrigo Pimentel, has moved across a variety of media platforms and sites of distribution and, as 
a result, has become perhaps the most important and formative set of ideas about security and the 
favela in circulation today in Brazil.  
 Elite da Tropa (2006), a book co-written with Andre Batista and Rodrigo Pimentel which 
served as the basis for the 2007 film, presents a series of ―fictionalized‖ accounts of stories about 
the BOPE (the Battalion of Special Operations Police), a 150-member squad of the Rio police 
that comprises one of the most lethal urban operations units in the world (former members of the 
BOPE frequently move into the private sector advising the Israeli and other armies on techniques 
of urban warfare). The BOPE was created during the dictatorship in 1978, but took on its current 
form in 1991, that is, during the ―transition,‖ once the state and national governments switched 
from a politics of favela eradication to favela containment. 
As a film Tropa de Elite was a surprise success. Shot on a shoestring budget it sold 
thousands of pirated copies on the street in Brazil before being re-edited and released in theaters, 
and it stands as one of the most terrifying and innovative cultural productions in the new favela 
genre for the way it generates new subjectivities for the public security state. The film tells the 
story of, and is narrated by, Captain Nascimento of the BOPE and traces two events: 
Nascimento‘s search for a replacement from the ranks of the BOPE and a major operation by the 
BOPE to pacify the Morro dos Prazeres favela in advance of a visit by the Pope to Rio. 
Nascimento has two potential successors, Neto and Mathias, and the film traces their evolution 
through the initial stages of training as Nascimento‘s voice-over measures for the audience their 
weaknesses and strengths and their progress in internalizing the worldview of the BOPE. In both 
characters, we watch the insertion of their subjectivities into the new police logic of the state, and 
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in this watching we are guided by Nascimento‘s voice-over which serves as both judge and jury, 
highlighting for us the positions the faithful servants of the security state must take up. For most 
of the film, Matias is the frontrunner in this search, and the film traces his subjectification in 
great detail.  
 Matias, played by Afro-Brazilian actor Andre Ramiro, is the figure whom the film uses to 
stage its condemnation of any thought that is not that of the police, and wherein we can see the 
force of the idea of the ―favela‖ conditioning not just social relations but knowledge. Matias, in 
addition to training for the BOPE, is enrolled in law school, which leads to a series of scenes set 
in comfortable university classrooms where Matias is the only (visible) person of color. In his 
voice-over, Captain Nascimento tells us that this interest in the university and these people was a 
failing of Matias, that he was ―soft at heart.‖ Enrolling in school is read for us as a personal 
failing to completely submit to the logic of BOPE, in which there are only friends and enemies, 
either friends of traffickers or those who fight to save society from them. In a world in which an 
absolute division between the formal and informal city rules, the logic of the friend-enemy 
becomes the only possible social relation.  
Indeed, the film rehearses this same absolute division that we saw in City of God by 
putting the well-meaning, left-leaning university students who run an NGO in the favela in 
awkward, embarrassing, or naïve positions (especially when confronted with what the film 
portrays as the harsh, dog-eat-dog reality of life in the favela). The film goes to great lengths to 
portray these students as ―out of touch‖ with ―reality,‖ possibly racist, and secretly fascinated by 
the perverse reality of the favela (a theme which is repeated in many popular films, such as the 
Paulo Lins authored Quase Dois Irmãos). The students and their NGO are, in the logic of the 
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movie, on one side of a divide, a divide that the movie portrays as uncrossable: the divide is real, 
total, and permanent.  
 Matias, however, is (similar to Knockout) the only character who circulates between the 
world of the BOPE-favela and the world of the middle class. The film uses Matias to 
demonstrate that this divide truly conditions all social relations and that there can be no crossing. 
This is nowhere more clear than in a scene in which, for his law class, Matias has to complete a 
group project on Foucault. During the group‘s presentation to the class, the film portrays the 
students prattling on about discipline, excessive force and the police as Matias quietly fumes. 
Finally, he explodes. Matias‘s discourse is of intense interest. He opens by saying the students 
don‘t understand the police, but he does not deny that the force used by the police is excessive 
nor that many urban poor frequently have few other prospects than the drug trade. His speech 
then moves immediately to a different conceptual register, repositioning the debate in a different 
field: ―The traffickers don‘t see grey, they don‘t accept excuses.‖ As Matias‘ argument unfolds, 
the discursive field is shifted completely from a debate concerning the limits of sovereign power 
and the social distribution of the surplus to a political logic imputed by Matias to the traffickers 
in a favela: the logic of the friend/enemy.
85
 It is clear, though, that this logic is less that of the 
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traffickers than that of the BOPE and that one of the film‘s aims is to effect this displacement of 
the abuse of the sovereign power to kill from the BOPE itself to the traffickers. 
 What is most interesting is not Matias‘ argument per se, but rather how the film has 
positioned him as black and as a trainee of the BOPE, as having access to what I call ―the 
singularity of the favela.‖
86
 The reason why Matias‘ argument leaves the room silent is not that it 
is better formed or more deeply reasoned. Rather the room falls silent because we are being 
shown that Matias‘ classmates recognize the film‘s ―truth‖: that deep in the heart of the favela 
there is a singularity and that there are two groups who have access to it. The first are those on 
the other side of the divide: the racialized others. Matias‘s classmates do not know he is a BOPE 
trainee so for them his access to the truth comes from his racialized social location. However, for 
the film‘s viewers, who know Matias is a BOPE trainee, the message is that the only group 
outside the favela with access to its truth are the BOPE. The film‘s affective pedagogy is to 
implant the idea that the middle classes, the intellectuals, anyone from the outside, can never 
have access to this singularity. This is a spatialized and racialized truth. If the social science 
literature produced the favela as an abstraction it is in films like Tropa de Elite that we can see 
that abstraction become real, determining not only social relations but the kinds and forms of 
knowledge that are possible. In the end, the film reveals how the specific linkage between the 
police and the new real abstraction of the favela has changed the social space occupied by the 
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police: no longer just the perpetrators of state violence, the police have become the guardians and 
producers of the only legitimate knowledge of the favela as well.  
 
Equivalence and the Law 
Accounting for the production of the favela as real abstraction severely puts into question 
the primary explanation for the ―favela‘s‖ existence—juridical exclusion—and the 
accompanying political solution to exclusion—integration. As we have seen, the tendency to 
homogenize incommensurable spaces into the category of the ―favela‖ is what gives it its 
salience as an academic and popular cultural term, although amongst both activists and 
researchers there is a growing acknowledgement that this equivalence is problematic.
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 However, 
this tendency to equivalence, even when acknowledged as an issue, as we saw with the 
Observatorio das Favelas at the beginning of this chapter, still structures the majority of accounts 
of the ―favela.‖ This inability to be avoided, the way meaning cannot help but fall into the 
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 The 2004 conference Favela é Cidade was important in this respect; as has been the work of Valladares (2005). 
Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva, who amongst social scientists working on urban violence has been, up to a point, a 
critic of the state and public security policies, has also noted the problem of equivalence (following the work of 
Valladares); see ―Violência urbana, segurança pública e favelas - o caso do Rio de Janeiro atual,‖ where he writes: 
 
É claro que, embora habitadas pelas camadas subalternas, elas nunca foram o espaço exclusivo de 
concentração dessas camadas, que sempre estiveram distribuídas também pelas áreas que, para simplificar, 
venho denominando genericamente de territórios da pobreza. Tampouco apresentam a homogeneidade 
interna que lhes atribui a perspectiva dominante, o que, aliás, seria impossível, dado o vertiginoso 
crescimento que as levou a corresponder, na atualidade, a cerca de 15% da população carioca, vivendo em 
750 a 800 localidades, a depender das definições operacionais adotadas. Tudo isso está exaustivamente 
demonstrado pela literatura especializada: há vários tipos de áreas de concentração das camadas 
subalternas, além do que as favelas são diferenciadas (internamente e entre elas) por qualquer critério, 
socioeconômico, cultural, político, moral, etc. (Valladares, 2005). Mas o reconhecimento desse fato tem se 
restringido à pesquisa acadêmica. Apesar de todos os esforços, pouco interfere no debate ordinário, nas 
políticas governamentais e na própria autoimagem dos moradores dessas áreas. 
 
Within the larger field of urban studies, the dichotomy of formal and informal as a means of understanding 
contemporary urban processes (in particular in the capitalist world periphery) has received an influential critique in 
the work of Ananya Roy and Nezar Alsayyed. See their edited volume: Informality: Transnational Perspectives 
from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004). 
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gravitational field of equivalence is how we can recognize the presence and power of a real 
abstraction.  
This tendency to equivalence and then the absolutization of a division between ―favela‖ 
and formal city is apparent even in the best recent work. What is important to push back against 
is not just this false equivalence but also the way this work justifies an absolute division between 
formal and favela by claiming the distinction is based in the juridical exclusion of the informal 
city. For example, Bryan McCann‘s Hard Times in the Marvellous City: From Dictatorship to 
Democracy in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro (2014), cognizant of the problems of equivalence, 
opens with a detailed differentiation between favelas, irregular subdivisions and housing projects 
(pgs. 24-31). However, as we can see in his introduction, the framework of the book‘s narrative 
(which is one of moradores‘ struggles for inclusion), despite this acknowledging of difference 
across informal spaces, is determined by a juridical, zone of exclusion (that is, absolute) 
difference between the formal city and favela: ―Mobilization and Reform had offered an 
opportunity to erase the boundary between favela and city. After the Breaking Point and 
enduring the Unraveling, that opportunity seemed more distant than ever, and favelas were 
perpetuated as zones of exception, where the rule of law and guarantees of citizenship did not 
apply‖ (16).  
Focusing on the production of the favela as real abstraction challenges this account in two 
ways. First, I have attempted to give a non-juridical account of how the favela emerges as an 
object of discourse and then as a force structuring social life. That is, there is no question that the 
legal regime for formal and informal parts of the city is different. However, the legal regime 
amongst favelas, irregular subdivisions and housing project is varied—and often what is termed 
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―favela‖ encompasses several different (disputed) legal regimes and historical layers.
88
 More 
importantly though, the weakness of the juridical account is that it assumes the legal sphere is 
immediately cultural. Even if we assume legal exclusion defines a consistent, absolute distinction 
between formal and informal city (which it does not), this juridical exclusion has to be put into 
cultural practice, it has to be become lived. There has to be some mediation between the legal 
and the cultural, and this is precisely what McCann and others are unable to track. As a result, 
instead of asking how did this absolute division become produced as a widely shared cultural 
assumption, they take the end product of a process of real abstraction (the absolute division 
between formal city and favela) as what needs to be explained. The easy answer, then, is the 
absolute division is explained by juridical exclusion. What my account argues is that it is the 
process of production of the absolute division as an ―actually existing thing,‖ and not the 
absolute division assumed as an actually existing thing, that needs to be explained.  
Second, the political solution offered by McCann, as is common for those who assume 
the favela/formal city divide as the ―problem‖ (rather than the object whose existence must be 
explained), is integration and more citizenship. A focus on real abstraction leads us to de-reifying 
this absolute division and allows us to focus on the myriad ways the favela and formal city are in 
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 Moreover, accounts that center on (juridical) ―exclusion‖ as the origin point of the ―favela‖ tend to ignore the 
complicated and functional parallel set of norms and accepted traditions that govern transactions in informal urban 
settlements. There is a significant literature tracing these norms or ―o direito da favela,‖ which are generally seen as 
being produced in conversation with state-defined norms; see Raquel Rolnik ―São Paulo, um século de regulação 
urbanística: para quem, para quê?‖ Cadernos IPPUR, Cadernos IPPUR, ano XI, 1.2 (1997): 131-162; Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos, O discurso e o poder: ensaio sobre a sociologia da retórica jurídica. Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio 
Fabris Editor, 1988; and Alex Ferriera Magalhães, O direito da favela no contexto pós-programa favela-bairro, 
IPPUR dissertation, 2010. Most importantly, the problem with ―progressive‖ accounts that use juridical exclusion as 
a point of revindication is that this very framework has now been adopted by the state as the justification (―ausencia 
do Estado‖) for a new set of policing campaigns in Rio, the UPPs (Unidades de Polícia Pacifcadora) begun in 2008. 
What this adoption, in my opinion, should force us to realize is that even informal spaces of the city are saturated by 
relations with the state. The idea that there is an absolute divide between morro and asphalto defined by juridical 
exclusion, then, is not an empirical condition that must be decried but rather part of the ideological matrix produced 
by state and capital. See Marcella Carvalho de Araujo Silva and Monique Batista Carvalho ―Circuitos políticos em 
uma favela pacificada: Os desafios da mediação,‖ DILEMAS 8.1 (Jan/Fev/Mar 2015) 63-76, for a summary of the 
state argument for a ―vazio institucional‖ (p. 67-8) in the favelas and how the experience of the favela of Morro do 





 My political perspective is that the various forms of informal urban 
settlement are, in fact, already integrated into the formal city and this specific integration, which 
is economic, marks the limits of citizenship as a means of redress.
90
 Put simply, the political 
corollary of the juridical exclusion perspective is to over-emphasize the importance of the state 
and to completely miss the centrality of the existence of the favela in contemporary urban capital 
accumulation in Brazil. That is, no amount of voting or redistribution of the social surplus 
through state programs will change this fundamental economic integration, which determines a 
whole host of issues from labor market segregation to exposure to real estate speculation and 
land seizure. The problems of the favela, namely poverty, land seizure, and state violence, are 
problems whose origins are in capital and which are not caused by the state (via legal exclusion) 
but which are extended and exacerbated by that legal regime. Thus, on a political level, we have 
to start with the existence of these multiple integrations and ask why they are unable to be 
spoken of, why they do not enter into critical accounts of the ―favela.‖
91
 The weakness of the 
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 There is a nefarious side to the intellectual genealogy of ―integration‖ in the present. Frequently, increased 
integration and participation are seen as the sine qua non of means to promote ―democracy.‖ However, as Renato 
Ortiz‘s Cultura Brasileira e Identidade Nacional (1985) details, integration was a central policy framework of the 
dictatorship. There is a sense in which integration—as a general political modality—rather than representing a 
democratic break with the dictatorial past, represents its continuation into the present.  
90
 One can imagine a counter-argument to my approach here which would run: ―But claims for integration are what 
the struggles of favela residents (however you want to define them) have looked like since, at least, the 1970s. By 
discounting the actual form political struggle has taken you are falling into an idealist, utopian position; your 
perspective cannot account for the form actual political struggles have taken.‖ My response to this kind of counter-
argument has two points. First, I am not saying legal exclusion does not have a role in the production of informal 
spaces—rather I am contesting whether it is fully explanatory and whether it is the primary cause. Second, I would 
push back against accounts that retroactively read all resistance in informal spaces as claims for integration. As I 
have highlighted consistently throughout this chapter, there is a subterranean history of riots and rebellions by urban 
proletarian and surplus populations which the liberal, pro-democratic narrative is forced to elide in order to produce 
its well-organized and sanitized image of community leaders engaging in productive discussions with the state. I 
would argue that this ―image‖ of how politics has functioned in informal spaces is rather not a ―reality‖ but is in fact 
the situation that clientalist state structures have attempted to produce.  
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 See Gary A. Dymski ―Ten ways to see a favela: Notes on the political economy of the new city,‖ Revista 
Econômica, 13(1): 7-36 for one recent recognition of the importance of these ―integrations.‖ Mariana Cavalcanti 
Rocha dos Santos has examined what she termed a ―paradoxical‖ inclusion-exclusion dynamic or ―the paradoxical 
ways in which the favelas‘ (shantytowns) social reproduction hinges simultaneously on their progressive 
commoditization, legalization and incorporation into the fabric of the so-called ―formal‖ city and on their 
constitution as residual "territories" of global flows of drugs and weapons by a drug trade that thrives on reinforcing 
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juridical account of zones of exclusion, then, besides reifying the particularities of different 
informal settlements which do not share the same juridical status, is that it cannot account for 
this integration of labor and land into capitalist accumulation in contemporary urban Brazil—
precisely because of its over-emphasis on the state. 
 
Other Than a Standpoint? 
Cultural critics‘ response to these literary (and filmic) works has seen in them a return to 
realism and has fallen along two lines: many such as Beatriz Jaguaribe, celebrate these new 
cultural productions as a form of testemunha (testimonio) that ―articulate their power of 
representation by positing a vital connection between significant personal experience and 
testimonial veracity‖ (―Beyond Reality,‖ 261). In contrast, some critics like Karl Erik 
Schøllhammer have sounded cautionary notes that it is occasionally difficult to distinguish 
between ―compromisso social‖ and ―marketing‖ in these works:  
 
Percebe-se, então, uma linguagem em texto e imagem que incorpora a crueza da 
realidade periférica, numa representação midiática pasteurizada que dilui qual quer 
problema de conteúdo e do ‗como‘ dar visibilidade a esse tipo de questao…. Aqui, fica 
claro que já não e mais possível avaliar o engajamento ou o compromisso com a 
realidade pela opção temática e nem pelos conteúdos escolhidos, uma vez que a realidade 




Outside these occasionally cautionary notes, the vast majority of the vast critical output on these 
novels and films has lauded their critical force, a force derived in part from the positionality of 
their authors. For example, Nelson de Oliveira in his introduction to the edited anthology Cenas 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
their spatial and social boundaries‖ (Of shacks, houses and fortresses An ethnography of favela consolidation in Rio 
de Janeiro, University of Chicago dissertation, 2007).  
92
 Translation: One sees, then, a language in text and image incorporating the rawness of peripheral reality, a 
pasteurized media representation that thins both content and the problem of 'how to' give visibility to this type of 
question… Here, it is clear that is not possible now to assess the engagement or commitment to reality for the theme 




da favela (Scenes from the Favela) argues that these new writers represent an overcoming of the 
prior ―romantic‖ modes of representation of the favela, as seen in films such as Orfeu Negro 
(Black Orpheus, 1951) and Orfeu (Orpheus, 1999). Oliveira writes: ―The fact is that, up til now, 
no author from the centro, from a middle class or upper class neighborhood, has succeeded in 
completely escaping the stereotypes and has registered the true face of the peripheral universe‖ 
(16). This reality effect can be seen in the first edition of Ferrez‘s Capão Pecado which comes 
with photo inserts of the author hanging in the favela of Capão Redondo in the southeast of São 
Paulo.
93
 While there is a long tradition of writing on the periphery and on lower income areas, 
only now are there widespread claims being made in the realm of cultural production that in 
order to capture the real of the favela, one has to come from inside it. 
What we can see in Tropa de Elite is that the testimonial structure that much critical work 
has celebrated is easily inverted, which should make us pause given the amount of celebration of 
this as the central contribution of new cultural production on the favela. If for cultural 
progressives new cultural production from the favela carries a critical realism in the form of 
giving space to marginalized voices, Tropa de Elite shows that this belief, that only authentic 
voices can express the truth of the favela, can be a truth or singularity that only the police have 
access to. Rather than getting trapped in an undecidable debate over whether these novels are 
―authentic‖ cultural products of marginalized persons or coopted, spectacularized forms of 
capitalist cultural production, what I have tried to do in this chapter is show their strange force 
lies not in the truth that they speak but in the abstraction that animates them. As cultural critics, 
what should also give us pause is that a linkage between progressive political formations and 
variations on testimonio or social location has deep roots within Brazilian cultural thought, 
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 It is worth noting that these authors‘ positional knowledge is, of course, not unaffected by other mediations. The 
majority of the information for Paulo Lins‘ City of God came from interviews he conducted for a research project 
into trafficking led by the anthropologist Alba Zuluar. 
129 
 
specifically in the literary criticism of Antonio Candido and Roberto Schwarz. Turning to their 
work can help us think about the limits of aesthetic production and our most common forms of 
critical response in a moment of the emergence of new forms of real abstraction.
94
 
But before doing so, it will be helpful to briefly sketch another line of heterodox Marxist 
thought which has been concerned with impersonal forms of domination; what we might loosely 
define as ―value-form theory.‖
95
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, critics, such 
as Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, began to point to the ―transformation problem‖ in Marx‘s Capital; they 
argued that Marx had confused and no coherent way of relating price and value in his work. The 
Russian author I. I. Rubin, in his Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value (1928, first English 
translation 1973) responded to these critiques by arguing that Marx was actually not interested in 
explaining the world through bourgeois economic categories (such as price) but rather saw 
capitalism as producing a form of social life shaped by the ―value form‖—in Rubin‘s case, the 
commodity fetish. In the 1970s, a group of German theorists, known as Neue Marx-Lektüre 
(New Marx Reading), drew on Rubin (and Evgeny Pashukanis) in attempt to refound Marxist 
thought after the exhaustion of orthodox Marxist programs. 
These authors, including Hans-Georg Backhaus, Helmut Reichelt and Alfred Schmidt, 
argued that Marx‘s Capital, which had been taken as a text about labor, exploitation, and direct 
class domination, had been completely misunderstood. The Neue Marx-Lektüre reading of 
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 At the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s there was a debate in Latin American studies about the nature of 
testimonio literature. The 1970s and 80s had witnessed an explosion of testimonial writing in Latin America, 
frequently alongside new forms of political mobilization (the case of Rigoberta Menchú being the most well-
known). Certain critics took this work as being proof that subalterns could indeed ―speak‖; while others, particularly 
after the canonization of this work in U.S. academies and its commodification in the market place, took a more 
cautious approach (for a summary of debates see Georg M. Gugelberger, The Real Thing: Testimonial Discourse 
and Latin America [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996]). What I want to suggest in this section is that 
current debates over ―favela realism‖ replay in certain ways this prior debate about testimonio but also that the idea 
that social location and access to knowledge are linked has a much longer history, one that is rooted in class-based 
Marxism, stretching back at least to Lukács‘ History and Class Consciousness. 
95
 The domain of work related to either contemporary or historical version of value-form theory is now very large 
and defies easy summary. My approach here focuses on a specific variant of it, Neue Marx-Lektüre, and the work of 
Moshe Postone, who shares some, but not all, of their ideas.  
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Capital emphasized not labor and the extraction of surplus value, but, drawing on the work of 
Adorno who was the teacher of Backhaus, on how capital produced a world of indirect social 
domination. Through detailed readings of the first chapter of Capital, which many interpreters 
skip over or dismiss as ―dialectical wordplay,‖ they presented a new picture of Marx as a 
theoretician of the value form. As Backhaus wrote in his classic 1968 essay ―On the Dialectics of 
the Value-form‖: 
  
In the foreword to Capital Marx energetically warns against neglecting the theory of the 
value-form: ―For bourgeois society, however, the commodity form of the products of 
labour or the value form of the commodity is the economic cell-form. To the uneducated 
its analysis appears to turn on minutae.‖ ―The human spirit has sought in vain to ground 
the value-form for more than 2000 years‖, the Ricardian school included. From the 
quotation it follows that Marx claims to have unravelled, for the first time in the history 
of research, this ―puzzling form.‖ (99) 
 
For Backhaus, Marx‘s project was not just the critique of the existence of this ―‘objective 
semblance‘ which constitutes the ‗mystical character‘ of the commodity‖ (103) but rather an 




 The Neue Marx-Lektüre reading of Marx—a critique of most prior interpretations of 
Capital—was also one of the theoretical foundations underpinning the workers‘ movement. Both 
the German school and subsequent authors influenced by them, such as Moshe Postone, argued 
that prior forms of Marxism and Marxist theory (whether orthodox or heterodox) were based on 
labor, as opposed to value—meaning that they were based in the standpoint of labor or a theory 
of capitalism as defined, primarily, by the exploitation of labor and the production of surplus 
value. Authors in the value-form tradition hold that capitalism is first and foremost a system of 
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 This brief summary does not begin to do justice to Backhaus‘ work. For a more detailed account see Riccardo 
Bellofiore and Tommaso Redolfi Riva ―The Neue Marx-Lektüre: Putting the critique of political economy back into 
the critique of society,‖ Radical Philosophy 189 (Jan/Feb 2015): 24-36. 
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impersonal domination. Postone, for example, argues in Time, Labor and Social Domination: A 
Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory (1993) that the standpoint of labor implies that 
capitalism is seen as a system of two classes where one, through possession of the means of 
production and the juridico-legal structure based in private property, directly dominates the 
other. This leads traditional Marxists into a politics based, not in the transformation of 
production itself, but merely on a redistribution of the social surplus. Postone argues that what 
the failure of ―actually existing socialism‖ demonstrates is that there can be no redistribution of 
the social surplus as ―solution‖ to capitalism, rather the entire system of production must be 
overturned. As a result, the forms of domination that structure capitalism are not, Postone 
continues, private property or forms of direct domination but rather impersonal and take place 
through the production of quasi-objective structures.  
Let‘s return then to the work of two of Brazil‘s foremost cultural critics: Antonio 
Candido and Roberto Schwarz as examples of the deep roots in Brazilian thought of a link 
between progressive political formations and variations on testimonio or social location. Antonio 
Candido‘s classic essay ―Dialetica da Malandragem‖ (1970) traces the origins of both a 
specifically Brazilian national identity, the malandro or the ―hero without character,‖ and a 
specific foundational form of Brazilian carnavalesque realism back to Manuel Antonio de 
Almeida‘s Memorias de um sargento de milicias (1852). Candido argues that the novel has a 
vision of society as composed of two spheres, one of order and one of disorder, and that it is the 
malandro who passes between the two, undercutting the hierarchies of the world of order by 
exposing it to the traditions of disorder. This refusal of ―morals‖ and the ―questão de policia‖ 
makes Memorias ―talvez o único em nossa literatura do século XIX que não exprime uma visão 
de classe dominante.‖ For Candido, then, the malandro is the outsider, the proletariat in the 
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Roman sense of ―those who have nothing,‖ who undoes the hierarchies of domination. Roberto 
Schwarz‘s work is associated more with an Adornian critique wherein master artists (such as 
Machado de Assis) condense a society‘s contradictions into literary form. However, in Schwarz 
as well, and especially in his important review of Lin‘s City of God, a central element of any 
society‘s contradictions are those of class. As he writes in his review, we witness in the novel 
―(without promoting any political illusions)…[the] activation of a different class‘s point of view‖ 
(―City of God,‖ 109).  
What Schwarz and Candido‘s positions have in common is that their form or means of 
cultural critique is derived from what we might call traditional Marxism or from the standpoint 
of labor. The critical perspectives of Schwarz and Candido derive from the idea that there is 
something in the subjugated knowledges or cultural forms of the marginalized (be they 
conceived as the proletariat or simply as a marginal population weakly integrated into the 
productive apparatus) that if released into the cultural sphere can contribute to a project of the 
undoing of the hegemony or domination of one class by another.
97
 We can imagine now how 
critics of impersonal domination, such as Neue Marx-Lektüre and Postone, might respond:  they 
would argue, instead, that the forms of domination that structure capitalism are not (primarily) 
direct forms of class domination but, rather, impersonal, and take place through the production of 
quasi-objective structures such as the value form and real abstraction. The point of this 
theoretical exercise is not that the state and capital do not try to control knowledge production 
and suppress certain forms of knowledge, but rather that this is not the only, not perhaps in 
certain moments, the most important, form of social domination one find in capitalist societies. 
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 It is important to note that my argument here is not that indirect domination is the only form of domination in 
Brazil: the police are real, and direct domination exists. My aim here is rather to put pressure on the link between 




What I have tried to bring out in this chapter is that while certainly the world of 
representation and the public sphere exist, there is another, more impersonal form of domination 
that textual and intellectual production contributes to in certain historical moments and 
situations, and that is the production of real abstractions. My point is that there is a real limit to 
the kind of work that can be done on a representational level by cultural products when they are 
caught up in a moment of producing a real abstraction. Neither the critical perspective of 
Candido or Schwarz, nor any of the other celebrations of the realism of new works on the favela, 
can address the new forms of abstraction that underpin the production of the ―favela‖ as an 
object in the period after the crisis of hyperinflation, breakdown of the myth of racial democracy, 
and the spread of new forms of state violence. This inability then is a limit, a real one, of the 
aesthetic in a moment of financial crisis, in which the fiction of money breaks down, creating a 
need for new forms of real abstraction to replace its role in capitalism‘s impersonal forms of 
domination.  
 Having noted this limit, we cannot simply fall into the grand hotel abyss (as Adorno was 
once accused of doing).
98
 Rather as cultural producers and critics we must learn to stay in the 
room with the intractability of real abstraction as a force in our social worlds, and not overvalue 
nor overestimate the work of representation. Part of this staying with the intractability of real 
abstraction means recognizing that the structuring of urban social relations and knowledge by the 
real abstraction of the favela has proven a durable one. In particular elite/high cultural production 
in both São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro focused on peripheral communities has had difficulty 
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 This was Georg Lukács assessment in the 1962 preface to Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay 
on the Forms of Great Epic Literature, trans. Anna Bostock, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 22: ―A 
considerable part of the leading German intelligentsia, including Adorno, have taken up residence in the 'Grand 
Hotel Abyss‘. . .a beautiful hotel, equipped with every comfort, on the edge of an abyss, of nothingness, of 
absurdity. And the daily contemplation of the abyss, between excellent meals or artistic entertainments, can only 
heighten the enjoyment of the subtle comforts offered.‖ 
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escaping from the force field of the favela‘s real abstraction. However, in a recent (2013) film 
shot in Brasilia, A cidade é uma só? (which blends documentary and fiction), we can see a 
conscious attempt to break with the forms of abstraction that underpin the discursive formation 
of the favela and to maintain an anticipatory distance from its fields of strange force.  
 The film follows three individuals, all residents of Ceilândia. As is well known, Brazil‘s 
capital city, a testament to high Modernist design and planning, contained no residences for the 
workers who built the city. As a result they settled in informal settlements and in 1969 the 
government initiated a massive publicity campaign and program of removal of one such 
settlement, which sat in the flight path of international flights landing in the capital. These 
residents were removed to Ceilândia where they were promised titled lots and infrastructure. 
There they found neither. The three individuals who the film follows are all residents of 
Ceilândia. One, Dildu, is running for vereador distrital on a platform that promises to end the 
institutional racism (in education, health, and employment) faced by those from Ceilândia. 
Another, Nancy Araújo, is a folk singer who as a young school girl participated in a government-
run publicity campaign for the removal, singing a song written to convince residents it was their 
duty to move, ―A cidade é uma só.‖ The third, Zé Antônio, is the brother-in-law of Dildu who 
spends the film alternately helping him campaign and cruising around Ceilândia looking for 
people who are selling their property.  
 The film documents three things which are pertinent to our discussion: first, Ceilândia is 
being absorbed into the formal city and all around high rise condominiums are going up. Second, 
because of the modernist framing of Brasilia we have informal settlements being read not as 
overdetermined ―favelas‖ but within a different frame, occasionally ironically invoked but 
frequently provokingly so: the utopian promise of one city for all. Finally, the film focuses 
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extensively on transport: many of the scenes are of the long bus rides Dildu takes to get to his 
job, Nancy driving to a radio station, or Zé driving around Ceilândia or out further in the 
countryside. The film reveals that the line between informal and formal is never static, that it is 
shaped by the pressures of land speculation and capital accumulation occurring through the 
construction sector. But at the same time the film extracts discourses on peripheral areas from the 
abstracted forms of the megalopolis and positions the thought of informality not in a frozen 
horizon of integration but rather in the empty category of the jingle ―A cidade é uma só.‖  
 Perhaps just as important and relevant are the aesthetic means used to accomplish this. 
The film never formally presents any of its subjects. As well, it never formally defines any 
territory or notes a transition from formal to informal parts of the city. The film operates from an 
aesthetics that is marked by its indirection and its distance. Never presenting a topic like land 
speculation or the transformation of Ceilândia into condominiums directly, the film allows these 
thematics and processes to emerge from the space and the speakers themselves, never wholly, 
always fragmented, frequently as an intuition. In one of the final shots of the film, we see in the 
distance across a barren, red dirt lot an ad for a coming high rise development. This distance is 
the aesthetic wager of the film: instead of participating in the abstractions that circle the space 
like vultures, this distance opens the possibility that something else might appear.  
 
Violence, Abstraction, and the Failures of Finance 
The title, at least, of Christian Marrazzi‘s The Violence of Finance Capital (2011) would 
seem to promise some remarks on the connection between finance and violence. The few 
references the book contains on violence mostly employ violent as adjectival modifier for 
different financial processes:  
136 
 
Beginning in August 2007 with the explosion of subprime loans, the financial crisis looks 
more and more like a long-term crisis, a crisis paired with a credit crunch, banking 
bankruptcies, continuous interventions by monetary authorities not able to structurally 
influence the crisis; there are costly actions of economic revival, risks of insolvency of 
individual countries, deflationary pressures and possible violent returns of inflation, 
unemployment increases and income reduction. (107) 
 
…and prices of financial assets (which can both increase and decrease) violently explode. 
(108) 
 
This is the moment when wage constriction is violently manifested, exactly like the 16th 
century enclosures where access to land as a common good was repressed with the 
privatization of the land and the putting wages to the proletariat. (119) 
 
Is there a connection between finance, the rise of finance, and violence that goes beyond the 
merely adjectival? What could our discussions of the connection between hyperinflation and 
national popular breakdown in Brazil contribute to it? 
 In Latin American studies, the topic of violence has received a great deal of attention in 
the last decade. Much of this work has attempted to address the paradox of rising or expanding 
forms of violence, social war, and ―failed‖ states during a moment of ―increasing‖ democracy in 
the region. Most often the diagnosis that has been advanced is that the failure of strong states has 
led to the proliferation of state and non-state violence across the social field.
99
 These 
explanations tend to think of the state and violence primarily in Weberian terms: the state is 
defined by a monopoly on violence and if there is violence in the social field then it must be 
caused by an issue with the establishment or maintenance of this monopoly. As a result, in this 
work, the cause of increasing violence is seen as the lack of a strong state which can lead also to 
a downplaying of state forms of violence.  
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 For one influential and widely cited version of this argument see Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (eds.), Armed 
Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America (New York: Zed Books, 2004). More recently, there 
have been attempts to think democracy and proliferating violence not merely as paradoxical, but rather as co-
constitutive, see for example Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M Goldstein (eds.), Violent Democracies in Latin 
America (Durham, NC: Duke, 2010). Another important work which attempts to push back against the failed state, 
proliferating violence paradigm is Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (eds.), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006).  
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 What happens, however, if we think of the state not primarily as defined by a monopoly 
on violence, but rather from the perspective of finance, in particular as the need to socialize debt 
and financial crisis? The position I want to advance here is that the main shift in peripheral states 
has not been a ―slimming down‖ leading to loss of the monopoly of violence, but rather a shift in 
their mediating function: not a decrease in the size of the state, but rather a shifting of resources 
from welfare and aid programs into policing to enforce a socialization of finance and debt. 
Thinking about Latin American states primarily via Weber and the monopoly on violence 
misses how peripheral states were formed as devices of mediation between internal populaces 
and external flows of capital; a relationship that is very apparent in the late nineteenth century 
during the creation of Latin American export economies.
100
 However, even at the height of the 
national popular moment and developmentalist ideology, states essentially continued to perform 
this function: directing external capital flows into their desired substitution strategy in the 
interior. In the case of Brazil, perhaps more so than other Latin American states, this position of 
the state is very apparent. In the early 1960s, a debt crisis was pressing and the solution was a 
military dictatorship with a commitment to adapting itself to a new form of mediation and 
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 I have tried to develop this argument in more detail in another piece of writing that compares Justo Sierra and 
Michel Foucault to sketch the differences in the process of state formation in Mexico. One piece of the argument 
shows how this mediating function which is so key to Latin America state formation is entirely absent from 
Foucault‘s work: 
 
I want to return briefly to an argument of Foucault‘s which I discussed at the outset. Foucault argues that 
the shift between the rasion d’Etat and the liberal state was marked by the creation of a principle of 
governmental regulation that was internal to government: whereas in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries law was used to control and limit the sovereign, the problem of liberal governance or what 
Foucault calls this new ―governmental rationality‖ was ―governing too much.‖ It was a shift from external 
limitations, from rights and a government based on right and wrong to internal limitations and government 
based on success and failure. I have argued here that the ―limit‖ played a much different role in the thinking 
of Justo Sierra and in the functioning of the Mexican state during the Porfiriato. Externally, the Mexican 
state was concerned with fomenting foreign direct investment and playing world powers and banking 
interests off one another as a solution to an on-going debt crisis and thus was not an exploiter of an 
―unlimited world market.‖ Moreover, internally, the state‘s policies, as we have seen in Sierra, were not 
referred to the kind of ―correct or not,‖ ―too much or too little‖ logic that Foucault describes as being at the 




opening itself to a greater volume of international capital. While it is the case that states, such as 
Brazil, do lose a certain amount of control over their external insertion and internal dynamics as 
new financial architectures are imposed on the world economy after 1973, this ―loss‖ should not 
be seen as an oscillation between sovereign control and external control, but rather as a shift on 
the continuum of the Latin American state‘s role as mediator of external flows.
101
  
Frequently in theorizations of new forms of or increasing violence in the periphery, the 
assumption is made that less state means more disorder and thus an increase in non-state 
violence as states recede, lose control, and shrink. A different, less developmental state-nostalgic 
perspective would be to start from the state as mediator; thus, in the 1980s and 90s in Brazil the 
state begins to take on a different mediating function: instead of regulating, directing, and 
opening the country to certain forms of international capital, now its mediating function is to 
socialize the debt crisis and to ensure payment. Once the decision is made not to default, all that 
remains is the mediation or the decision which social group(s) will bear the burden of paying for 
the debt. The socialization of this debt onto peripheral and working class groups generates the 
unrest associated with hyperinflation and unemployment. It is to impose this socialization and 
successfully perform its mediating role that the Brazilian state doubles down on state violence, in 
direct and indirect forms. The state then does not merely get out of the business of social welfare, 
it transfers these resources into the repressive apparatus. 
Racialized state violence as a material practice and new forms of real abstraction are what 
appear when the saltos of finance capital miss their mark, when they stumble and fall, when the 
circulation of M-C-M‘ (money – commodity – money) fails to complete. The turn to racialized 
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 In other words, the beginning of neoliberalism does not signal a radical break between a period in which Latin 
America states were ―autonomous‖ and one in which they are now the puppets of the IMF, World Bank, etc. My 
position is rather there is much more continuity between these two periods and that focusing on the state as a 
mediator for international capital flows demonstrates that continuity.  
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state violence in order to impose a socialization of debt is an attempt to fulfil a mediating 
function, to partially complete the failed saltos of finance. This is why the moment of finance‘s 
rise is accompanied by those ―unpolitical‖ gestures of marginalized surplus populations, which 
have been rejected and erased by state and progressive historians alike: riots, looting, saques. 
The popular measures adopted in a moment of financial crisis are precisely the inverse of 
finance‘s failed saltos and the state‘s socialization strategies: saques are the seizure of what 
finance makes scarce. The politics of the saque is the politics of a counter-salto, jumping directly 
from C to C, a refusal of the failed mediation of finance (money) and a recognition that the state 
is attempting, through a socialization of the debt, to close this gap, complete a failed leap. What 
we can see in the complicated politics of the saque is the important role that seizure—perhaps 
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E (Elio Gaspari): Como saideira, Gullar, como é que voce ve as perspectivas de socialismo no Brasil hoje? 
F.G. (Ferreira Gullar): A longuissimo prazo…. A longuissimo prazo… 
E: E com juros! 
F.G.: E com juros!... 
 






At the beginning of the 2000s, the general financial and political crisis of Latin American 
countries had been ―stabilized‖ and Mexico and Brazil moved to a new model of finance and 
export-led accumulation. This model, in Brazil, had two components: personal credit to spur 
domestic consumption and the export of primary commodities (in particular minerals and oil to 
China and other countries). As such, the new economic model was a mix of financial and 
extractive industries. One of the distinctive features of this period in Brazil is the degree to which 
the state was able to harness global capital flows and channel them into personal credit structures 
and operating capital for corporations, thereby enabling a (temporary) boom fueled by domestic 
consumption and extractive ―national champions.‖ In this chapter, I trace three transformations 
that the massive entry of finance into Brazil after 2003 has wrought: a form of (failed) financial 
corporativism, a projective structure of feeling, and a certain kind of subjectivization. In each 
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 E: And to conclude, what do you think about the possibility of socialism today in Brazil? 
FG: Very distant…. Very distant… 
E: and with interest! (E makes a play on words here, prazo is the period of a loan but also means more generally 
―time‖) 
FG: and with interest! 
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case, my aim is to be attentive to finance‘s fragility or instability: finance-led booms last only as 
long as the financial flows do. Thus, part of what this chapter traces is how once the financial 
boom begins to fade, the state turns more and more to violence and policing in order to seize 
assets, control unruly populations, and supplement the failed corporatist machinery.  
In the opening section of this chapter, I chart the expansion of personal credit (which has 
been woefully understudied) as a form of financial corporativism during the PT governments in 
Brazil since 2003. As well, I examine some of the principle cultural mediations of credit and the 
role of Rio de Janeiro as the site of the production of these mediations, in particular the transition 
from discourses of racial democracy to credit democracy elaborated in the 2012 telenovela (or 
novela in Brazilian Portuguese) Cheias de Charme. In the second part of the chapter, drawing on 
the work of Raymond Williams, I turn my attention to finance‘s structure of feeling and how the 
mental act of projection has secured legitimacy or acquiescence to the spread of finance across 
different social situations and shaped new social relations of credit. In the final section, I 
examine the kind of subjects that the personal credit expansion has produced. Here I argue that 
credit expansion has produced a form of the subject as a pass-thru or gateway in which the state 
is less concerned with subjects‘ interiority and more with facilitating the seizure of assets or 
income. This seizure requires a concomitant expansion of militarization and the threat of state 
violence which further hollows out the subject. I conclude by returning to Rio de Janeiro to ask 
what imbrications between new public security strategies (the UPP) and finance might tell us 
about coming political formations in Brazil.  
 
Credit, the Corporativist ―Miracle‖ 
148 
 
The so-called ―new middle class‖ of Brazil has been the object of countless studies and 
homages—perhaps to the point of exhaustion. They have been called the new batalhadores, seen 
as a new source of wealth ―at the bottom of the pyramid,‖ and heralded as the protagonists of a 
new era of Brazilian politics. However, what went overlooked or under-analyzed, for many 
years, in these paeans and pesquisas is perhaps today finally coming to the surface: namely, the 
centrality of credit—which is not a wage but rather money one has to pay back and with 
interest—in this Brazilian ―miracle‖ and the state‘s role in providing it. What was lost amongst 
the celebrations of ―sustainable development‖ and upward class mobility is that since 2003 
Brazil has witnessed a massive expansion of personal credit, across almost all sectors of society. 
With the slowing of GDP growth, starting in 2012, and after the popular uprisings in June 2013, 
there is more space now for critical approaches to this most recent boom and for questioning the 
role of the state in producing a situation in which as of July 2015 21.5% of families are behind 
on one credit account (CNC n.p.) and where the APR on some credit cards has hit 345% and 
APRs of at least 200% are common (Martello n.p.).
103
  
While real wages most certainly did rise in the period after 2003, the expansion of credit 
has been just as strong.
104
 Since 2003, the total amount of credit to pessoas físicas has grown 
from R$ 84,792 milhões to 789,428 milhões as of May 2015 (Banco Central, ―Relatório de 
Economia‖ n.p.; Banco Central, ―Política Monetária‖ n.p.).
105
 Total credit to households as a 
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 For example, a featured interview in the December 2014 issue of the Brazilian credit industry‘s trade journal 
Credit Performance with political scientist Murillo de Aragão is framed by his declaration, ―A expansão do crédito 
para alavancar o crescimento econômico parece ter chegado ao limite‖ (Balthazar 9). Through the first six months of 
2015, 93 Brazilian companies have had their credit ratings downgraded and U.S. investment banks are now 
investing in Brazilian debt collection agencies in anticipation of increasing defaults (Levin n.p.; Pacheco n.p.). 
104
 Between 2002 and 2013 the minimum wage in Brazil increased from R$ 200,00 to R$ 678,00, an increase of 
70.49% (Vozes 19).  
105
 The Banco Central do Brasil divides its reporting of credit to individuals (pessoas físicas) into two categories: 
―recursos livres,‖ which includes such things as crédito consignado, credit cards, cheque especial, and auto loans 
and ―recursos direcionados‖ which include housing, BNDES, and rural development loans. The numbers above refer 
to the total amounts of lending in the ―recursos livres‖ category.   
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percentage of GDP (a common rule of thumb for measuring the amount of consumer credit) is 
hovering around 46%, having grown from 18% just a decade ago (Banco Central, ―Séries 
Temporais‖; The Economist n.p.). Most importantly, currently debt service takes up roughly 22% 
of all disposable income in Brazil (Banco Central, ―Relatório de Estabilidade‖ 22; Banco 
Central, ―Séries Temporais‖). For comparison purposes, debt service in the United States is equal 
to 9.92% of income and, in the months before the 2008 financial crisis, broke 13% for the first 
time since the Federal Reserve began tracking these numbers in 1980 (Federal Reserve n.p.). 
What this means in practical terms is millions of people all over Brazil paying massive amounts 
of interest for homes full of appliances, for new or used cars, and, increasingly, for their homes 
themselves. However, credit has been sold by the governments of the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT) as a part of a process of ―democratization,‖ of making society more ―inclusive,‖ and while 
it may change consumption patterns, mass credit has most certainly made a great deal of money 
for those holding the loans (which includes a broad selection of national and foreign elites, as 
well as state banks). The rapid expansion of mass credit during the Lula and Dilma 
administrations, and its effects on social and cultural life, then, remains an under-researched 
question (Müller 2014) and my approach to it in this section will be as an attempt by the state to 
rebuild its corporativist machinery which neoliberal policies had undercut. The creation of 
structures of financial corporativism is accompanied by a new kind of national cultural 
integration or imaginary, one which I will call, credit democracy, to emphasize its historical 
roots in and difference with racial democracy. 
In the process of financial liberalization in the 1990s, many Latin American countries 
privatized, to various degrees, their banking systems. What differentiates Brazil is the degree of 
public control maintained via the government‘s direct and indirect control of large pension funds 
150 
 
(Jardim 5), as well as public banks such as Caixa and Banco do Brasil and the development 
bank, BNDES. These forms of government control over public money have made possible the 
attempted reorientation of the Brazilian economy around internal demand supported by mass 
consumer credit (as well primary commodity exports). Due to its control of these large state 
banks and other financial levers, the federal government can incentivize or prime the amount of 
personal credit in the market. However, under the Lula administration, the state went one step 
further, in essence creating a ―new‖ form of personal credit, known as crédito consignado.
106
 
While all forms of personal credit can be thought of in some way as enacting a kind of financial 
corporativism (as the state ultimately can regulate how much credit is being offered by lenders 
and the state controls the legal environment defining different credit modalities), crédito 
consignado represents a more direct form and a discussion of the rise of this credit modality 




 One of the key instruments that have made possible the expansion of consumer credit was 
the massification of a formerly little used modality of credit, crédito consignado, which occurred 
in 2003-4. Crédito consignado functions essentially as a payroll deduction loan, which means 
that as long as someone is employed in the formal economy or is receiving their retirement 
benefits, their loan payment is deducted directly from their paycheck or benefits payment. As 
such, the loans carry very little risk; in particular loans to retirees are almost risk-free. As of May 
2015, crédito consignado accounted for roughly 33% of all credit to individuals (including auto 
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 The legal framework for payroll lending had existed since the 1930s and BMG had been making consignado 
loans to governmental employees since the late 1990s (Ferreira 8).  
107
 In addition, a large portion of all credit to individuals has been provided by state-owned banks, and their share of 
lending is increasing, from 35% of all loans in 2009 to 55% in 2015 (Associated Press n.p.). As well, instead of 
reading the recent past in Brazil has part of a ―transition to democracy,‖ my approach emphasizes rather the carry-
over of corporativist and state policing structures and the tendency to secure state control through their capillary 
extension and amplification (Wiarda; Zaverucha). 
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loans) and since 2005 the amount of consignado loans has increased 382% to total, as of May 
2015, R$ 263 bilhões (Banco Central, ―Política Monetária‖ n.p.; ――Empréstimo‖ n.p.).  
The creation of crédito consignado forms a part of a larger story of what Roberto Grün 
has termed the ―financeirização de esquerda‖ and Ricardo Antunes ―sindicalismo de negócio.‖ 
As Grün notes, Central Única dos Trabalhadores [CUT] and Força Sindical had, in the 1990s, 
begun to fight for control of or influence over large pension funds (Grün ―A Evolução‖; Grün, 
―O ‗Nó‘‖). By 2003, these large union federations, in particular CUT, which has close ties to the 
PT, began undertaking negotiations that would allow them to offer consignado to union members 
(Moreira A4). While the rhetoric of the unions was of attacking banks (i.e., negotiating lower 
interest rates for members), in fact the unions were contesting with the banks for financial 
service revenue streams (Weissheimer). When in November of 2003, CUT signed a deal creating 
a crédito consignado structure for some of its members, Lula‘s finance minister, Antonio Palocci 
was present at the signing, highlighting the degree of government support in preparing and 
promoting the new credit form (Moreira A4).  
In September 2004, the Lula government extended crédito consignado to individuals with 
INSS benefits, in effect massifying the consignado credit structure beyond the PT union-linked 
base (Salomon; Gigliucci). The lower interest rates led to the quick expansion of consignado to 
INSS recipients and the slow extension of consignado from public to some private workers. In 
practice, the consignado loans function like a line of credit. The INSS, for example, sets a cap on 
the amount that can be lent from an individual‘s benefit payment (currently 30%).
108
 If a retiree 
gets a monthly benefit payment of R$ 1000, they can have up to R$ 300 per month deducted 
directly from their payment. This R$ 300 functions like a line of credit which the retiree can use 
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 On July 7, 2015 the government raised the limit from 30 to 35% but this extra 5% can only be used for paying 
down credit cards. In essence the limit which can be used for new debt continues to be 30%.  
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to make commodity purchases or put towards a payment on a car or even house loan. Many 
consignado providers also offer credit cards, allowing part of the credit to be used through this 
modality.  
Crédito consignado was from the very start a government-linked program and part of an 
attempt to promote domestic consumption after the recession of the early 2000s.
109
 Lula‘s 
finance minister Antonio Palocci declared in 2003 that he expected R$ 20-160bn in consignado 
loans to be made, and when it became apparent that this wasn‘t happening, public banks began to 
buy the loan portfolios of smaller banks like BMG (Banco de Minas Gerais) who were making 
the majority of consignado loans (this functioned like a form of securitization, allowing the 
banks to make more loans; Rodrigues; Nascimento; Ferreira, Leitão and Sadi). While much has 
been written about the Bolsa Familia as a wealth redistribution program, it amounts to only .05% 
of GDP per year (Watts). Accumulated domestic credit in Brazil, as noted before, stands at 
roughly 55% of GDP. Credit then has been the PT government‘s most important strategy of 
attempted ―wealth transfer‖; the question is in what direction is the wealth really flowing, as 
even with 21-32% APR (current rates for consignado loans for public employees [Banco Central, 
―Taxas‖]) many consignado borrowers can end up, depending on the length of the loan, paying 
back almost double, or more, of what they have borrowed and none, as long as they are 
employed in the formal labor market (for active workers) or are alive (for retirees), have the 
ability to stop, skip, or renounce payments. 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a widening gap between the formal and informal labor 
markets and the increasing inability of the state to mediate the capital-labor relation through 
traditional corporativist structures (Bensusán and von Bülow; Boito Jr.; Veloso). The movement 
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 Credit provision has been an important part of the recent boom, as 50% of GDP growth seen in the last ten years 
has come from private consumption (The Economist n.p.).  
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of the PT as the party of labor into control of pension funds and the movement of unions 
themselves into financial services was an early reformulation of these corporativist structures. 
The central instruments of mass credit, such as crédito consignado, are developed from within 
and by union structures and then taken over by social security and the private sector. Thus, the 
expansion of personal credit should be seen, along with the expansion of state police and 
paramilitary forces in the same period, as a structure that emerges to reestablish a form of social 
control beyond the processes of production, outside the traditional form of capital-labor 
mediation through the wage—which is not to say this traditional form of mediation has entirely 
disappeared, rather it has been supplemented by credit and state violence. The fact that state 
violence and credit as non-traditional corporativist structures emerge at the same time is 
important because the utopian promise of credit, the ―equality‖ through consumption it promises, 
is highly unstable and primarily illusory. Thus, as we will see, not only is the utopia of credit one 
that leaves critical social relations, particularly those of social reproduction, untouched, it also 




A Nova Classe Média (Parcelada) 
 The debate over the social effects induced by the rise of credit in Brazil has played out 
through the discursive construction and contestation over a category that has been labeled, ―a 
nova classe média.‖ While both real wages and state income transfers have grown since 2003, 
the key documents which have produced and promoted the category of the new middle class—
regardless of the problems with their definition of class—depend, in ways that generally have not 
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 Initially, mass credit is tipped in favor of union employees, which functions as a reinforcement of Brazil‘s labor 
aristocracy (in the Bakunin sense), but this does not last for long. While crédito consignado is never formally 
extended to those in the informal sector, informal workers have access to credit through retail stores  and through the 
practice of lending credit cards to friends or family members to make purchases.  
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been foregrounded, on the expansion of credit.
111
 I start here in order to deconstruct this category 
that has received a wide projection and to demonstrate its dependence on credit expansion. While 
traditional approaches to the definition of economic classes are based in income, social status, or 
location in the relations of production, discursive constructions of the new middle class have 
centered on, or made space for, not only income, but the kinds of objects in a home. Thus, the 
idea of a new middle class has been at least partially defined—frequently without being 
explicitly stated—by what can be purchased with credit. It is this association of the new middle 
class with consumption tout court (occurring by wages or borrowed funds) which has carried 
over into the journalistic media and popular consciousness and has led to the creation of a new 
cultural imaginary of credit democracy.  
The category of the ―nova classe média‖ was advanced in key ways by two documents. 
The first was a classificatory system which began to be used by the Associação Brasileira de 
Empresas de Pesquisa (ABEP) and which was developed in the late 1990s (ABEP pers. comm.), 
known as the Critério de Classificação Econômica Brasil (CCEB) or, simply, the Critério Brasil. 
The Critério abandonded ―a pretensão de classificar a população em termos de ‗classes sociais,‘‖ 
that is through income (Associação n.p.). Instead the Critério builds classes (into the standard 
Brazilian system of A-E) through a point system based on consumer objects in the home and the 
level of education of the ―chefe de familia.‖ Here the hidden dependence on credit in the 
                                                          
111
 I am bracketing here a larger debate about the definition of class in these works on the nova classe média, in 
particular the Bourdieusian and Marxist critiques they have received. For example, Brazilian sociologist Jessé Souza 
in Os Batalhadores (2012) argues, from position informed by Bourdieu, that definitions of the ―nova classe média‖ 
that focus on power of consumption are economistic and as such miss the crucial spectrum of symbolic and cultural 
capital. Philosopher Marilena Chaui (2013) has argued, in a series of talks that have circulated widely in the 
Brazilian blogosphere, for a more traditionally Marxist definition of the middle class as defined by their position in 
the relations of production (see also Pochmann 2014). My argument with the Bourdieusian and classical Marxist 
positions is that they also push into the background the credit expansion, thus rendering it as invisible as in the 
economistic approaches.  
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definition of the new middle class is clear as both consumer items, and frequently education, 
depend on the provision of credit for purchase.  
The second document, Marcelo Neri‘s 2010 A Nova Classe Média: O Lado Brilhante dos 
Pobres (published by the prestigious Fundação Getulio Vargas), created a classificatory system 
based on income in which 50.9% of the population had become by 2009 classe C, or ―middle 
class.‖ However, it also gave, if not analytic weight, then descriptive space to the ABEP 
approach of thinking of class as a function of the power of consumption (Neri 52 passim). While 
Neri‘s approach is based in income, it also makes room for the Critério association of class with 
the power of consumption. 
What is important is how in the Critério, Neri‘s work, and the flood of popular press and 
journal articles that followed the publication of A Nova Classe Média, this new power of 
consumption defines a new national subject—the new middle class or classe C which now 
encompasses over half the population. As Neri writes, classe C ―é a imagem mais próxima da 
sociedade brasileira‖ (5). The literature on the nova classe média, in its academic, business, and 
popular flavors, produces a new national subject, one not just of production (of labor, the wage, 
and the worker), but of finance and consumption, and, more specifically, of credit. The 
discursive framing of equality through consumption, which is then amplified in various mass 
cultural products, define a new national imaginary, not of racial democracy, but rather of what 
we might call ―credit democracy.‖   
  
From Racial Democracy to Credit Democracy  
 As discussed in Chapter 2, during the 1930s and 40s, the Vargas dictatorship, like many 
Latin American states at the time, incorporated a theory of mestizagem into the formation of a 
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national popular culture (Alberto 9-11; Telles 177-180). While the Vargas state incorporated 
elements of Afro-Brazilian culture (samba, carnival, futebol, malandragem) into the foundation 
of Brazilian national culture, intellectuals elaborated a theory of ―racial democracy,‖ which 
celebrated Brazil as a country without, or with minimal, racial discrimination. Peripheral urban 
areas (in particular those of Rio de Janeiro, then the national capital) occupied a contradictory 
place in national popular culture as they doubled as sites for racialized proletarian exclusion and 
national culture. This system of national integration via a ―racially democratic‖ national culture 
began to break down in the 1980s and 90s for two reasons. First, the 1982 debt crisis, 
hyperinflation, and the implementation of neoliberal reforms meant that the Brazilian state put 
fewer resources into the corporativist structures which had underpinned this imaginary. Second, 
starting in the military dictatorship, militant black intellectuals began to question the myth of 
racial democracy, arguing that it was more a technique of social control used to mystify and 
pacify peripheral populations than an ideal that the Brazilian state was committed to realizing 
(Alberto 17). 
 With the ―stabilization‖ of the Brazilian economy in the 2000s and the coming to power 
of the PT, the state began to rebuild its corporativist machinery of which, as we have seen, the 
provision of credit was an important part. In the discourses around the nova classe média we can 
see the beginnings of a new collective imaginary, used to fuse individuals into the nation. The 
imaginary that has been produced has not been a return to racial democracy, but rather what we 
might call credit democracy. While government-linked discourses around the nova classe média 
begin this process of articulation, it is in mass cultural production where the new subject 
positions and horizons of this formation have been fashioned and disseminated nationally.
112
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 This is part of a larger recalibration of the state‘s approach to race in this period; see Reiter and Mitchell (2010) 
for a window into this new environment and Joseph (2013) for a summary of the different positions in current 
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These cultural productions, much like the national cultural productions of the Vargas period, are 
overwhelmingly set in Rio de Janeiro, which continues to serve as the backdrop for the creation 
of national cultural imaginaries. In the following, I discuss one such production, the 2012 novela 
Cheias de Charme and its crafting of a form of credit democracy. If racial democracy was 
concerned with producing forms of cultural commonsense that obscured real structures of racial 
and class domination, the imaginary of credit democracy posits a false equality of consumption 
which obscures, as well, very real differences in access to goods and services as well as forms of 
race and class inequality that cannot be overcome by credit-based consumption. At the same 
time, Cheias reveals the imaginary of credit democracy to be an internally fragile one, as the 
dreams of social accession in the novela itself cannot be realized through increasing wages or 
credit but rather require the deus ex machina of pop stardom.   
 Cheias de charme tells the story of three women—Maria da Penha (Taís Araújo), Maria 
Aparecida (Isabelle Drummond) and Maria do Rosario (Leandra Leal)—employed as domestic 
workers, who form a music group ―As Empreguetes‖ and become an overnight sensation. 
Cheias, a Globo novela, was on the air from April 16, 2012 to September 28, 2012 and while not 
the most successful Globo novela of the moment (that would be Avenida Brasil), its narrative of 
lower class upward mobility became a frequently cited point of reference for the changes in and 
debates over the new Brazilian ―middle class‖ (Mauro and Trindade; Grijó). However, Cheias, 
more than Avenida, articulates the presumptions and horizon of credit democracy, in part 
because its plot turns around the very notion of equality and the overcoming of differences 
between social classes. In the novela, the lives of the three Marias are turned upside down after 
their self-recorded song (and video) go viral. Their accession to pop stardom makes them into the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
debates on racial democracy in Brazil. As should be clear, I think there has been an important shift away from the 
discursive nexus of racial democracy. 
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social equals of their former bosses and enables them to enact all their fantasies of 
consumption—during the novela they buy houses, reform them, and fill them with 
electrodomésticos.
113
 The show then does not specifically focus on credit, but rather on the 
credit-form or the fantasy of equality via credit-based consumption. That is, credit exists in the 
background, occasionally appearing in moments of consumption, while the show itself models 
the fantasy of credit-enabled consumption, namely the ability to transcend or suspend one‘s 
socio-economic position. This mix of the belief in potential equality through consumption and 
the obscuring of structural class and race difference through their (temporary) suspension is what 
defines the cultural imaginary of credit democracy.  
Cheias is a form of Latin American telenovela which has become very popular and 
lucrative in recent years. By making novelas that center on fictional pop groups (the Argentinean 
novela Rebelde Way was among the first in this genre), media companies have been able to add 
additional revenue streams, including CD and single sales of the songs made popular on the 
show, concert tickets, etc. While the show itself was popular, part of its wide cultural 
dissemination was its utilization of multiple media platforms, including the singles spun off from 
the show and contests in which domestic workers were invited to submit their own videos with a 
chance to win a guest appearance on the show. In Cheias, the first single from the group, ―Vida 
de empreguete,‖ condensed a series of cultural concerns, perceptions, and aspirations over the 
new middle class and credit expansion—which can be seen in part by the number of parodies and 
remakes the single has received in different cultural mediums, in particular on the internet video 
site Youtube. This single mixes references to credit-enabled consumption with class-based 
revenge fantasies against cruel mistresses and their vain, ungrateful offspring. In short, the song 
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 In one episode (#79), Penha buys a new car (a Volkswagen) and cooks dinner uses her new kitchen while Cida 
dines in the same restaurant as her former employers, much to their disgust.  
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mixes affects resulting from structural positioning with the aspirational content of this 
positioning‘s suspension: 
 
Todo dia acordo cedo  
Moro longe do emprego 
Quando volto do serviço quero meu sofá 
Tá sempre cheia a condução 
Eu passo pano encero o chão 
A outra vê defeito até onde não há 
 
Queria ver a madame aqui no meu lugar 
Eu ia rir de me acabar 
Só vendo a patroinha aqui no meu lugar 
Botando a roupa pra quarar 
 
Minha colega quis botar  
Aplique no cabelo dela 
Gastou um extra que era da parcela 
As filhas da patroa  
A nojenta e a entojada 




Levo vida de empreguete, eu pego às sete 
Fim de semana é salto alto e ver no que vai dar 
Um dia compro apartamento viro socialite 




Cheias and the song ―Vida‖ draw on academic and journalistic accounts‘ framing of the 
rise of the nova classe média as a narrative of the production of equality through consumption. In 
the single, this equality (―compro apartamento‖) is linked to the suspension of the domestics‘ 
structural positioning (―um dia‖). In the case of ―Vida,‖ this positioning is determined by the 
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 Translation: Every day I wake up early live far from my job/ When I come back I want my couch/ 
Bus is always full/ I mop the floor and wax/ Another sees a mistake where there‘s none/ I want to see the madam 
here in my place/ I would die laughing/ Just seeing boss-lady here in my place/ Putting clothes in to soak/ My friend 
wanted to put extensions in her hair/ Spent an extra portion which was parcelada (credit)/ The daughters of the 
employer are disgusting and revolting/ They only know how to exploit and are worthless/ I live the life of an 
empreguete (maid)/ I‘m up at seven/ On the weekend, put on high heels and see what goes down/ One day I‘ll buy 
apartment and become a socialite/ Everything good, travelling with my lover 
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division of labor of social reproduction, of who does the dirty work of ―passando pano‖ and 
―botando a roupa‖ under the arbitrary power of others.
115
 However, credit-enabled consumption 
(―da parcela‖) cannot realize in a tangible way all the desires forwarded by the song ―Vida,‖ and 
thus the only way to make good on credit and consumption‘s promises of equality is through the 
external device of pop music stardom. That is, even the narrative universe of Cheias appears to 
lack faith in credit‘s ability to change structural conditions. This, then, is the contradictory 
imaginary offered by credit democracy: the belief in the possible overcoming of one‘s 
positioning in a certain set of social relations (or the belief in equality through consumption) 
accompanied by the suspicion that this overcoming will only be temporary or might be 
impossible.
116
   
There is a tendency for cultural objects in a moment of credit (such as Cheias and news 
reports on the ―nova classe média‖) to focus on those individuals whose positioning is most 
disadvantaged within the division of labor. Maids, cooks, and sex workers all attract attention in 
this moment as subjects of economic and journalistic reports: why? I would argue this is because 
credit promises equality but is, in fact, most adapt at delivering the temporary suspension of 
one‘s socio-economic location. Thus, the concern with figures positioned at the very low end or 
in the most socially degraded parts of the division of labor is driven by the impact of the 
suspension that can be realized there. Maids buying sofas; maids buying houses—the sudden 
traversal of this distance in consumptive power is a kind of sublime equality effect of credit and 
generates a good deal of the affective impact of Cheias as well as of journalistic puff pieces that 
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 One thing that cannot be paid for with credit is wages. Thus, of all of the changes in Brazilian households in this 
period, one thing that does not change drastically is the composition of the labor of social reproduction.  
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 Suspicion is an affective category that seems to accompany throughout history the introduction of new financial 
instruments: this was the case with the introduction of paper money in Great Britain in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries (Mary Poovey Genres of the Credit Economy [2008]) and early forms of credit instruments 
(Carl Wennerlind Causalities of Credit: The English Financial Revolution [2011]). 
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push the (false) equality of consumption. Moreover, in Cheias this equality effect of the credit-
form affects an erasure of race: domestics in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are predominantly 
women from Afro-Brazilian backgrounds, while in Cheias only one is visibly marked as Afro-
Brazilian (Taís). In this way, the form of credit democracy produced in Cheias has the added 
effect of making race almost completely disappear as a problematic of Brazilian society.  
The aspirational form of credit which underpins the imaginary of credit democracy 
presents itself as inheriting a prior socialist or social democratic imaginary of the wage as a 
mechanism for the redistribution of surplus. The promise of wage redistribution was not 
necessarily the promise of a structural change in or overthrowing of the relations of production, 
but it was most definitely a redistribution of wealth. Credit cannot fulfill either a function of 
redistribution or structural change; it can rather only deliver a temporary equality in (certain) 
patterns of consumption. Clearly equal consumption of refrigerators or airline tickets does not 
mean equal income, equal rights, or equal access to more prestigious or valuable goods (e.g., 
homes, education, pensions, state services or protections). However, contemporary discussions 
of credit in Brazil appropriate the aspirational language of previous left movements for the ends 
of sculpting a new national imaginary: credit is a net positive in these accounts, because it 
democratizes consumption and creates a more ―inclusive‖ society. While for many years the 
dominant discourse of consumption (via credit) was as a form of equality or democratization, its 
reality, which is perhaps more tangible now, is that it is a site of extended financial exploitation. 
While the state has controlled the spread of credit and the production of an environment 
in which consumption has been sold as a new form of equality, the state does not get to choose 
how this environment comes to be mediated culturally—though it has tried to influence this as 
much as possible. Through its promotion of discourses of the nova classe média, the PT state has 
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attempted to control the framing of credit expansion as a net positive; as we can see in Cheias, 
however, the cultural imaginary of credit and consumption has come with suspicion built into it. 
To the extent that state-promoted ideologies, such as racial democracy, attempt to suture real 
differences of race and class, such formations have always been in contradiction with the 
structural conditions out of which they were developed. The difference between racial 
democracy and the kind of credit democracy or promise of equality through credit-enabled 
consumption seen in Cheias is that the latter is a discursive form that appears to not entirely 
believe in itself.  
  
Finance, Fragility, and Affect 
 While the expansion of personal credit has not received the attention it has deserved, the 
rise of finance as a general phenomenon has not gone entirely unremarked. The most common 
approach within the ambit of critical literature in Brazil, which includes the work of Robert Grün 
and Francisco de Oliveira (amongst others), draws on a Latin American Gramscian paradigm 
which sees power as constituted by control of the state by hegemonic class fractions in alliance 
or in competition with one another. The Gramscian argument regarding finance in Brazil is that 
the class fraction tied to the financial sector (which now includes union administrators) has 
entered into a new alliance with the governing PT party, displacing the hegemonic power bloc 
linked to the industrial class fraction. This approach, while grasping aspects of the 
transformations the rise of finance has wrought, fails to explain how this rise has been justified 
and its effects on social relations. In this section of the chapter, after detailing de Oliveira‘s 
arguments concerning finance, I expand on the suspicion found in the formation of credit 
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democracy to explain the deep-seated connection between finance and unstable affective 
structures. 
 Francisco de Oliveira‘s insightful and acerbic essay on the trajectory of Brazilian 
underdevelopment, ―Duckbilled Platypus‖ (2003),
117
 argues that the international position of 
Brazil continues to determine much of its political and social formation. Oliveira notes, however, 
an important change from the developmentalist period to the present; namely, the emergence of a 
new class, wherein ―the upper layers of the old proletariat became, in part, what Robert Reich 
called ‗symbolic analysts‘. They are the administrators of the pension funds that originated in 
former state enterprises, of which the most powerful is Previ—the fund of the functionaries of 
the still state-owned Banco do Brasil‖ (54-5). Oliveira continues:  
It is this that explains recent pragmatic convergences between the PT and the PSDB, and 
the apparent paradox that Lula‘s government is carrying out Cardoso‘s programme, and 
radicalising it. This is not a mistake, but the expression of a genuinely new social stratum, 
based on technicians and intellectuals doubling as bankers—the core of the PSDB; and 
workers become pension-fund managers—the core of the PT. What they have in common 
is control over access to public funds, and an insider‘s knowledge of the lay of the 
financial land. The formation of this class in the periphery of globalized capitalism—
Reich‘s theories are essentially concerned with phenomena at the system‘s dynamic 
centre—needs closer scrutiny. For not only is there a new place for it in the system—
above all in the financial sector and its mediations in the state—which satisfies one of the 
Marxist criteria for defining a class; there is also a new class ‗experience‘, in Thompson‘s 
terms. (55-56) 
 
Oliveira‘s analysis of finance, which is insightful and helpful in many ways, is also limited by a 
sociological Gramscianism which conceives of social control as operating through the formation 
of class fractions and their sway over elements of the state or para-statal apparatus. In this 
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 In this piece, de Oliveira uses the metaphor of a duckbilled playatus (that is, of a creature who appears to blend 
elements which should not or traditionally do not belong together, i.e. the fur of a ‗mamamal‘ with the bill of a 
duck) as an ironic description of contemporary Brazi which, so he argues, has joined classic forms of dependency 
with the most contemporary forms of ‗casualized‘ labor. 
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approach, the effects of finance have been the creation of new sites of power and the 
modification of existing or production of new class relations.   
What the Gramscian approach to finance misses is both the everyday ways finance‘s 
legitimacy is enacted and tested and the fragility of these enactments. This fragility is visible in 
the uneven ways in which individuals and groups come to express their belief in, acceptance of, 
or acquiescence to finance‘s instruments, effects, and discursive justifications. Finance is able to 
legitimate itself, not because unions move into control of pension funds—although this is an 
important transformation—but through the kinds of feelings it effects or through the affects that 
it conjures, both pleasurable and contradictory. What this means is that there is a special relation 
between finance and affect and that a great deal of finance‘s acceptance as a form of governance 
and a form of social relation, depends on the ―animal spirits‖ of affect. Finance is a fragile 
construction because its effects last only as long as the flows of credit last, and these moments of 
calling to account are its moments of fracture and failure. Affect, then, is central to both the 
experience of finance and how finance secures the compliance or belief of individuals and shapes 
new social relations. 
Affect emerged as a topic of critical discussion in the early to mid-1990s, and since then 
scholars have produced genealogies of a set of linked, yet distinct, philosophical and cultural 
discussions of affect and emotion ranging from Heidegger‘s stimmung (mood), Spinoza‘s affect, 
and Benjamin‘s theory of emotion. In my approach to the relation between finance and affect, I 
draw on two bodies of work: Deleuze and Guattari‘s rearticulation of Spinoza‘s concept of affect 
and Raymond Williams‘ notion of a structure of feeling. From Deleuze and Guattari, I take the 




Deleuze and Guattari‘s notion of affect—as developed in A Thousand Plateaus—is based 
in the Spinozian conception of power (puissance) as the ability of one body to affect or be 
affected by another. As such, affect is always social, a relation between bodies and groups. As 
they write: ―Affect is the active discharge of emotion, the counterattack…affects are projectiles 
just like weapons; feelings are introspective like tools‖ (400).  Affect is then also associated with 
the transition from one state of being to another—―affects are becomings‖ as they write also in A 
Thousand Plateaus. However, Deleuze and Guatarri maintain as well a distinction between affect 
and emotion (or feeling): affects are generally see as pre-individual and mobile, while emotions 
are individual and result from the capture of affect by a given system of inscription or 
representation.  
Raymond Williams‘ notion of a ―structure of feeling‖ shares with Deleuze and Guatarri‘s 
theory of affect an emphasis on the transitional. Williams opposes structures of feeling to 
ideologies and institutions, arguing that structures of feeling are more transitory. A structure of 
feeling can anticipate the formation of a new ideological structure, but that doesn‘t always have 
to be the case. As Williams writes in Marxism and Literature—and note that his example here is 
of a structure of feeling tied to finance (specifically poverty caused by debt and the inability to 
inherit wealth):  
 
Early Victorian ideology, for example, specified the exposure caused by poverty or by 
debt or by illegitimacy as social failure or deviation; the contemporary structure of 
feeling, meanwhile, in the new semantic figures of Dickens, of Emily Brontë, and others, 
specified exposure and isolation as a general condition, and poverty, debt, or illegitimacy 
as its connecting instances. An alternative ideology, relating such exposure to the nature 
of the social order, was only later generally formed: offering explanations but now at a 
reduced tension: the social explanation fully admitted, the intensity of experienced fear 




As Heather Love has emphasized, structures of feeling are, in this way, diagnostic: ―For 
Williams, the primary value of feeling in this essay is diagnostic. In paying attention to things 
like tone, dress and habit, one may discover ‗social experiences in solution.‘ It is possible to 
detect impulses that are not yet organized as movements; we can understand and respond to a 
historical moment that is not yet fully articulated in institutions as the dominant mode of 
existence‖ (12). The fragility or instability of finance calls for constant diagnosis and 
justification: against the creeping sense that all that glitters is not gold, new forms of proof or 
explanation are called forth.  
Affect and structures of feeling then are, in a sense, what finance traffics in—finance is 
never long lasting, but rather, especially in the contemporary period, a crisis waiting to happen, 
as one asset bubble follows upon another. In this section, my aim will be to combine Deleuze 
and Guattari‘s notion of affect as what is shared on a pre-individual, social level with Williams‘ 
sense of a structure of feeling as diagnostic. I want to hold on the mobile, transitory nature of 
affect while combining it with the periodizing or analytical impulse of Williams. What I will 
argue is the affective structure specific to finance in Brazil does not lead to a new, fully formed 
ideological formation, rather it is a temporary structure which takes the shape of a form of 
anticipation or projection. Moreover, I will argue that finance, due to the fragility of its social 
formations and inability to sustain itself, operates primarily in this transitory, affective register.  
Affective structures sit on the border or mediate between the psychic and social, between 
the individual and society.
118
 The affective structure of Brazilian finance, which I call projection, 
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 For example, Sianne Ngai has argued that this bridging of the subjective and objective is inherent in emotion or 
feeling: ―Confusion about feeling‘s objective or subjective status becomes inherent to the feeling. Our readings of 
the Bartlebyan moments of inaction highlighted above have thus prepared us for a crucial reversal of the familiar 
idea that vehement emotions—in particular, the strongly intentional or object-directed emotions in the philosophical 
canon, such as jealousy, anger, and fear—destabilize our sense of the boundary between the psyche and the world, 
or between subjective and objective reality. In contrast, my argument is that a systematic problematization of the 
distinction between subjective and objective enunciation lies at the heart of the Bartlebyan feelings in this book—
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takes a variety of different forms: a social relation, an epistemological mode, and a loosely 
groupal assessment of the ―state of things.‖ It is in this opening onto the future, in its promise or 
projection, that finance secures its temporary (suspicion inducing) legitimacy by being put into 
practice, by shaping social relations, appraisals, and knowing. Neither merely the objective space 
of class fractions contesting for power, nor that of capital‘s colonization of subjectivity, finance‘s 
form straddles the psychic and social. 
The expansion of finance has passed through three relays into the everyday social world 
of Brazil: personal credit, the shift of corporations to capitalization (and thus entry of global 
capital) via the stock market, and a state-sponsored real estate and infrastructural boom. In the 
following, I trace one example of how the expansion of finance in each of these relays of 
financialization has been accompanied by a refraction of finance‘s projective affective structure. 
In so doing, I draw on a corpus of recent financial, sociological, and journalistic writing to read 
these pieces (occasionally against the grain) for the fleeting glimpse they give us of finance‘s 
projective affective structure.  
 
Post-Dating, or Social Relations of Credit. In 2006, Larissa Pelúcio‘s talk at the 12
th
 Congreso 
Brasileiro de Sociologia discussed a phenomenon that had emerged in 2005, early in the 
expansion of personal credit in Brazil, where straight men who frequented travesti sex workers 
(self-identified as ―t lovers‖) began organizing ―t days‖—days of celebration of travestis.
119
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
minor affects that are far less intentional or object-directed, and thus more likely to produce political and aesthetic 
ambiguities, than the passions in the philosophical canon. For just as the question of whether one‘s paranoia is 
subjective or objective is internal to paranoia, the historically feminized and proletarianized emotion of envy has 
another version of this problematic at its core‖ (Ugly Feelings 20-21).  
119
 ―Sexualidade, gênero e masculinidade no mundo dos t-lovers: a construção da identidade de um grupo de 
homensque se relacionam com  travesties.‖ Travesti is the Brazilian popular word and category for defining men 
who have undertaken feminine bodily transformations, especially by hormones and silicone, but who have not done 
male-to-female genital surgery. Therefore they cannot be confounded with transexuals, who have undergone sex 
change surgery (in the Brazilian typology, see for example Silva [1993], Kulíck [1998], and Pelúcio [2009]). In 
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These days, however, had one curious rule: economic transactions were forbidden.
120
 As Pelúcio 
narrates, a loose knit group of ―aficionados,‖ frequenters of the t lover blogosphere and chat 
boards, started organizing days, in both Rio and São Paulo, where they would gather at a t girl 
watering hole, usually frequented by pimps, girls and their cliental for the purposes of business, 
in order to have a day celebrating the t girls as ―muses.‖ The rules, for the São Paolo gathering 
were very strict, no touching the girls, no lewd talk, and the days had the stated aim of passing an 
evening or several hours in pleasant, albeit perhaps strained, conversation. Pelúcio‘s talk 
recounts how many of the travestis only showed up to get a photo so that it would be posted on 
the blog (as a form of advertising) and then left.  
These events appear as an attempt to open a different space for social relations, but one 
that is created not from an overthrowing of the hierarchies of sex work and the economic 
exploitation, but rather from their momentary cancellation or postponement. That is, the t days 
are a space of social relations generated by a temporary post-dating of relations of exchange and 
the money-form (buying of services) wherein the ―celebration,‖ which is an idealization, takes its 
semantic force from its momentary displacement from the prior conditions of a social relation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Brazilian political groups, transsexuals and transvestites are frequently distinguished as separate groups, hence the 
increasing use of the term ―GLBTT‖ (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transvestite, and Transsexual) rather than the 
acronym most familiar in the United States, ―LGBT‖(Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender), where 
―transgender‖ is used as an umbrella term. Travestis we could say are formed at the intersection of three regimes: 
first, a mechanics of the body, hormones and silicone, with a directionality towards certain standards of femininity 
as well as decisions or not regarding sexual reassignment surgery; second, a self-differentiation from both gay men 
(Silva 1995) and the self-identified ―heterosexual‖ men who seek their company via ―working-relationships‖; and 
third, at the intersection or layering of a traditional passive/active discursive system and a ―modern‖ gay or queer 
one. 
120
 Since 2004-5, with the spread of the internet more and more into daily life in Brazil‘s large cities, a new identity 
has begun to be constructed among groups of men across blog and chat rooms centered around travesti and the men 
who ―love‖ them, that of the t-lover. The term t-lover is derived from the US term t-girl, however in Brazil the term t 
lover is strictly linked to heternormativity and the term works in some ways as a means of shoring up a masculine 
identity, not queer, but rather t lover, in the face of the spread of LGBT ideas within Brazil. A brief survey of the 
primary blogs and chat rooms and conversations that are occurring between these men reveals that the vast majority 
identify as heterosexual (in studies 97.5% identify as heterosexual) with a small minority (in the t lover blogsphere) 
seem to have some sympathy for GLBT rights or at least a queer approach to sexual identities (Pelúcio n.p.). The 
blogs and chatrooms are used to share experiences, maintain lists of girls who rob or don't perform services 




mediated through exchange (but not complete break from, which would be a politics). What we 
have then is a trading in or up for an idealization: the muse, the celebration not of t girls in and of 
themselves, but a celebration and an eroticization of a momentary departure from the conditions 
of ―real‖ existence, a celebration of the very power to defer for a moment economic realities, to 
post-date or project them into a different version of the present—which is a celebration of the 
power of mental action to defer, post-date or project beyond the economic structuring of 
everyday life. 
This celebration of the post-dating of economics is not confined to the straight male 
organizers of the t days, but rather can be seen in the general mediatic and cultural positioning of 
travestis in the last decade. In Brazil, an estimated 80-90% of travestis make their livelihood via 
or are connected in some way with sex work. However, in the last several years these same 
travestis have converted into the glamorous face of (to some extent) carnival and (to a large 
extent) Brazilian gay pride (whose São Paulo incarnation has grown to be the largest gay pride 
parade in the world). Some general indexes of this shift: If one does a casual search for example 
of images of ―Brazilian gay pride‖ or looks up ―Gay Rights in Brazil‖ on Wikipedia a 
disproportionate number of the photos either ―representating‖ gay pride or representing gay life 
in Brazil are of travestis; not of women and men working the street but rather images with a 
certain level of glamorous anesthetization, a kind of high gloss perfection. We have a gap then 
between two kinds of lived experience: one defined by a set of economic relations or a structural 
determination, and the other an image, an aspirational anesthetization or eroticization, a 
celebration of the postponement of economic structure. In other words, we have a gap between 
the ethnographic realities of travesti life in Brazil which focus on illness, violence, poorly paid 
sex work, physical problems resulting from silicone injections and a spectacular suspension of 
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these conditions in the circulation of images of a third sex, a perfection of the codes of femininity 
in a predominantly gay male context in the case of Pride or heterosexual context in the case of 
Carnival. 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Brazil, beginning in 2003, has witnessed a 
massive expansion of its credit economy and of the resources flowing into personal credit. In the 
example of the t days and the general positioning of travestis, we can see that the spread of credit 
has made possible a new form of social relations producing not a market-based sociality that one 
would expect of neoliberalism but rather by shading social relations with an projective affective 
structure, that of the post-dating of the economic structuring of everyday life.  
Credit, as Joshua Clover and Annie McClanahan have argued, is best understood as a 
claim upon future wages (―Investing in the Future‖ 90; ―Value, theory, crisis‖ 110). That is, the 
post-dating or projection of credit is built into its very structure as an economic instrument. 
Credit is not speculation; rather credit is a claim upon future earnings, a form of extraction that 
extends the process of extraction beyond the present and into the future. Thus, the very form of 
this projection is inherent in credit as a modality or instrument. And this form is what structures 
the generalized celebration of a particular image of travesti visibility in contemporary Brazil: the 
social form of credit yields a pleasure in abstracting from the economic structuring of everyday 
life, a pleasure of projecting a different version of the present, one in which its underlying 
economic form is deferred.  
 
 Eike, Projection, and Speculation. One of the defining features of finance in Brazil has 
been its positioning as a sink for excess global capital flows, in particular after the 2008 financial 
crisis in Northern Atlantic countries. Brazil avoided the effects of this crisis by doubling down 
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on credit and finance—massively increasing the amount of capital and credit flows in different 
sectors of the economy—and this was possible, in part, because money that had been invested in 
North Atlantic stock, housing, and personal credit instruments was searching for new, non-crisis 
ridden sites for investment. One of those sites became the Brazilian stock market. In 2007, the 
Brazilian stock exchange was home to IPOs
121
 totaling R$ 26 billion (Spinetto and Levin n.p.). 
In 2006 and 2007 alone, Brazilian companies, through IPOs and debt issuances, raised more 
capital than they had in the previous twenty years combined (Forbes n.p.).  
 No figure was more representative of this period of Brazilian finance-led capitalism than 
Eike Batista. Between 2005 and 2012, Eike‘s EBX group of companies captured US$ 26 billion 
in funding, primarily through the Bovespa, the Brazilian stock exchange. As a result, Eike‘s net 
worth, tied to his ownership of various EBX companies‘ stock, soared to US$ 30 billion, making 
him the seventh wealthiest person in the world, and led him to state his ambition to overtake Bill 
Gates at the top of that list. Today, after the collapse of his companies‘ stock prices, Eike is 
Brazil‘s first ―negative billionaire,‖ with a net worth of US$ -1 billion.  
 One way that Eike‘s story has been read is as an exemplary case of hubris or as a 
cautionary tale—Eike‘s own reading was that he was the victim of ―bad luck.‖ However, these 
kinds of readings can‘t explain why people once believed Eike‘s companies were, in fact, worth 
investing their money in, nor how stock market inflows and global pressure to find profitable 
sites of investment, came to be seen as the doorway to a different economic future in Brazil. To 
do this, we have to name the affective structure which accompanied Eike‘s rise and fall.  
 Eike‘s empire was centered on the petroleum extraction company OGX. The company 
was created in 2007 and captured US$ 1.7 billion through a private offering of shares. Its IPO—
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 IPO is short for ―initial public offering‖ which refers to the first time a company sells shares in itself on a stock 
exchange. This process is also known as ―going public‖ or opening a company to outside investors.  
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the largest in the history of Brazilian market—in 2008 captured another US$ 4.1 billion. All this 
before the company had produced a single drop of oil. As Batista relates in his 2011 memoir cum 
business self-help guide, O X da Questão, there was so much demand for OGX that another US$ 
40 billion was invested (122). Eike‘s empire crumbled when drilling began…and it was revealed 
that OGX‘s projections of the amount of oil they would be able to extract were incorrect.
122
 In 
2010, OGX was worth R$ 74 billion, by April 2013 it had lost 94% of its value (Magnoli n.p.). 
 It would be possible to simply say Eike is representative of the speculative impulse of 
financialized capitalism, but such a critique would be both too easy and would miss the specific 
form of legitimation or belief underpinning Eike‘s rise, which concerns the ability to project. In 
O X da Questão, Eike writes:  
A constatação de que a atividade de exploração e produção no Brasil ostenta taxa de êxito 
de 50%, enquanto a média mundial não ultrapasa 18%, me chamou atenção para as 
possibilidades de empreender em território nacional. Ou seja, eu teria três vezes mais 
chances de encontrar petróleo por acqui do que teve meu colega americano um século 
atrás. Se o negócio já era fantástico com apenas 18% de possibilidade, ele certamente 




Projected production is not actual production. So in fact what people were investing in was a 
possible future.
124
 This is what happens when there is an excess of capital and fewer and fewer 
sites of investment capable of producing returns—people begin to bet on the future, on 
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 Malu Gaspar‘s Tudo ou Nada: Eike Batista e a verdadeira história do grupo X (2014) intimates that these 
estimates were known inside OGX to be over-estimates, see p. 255 for example. 
123
 Translation: The fact that exploration activity and production in Brazil had a success rate of 50%, while the 
global average was only 18%, called my attention to the possibilities of undertaking in the country. That is, I would 
have three times more chances of finding oil here than my American colleagues might have had a century ago. If the 
business was already fantastic with only 18% chance, it would certainly be spectacular with 50%. 
124
 The value of OGX stock was driven by a similar structure—that of projection, of estimation or probability. It was 
in June 2012 that OGX released their first statement lowering the projected production in their highly valued 
Tubarão Azul (Waimea) site, from 20,000 to 5,000 barrels per day. Announced on June 26, OGX stock price fell 
25.32% (Globo, ―Antes presença‖ n.p.).  
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probability, on predictions. What is important to note, however, is that this is not just pure 
fantasy or speculation as frequently is intimated in some ―critical‖ literature.
125
  
The structure is more precise, in that it is not just any kind of company that underwent a 
spectacular rise and fall, but an oil company. And what is specific to oil (and real estate) 
companies and what makes them the sites for asset bubbles in moments of finance is that they 
possess ―reserves‖ or ―land banks.‖ In both oil and real estate companies, their primary asset, 
besides the actual homes or barrels of oil they sell, are these pieces of territory that they have 
bought but have not yet exploited. A land bank or set of territorial reserves are the location of 
future value production in their industries—but their value is always only a projection. This then 
is the specific form that OGX and Eike sold: not entirely a fantasy but rather a projection linked 
to material conditions but one that would be verified only in the future. ―Our initial estimates 
were incorrect…‖ is a statement one cannot make about an assembly line where all variables and 
inputs are more or less known. What makes possible the production of billions of dollars of 
investment in a company that has produced nothing, is, one, an excess of capital in global 
markets, and, two, the mental action of projection and its associated forms of anticipation. The 
inflection of finance‘s projective affective structure as it passes through the lens of the stock 
market is projection as a means of producing anticipatory knowledge of unknown future value. It 
is not that finance is entirely speculative, that its promises and projections are completely 
arbitrary and disconnected from the real economy, but rather its specific form is that certain 
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 Historically, moments of financialization have been accompanied by similar projective or anticipatory mental 
forms, which do not fully break with a rootedness in a certain set of material conditions, despite their projective 
nature. For example, the first royal bankruptcy in Spain in 1557, as Elvira Vilches notes, produced a new genre of 
economic writing which shifted from explaining the problems of inflation and ―obscurities of credit‖ (221) via moral 
economy to attempting to solve them through fantastical policy measures. Many of which involved figuring out 
ways to increase taxes or construct elaborate (and often ―hair-brained‖) measures for preventing bullion from 
leaving the country. Adam Smith, in Wealth of Nations, devotes a long section to a critique of British ―projectors‖: 
stock market operators who used credit schemes to buy stock and to drive up stock prices. Both are examples of a 
kind of epistemology of projection or anticipation made possible in a moment of finance‘s rise. 
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conditions can be misread, mis-projected into the future, as an inflection of an affective structure 
of projective anticipation.  
 
 PACs and Contradictory Waiting. Starting in 2007, and continuing in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis, the Lula government released a massive amount of credit into the 
financial system and used its control of development and public banks to inject capital into 
industrial sectors, in particular the construction sector. This was done through two instruments. 
The first was through the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC) which aimed to release 
R$ 619 bn into the Brazilian economy between 2007-2010, primarily into infrastructural projects 
(Jardim, ―A construção‖ 172). The second was through the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program, 
begun in 2009, which set aside R$ 34 bn for housing construction primarily aimed at low or 
middle class sectors of the housing market (Jardim, ―A construção‖ 174).
126
   
In an article written in 2012, ―Waiting in the Ruins: The Aesthetics and Politics of Favela 
Urbanization in ‗PACification‘ Rio de Janiero,‖ Mariana Cavalcanti describes how PAC 
program funding has been used to remake the urban landscape of Rio, in particular in the run up 
to the Copa and Olympic games. The article explains how PAC funds have been used for highly 
visible infrastructural projects (such as the Rocinha pedestrian overpass or the Alemão cable car) 
which, Cavalcanti argues, create the spectacle of (as opposed to real) integration of favela and 
formal city. In the latter half of the article, she examines PAC building projects in the 
Manguinhos region of Rio, concluding that many of them (for example, the housing 
condominiums) are poorly built and have quickly descended, like many other prior favela 
urbanization projects, into ruins. These new urbanization projects, as well as the UPP, the new 
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 However, by 2010 only 10% of PAC projects had been completed, and 62% had not yet started (Globo, ―Menos 
de‖ n.p.). In 2010, President Dilma announced PAC-2 which would aim to distribute R$ 1.59 trillion between 2011-
2014 (UOL n.p.).  
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public security project of placing police stations in informal areas, have been heralded as a return 
of the state to the informal areas of Rio. Cavalcanti complicates this perception and concludes 
her piece by describing residents‘ ―sense of waiting.‖ She writes: 
Manguinhos residents share a tacit sense of waiting for something to happen. Signs of 
change seem to be closing in on them. As the remote effects of the UPP program entwine 
with the transformation in the physical landscape of Manguinhos, the sense that a rupture 
is looming on the horizon colors the imaginations of residents. And yet on a daily level, 
these changes end up being experienced as an intensification of what is already 
known….The sense of imminent change itself has, moreover, endured for over three 
years, thus becoming yet another contradictory part of daily life itself. (110) 
 
Change (PAC construction, UPP implantation) appears to be occurring all around the residents, 
but these changes result in merely an ―intensification‖ of the known (i.e., ruins). Moreover, this 
sensation of pending change or of the anticipation of change has endured now for over three 
years, which marks the period from the beginning of PAC construction in Manguinhos (2009) to 
the writing of Cavalcanti‘s article (2012). Cavalcanti describes a contradictory sensation of 
waiting, which represents what we might call a form of collective assessment or judgment on the 
part of residents as to the possibility of an anticipated change‘s arrival. Here finance‘s projective 
affective structure is refracted through a form of collective or group assessment and the 
contradictory nature of this assessment is a measure of this structure‘s fragility.   
Jumping ahead three years to the present day, we can find, also in Manguinhos, another 
example of the legacy of this anticipatory form—but now in the fading of finance‘s power.  
In 2008, the periodical EXTRA published what was to become a celebrated photo on its front 
page of a young boy, Christiano Pereira, ―swimming‖ in drainage from Cedae, Rio‘s water and 
sewage utility. Then President Lula, moved by the photo, promised as a part of the PAC program 
to build a swimming pool for Christiano, whose dream, reported by the news media, was to be a 
professional swimmer. When Lula came to Manguinhos in 2008 to inaugurate several of the 
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PAC works, including a swimming pool, there were multiple photo-ops of Lula and Christiano 
together which were passed on by traditional media and spread across social media. In July of 
2015, Christiano, now 15 years old, passed away in mysterious circumstances, which many news 
outlets took as an opportunity to update Christiano‘s story and that of the impact of the PAC on 
Manguinhos. EXTRA was most direct: ―Christiano foi o símbolo da esperança num futuro que 
nunca se concretizou‖ (Oliveira, ―Dilma é‖ n.p.).
127
 Many of the PAC works, including the pool, 
are now abandoned. Instead of a contradictory waiting whose outcome is still undecided, here we 
have an assessment that the projected future never materialized. The anticipatory feeling 
produced by the spread of finance-enabled PAC construction was temporary. What this 
projective affective structure leaves in its wake is a more long-lasting one, namely that of failed 
and disappointed hopes, an affective structure for which there is no quick or easy resolution.  
 
Finance produces a projective affective structure, which has received a refraction through 
each of the primary sites of finance‘s entry into Brazil. In this affective structure, an initial 
pleasure at or permitting of projection fades, once the financial boom begins to weaken, into 
suspicion, complaint, and resentment. Finance‘s projective affective structure is fragile in that its 
promises and propositions never seem entirely convincing; that its anticipations always require a 
partial suspension of belief; that its post-dating of economic realities always feel a bit too easy. 
Because of this incompleteness or instability, finance‘s legitimation through feeling has to be 
supplemented with state violence once its crisis begins to shake out. This is the importance of 
focusing on feeling—in contradistinction to the arguments of Oliveira—for only by focusing on 
the fragility of finance‘s affective structure can we account for the political forms that have 
emerged in its wake.  
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 Translation: Christiano was a symbol of hope of a future that was never realized (concretized).  
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This is nowhere more apparent than in the interpretations and analyses of the June-
October 2013 wave of protests that swept across Brazil.
128
 Generally speaking, two 
interpretations of the political subject of this sequence have been common: the first, sees the 
protests as the result of the ―new middle class‖ making greater demands upon the state, coming 
into political subjecthood as it were, while the second sees the protests as the result of a generally 
naïve, politically inexperienced individuals (which can be seen in their ―apolitical‖ demands), 
individuals who are potentially easily led astray by the right.
129
 However, neither of these 
interpretations takes into account the spread of personal credit and finance and the fragile 
formations of credit democracy and projective feeling across Brazilian society in the last decade. 
Most importantly, both positions mis-interpret the meaning of the demands that circulated in the 
streets during those months: namely calls for better health, education, and infrastructure. These 
were not naïve demands of the politically inept or ―newly‖ middle class, but rather demands that 
recognized the fragility of the financial boom underpinning state policies of the last decade. The 
calls for infrastructure and public services represents a call for the state to materialize something 
solid, something that would endure out of the immaterial bubble of credit that it had inflated for a 
decade. They are demands that emerge out of the down slope of finance‘s affective structure, of a 
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 In June and October 2013, millions of Brazilians took to the streets in hundreds of cities across Brazil. The 
manifestations were sparked by a series of protests in São Paulo against the hiking of the transit fare, protests which 
had been brutally and very visibly repressed by security forces. At first, the nation-wide marches were called in 
support of the São Paulo transit fare movement but these larger, nation-wide marches articulated a very wide 
ranging set of concerns.  
129
 André Singer makes a version of the first argument, arguing that the center of the protests were ―post-
materialists‖: ―in the sense used by Ronald Inglehart: as societies gradually resolve their material problems, values 
change, shifting from an emphasis on ‗economic and physical security‘ to one on ‗self-expression and quality of 
life‘. This is a trans-generational process that takes place as those already socialized in a middle-class milieu, free 
from the material burdens of previous generations, become the majority, producing a sea-change in their manner of 
political engagement‖ (34). An example of the second position would be Marcos Del Roio‘s ―Que Crise é esta?‖ 
which argues that the ―manifestações foram a demonstração de uma subjetividade social fraturada. Críticas e 
reivindicações de toda ordem tiveram desafogo: contra a corrupção, contra os partidos, contra os políticos, mas em 
favor dos direitos sociais. Era clara a expressão de crise de representatividade…. As massas mobilizadas sem 
direção, sem projeto, tendiam a se bifurcar em duas direções: uma minoria mais à esquerda que clamava por direitos 




moment in which the realization that the projections and promises of finance were more faux 
than firm, and in which the sensation of contradictory anticipation has been resolved into 
resentment and frustration.  
In ―Lula in the Labyrinth‖ (2006), which continues his analysis of the rise of the PT, 
Francisco de Oliveira argues that contemporary Brazil is marked by ―a novel combination of 
neo-populism and party stratification, shored up by social-liberal handouts, on the one hand, and 
government graft, on the other,‖ which ―has helped to forge a new form of class rule in Brazil 
that could be characterized as ‗hegemony in reverse‘‖ (5). Oliveira, revisiting his earlier analysis, 
compares Lula‘s Brazil to a duck-billed platypus, combining ―external dependency with 
casualized labour, truncated accumulation with an unremittingly inegalitarian social order; 
despite thirty years of democratization‖ (10). In Oliveira‘s opinion, this new social class—a 
social class with access to and control over public funds—has not been able to unify the 
bourgeois, leading to ―hegemony in reverse‖—wherein the oppressed masses appear to gain 
moral leadership of a society (via the PT‘s election) but in fact what their ascension to power 
makes possible is a more rapacious form of capitalist accumulation. 
Here is where Oliveira‘s analysis and Gramscian or sociological readings of finance in 
general are mistaken. There is no hegemony (in reverse), in part, because the means of control 
utilized in the last decade have been not those of hegemonic politics, but rather failed financial 
corporativism and a fragile affective structure of projection. As such, it is not surprising that the 
first political form of the end of the credit bubble was a call for the government, which had 
profited so handsomely from the boom, to produce something other than financialized forms of 
exploitation (housing debt, crédito consignado, public debt from unfinished infrastructure 
projects, etc). Throughout the fall of 2013 the PT‘s position, as well as the meaninglessness of 
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hegemony arguments, became clear: there was much talk of proposals and listening to the 
movements, but no money—the coffers are empty and the cost of borrowing more too high. 
There was nothing left to give, no more projection, no more credit; all that remains now is 
repossession and repression.  
 
The Anti-Subjects of Credit 
 The third level, beyond failed financial corporativism and unstable feeling, on which 
finance has worked in Brazil is on the level of the subject. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
discusses modern disciplinary procedures as producing the ―modern soul‖ (23). With the rise of 
disciplinary apparatuses and institutions of enclosure, disciplinary techniques like imprisonment 
came to reform the soul instead of punishing the body. They did so, however, through a complex 
set of processes aimed at the body; which Foucault describes as the art of distributions (placing 
bodies in enclosed, portioned spaces), the control of activity (of time and gesture), the 
organization of ―geneses‖ (various forms of training), and the composition of forces (tactically 
combining individual bodies into larger ―machines‖). All these are operations on a body, but they 
also give rise to the subject‘s interiority, its ―soul.‖
130
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 In this chapter and in chapter 4 where I discuss the subject again, my understanding of the subject will be drawn 
from the work of Foucault. For Foucault, the subject is historically produced as an interiority. In his later work, such 
History of Sexuality, vol. 1, Foucault tracks how the Christian device of confession is secularized by the modern 
state and human sciences to produce a modern subject open to regulation by the state and these sciences. As Robert 
Strozier notes, in Foucault, ―[t]he subject produced is a subject of knowledge: self-inquiry and confession in the 
modern era always led to knowledge, both in the local, individualizing form and larger institutional forms‖ (151).  
This understanding of the subject is present throughout Foucault‘s work, and for Foucault this interiority is both 
―real‖ and ideological. For example, in Discipline and Punish he writes:  
 
It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it 
has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, without the body by the functioning of a power that is 
exercised on those punished—and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects. . . 
.This is the historical reality of this soul, which, unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not 





If the subject as we have known it since the seventeenth century has been created by 
―subject[ion] to someone else by control and dependence‖ and through the production of ―a 
conscience or self-knowledge‖ (―The Subject‖ 781), the specific environment of credit expansion 
has required a shift in this apparatus, from a concern with monitoring the interiority of 
individuals to turning the subject into a pass-thru or gateway to an asset. That is, in the moment 
of personal credit, the state has become less concerned with the ―souls‖ or interiority of 
individuals and has instead prepared a legal environment in which the subject serves as a 
gateway for repossessing or seizing assets and income. As we will see below, this legal 
environment, which exposes individuals to state violence in new ways, was a necessary 
requirement for the expansion of personal credit in Brazil.  
This approach to the subject and credit differs from what has been so far the most in-
depth work on the relation between the subject and finance (in this case, debt), Maurizio 
Lazzarato‘s The Making of the Indebted Man (2012), which tracks the asymmetry of power 
inherent in debt (and from which other post-workerist authors draw their arguments). Drawing 
on a rich philosophical tradition of thinking on debt (including Nietzsche, Marx, and Deleuze 
and Guattari), Lazzarato makes an argument for debt and debtor-creditor relationships as the 
―archetype of social relations.‖ For Lazzarato, making debt the archetype of social relations 
means society is based in ―an asymmetry of power and not on that of a commercial exchange 
that implies and presupposes equality‖ (33). Debt implies the production of a subject who 
secularizes Christian guilt, promising to repay and to keep his or her promises (164).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
I deploy this understanding of the subject as a produced interiority in order to highlight how this technique of control 
begins to fade with the expansion of credit in Brazil. What I am particularly interested in is how states in moments 
of finance appear less interested in tracking, policing, regulating, and cataloging the interior states of their 
―subjects.‖ I will use, here and again in chapter 4, the phase ―hollowing out‖ to refer to the de-emphasizing of 
secularized confessional modes of control in the financialized present.  
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My position is that credit, in general, but also specifically in the way it has been 
massified in Brazil, represents less a social relation of obligation and more a new commitment on 
the part of the state to use or allow violence to seize assets and to defend a narrower definition of 
property and collateral. That is, credit is not merely a social relation but requires a new social 
environment, one which blends very specific legal characteristics and public security institutions 
and apparatuses. To ―convince‖ banks to lend to individuals has required giving them the ability, 
authority, and means to repossess whatever the credit was used to purchase, to seize future 
income, and/or the assets posted as collateral. In short, credit requires the readying of a legal 
environment where repossession is swift and difficult to contest and in which the state or 
parastate forces signal their readiness to do or support the work of repossession and to defend 
intensified notions of private property. In this way, credit represents an important site of 
imbrication between the militarized security state and the financial corporativist state. This legal 
environment, due to new linkages between repressive and institutional state apparatuses, 
produces, not subjects with ―modern souls,‖ but rather subjects whose interiority is no longer of 
great concern and who serve, within the social relations of credit, primarily as a pass-thru or 
gateway to assets to be seized. 
 The readying of this social environment and the armed force necessary to sustain it can 
be described as the new security logic of credit. To take one potential example among many: 
Ana Carla A. Costa and Joao M. P. De Mello in ―Judicial Risk and Credit Market Performance: 
Micro Evidence from Brazilian Payroll Loans‖ (2006) present the argument for the necessity of 
this new environment:  
In recent years, the literature has built a near consensus that ‗sound‘ institutions are 
congenial to good economic performance (North 1994). Institutions, insofar as they 
determine the economic environment agents operate in, should be important for 
explaining economic outcomes. Quite often, the specific mechanism through which 
182 
 
institutions influence economic performance is protection from expropriation. In 
environments in which expropriation is likely, agents underinvest (from a social 
perspective) relative to more secure ones. In the end, a plethora of suboptimal micro-
economic decisions amount to a poorer aggregate economic performance. (156) 
 
The environment that must be created then is one in which lenders are protected ―from 
expropriation.‖ The legal framework of repossession and bankruptcy was the subject of a great 
deal of change in the early 2000s in Brazil: repossession was facilitated, bankruptcy made less 
complicated and certain kinds of creditors given priority over others, and crédito consignado‘s 
practice of using future income as collateral was defended by the state in court (Ferreira 13).
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The central aim of these changes was making the repossession and resell of assets easier and this 
was done, primarily, by removing rights and legal remedies from debtors. Before these changes, 
the general legal framework governing the repossession of collateral was that creditors could 
repossess but could not resell until debtors had exhausted a series of legal and juridical measures.  
 The argument advanced by policy makers and bankers was that making repossession 
easier and allowing payments to be deducted directly from individuals‘ income (which we might 
call by the less uplifting term of wage or income garnishment) would allow lenders to deepen 
credit markets by lending to more risky individuals. This type of argument is laid out in detail in 
Juliano Assunção, Efraim Benmelech, and Fernando S. S. Silva‘s ―Repossession and the 
Democratization of Credit‖ (2013). The authors analyze the changes to repossession law and the 
market for auto loans, echoing a theoretical stance that proliferated throughout the mainstream 
economic literature and popular media in these years, that changing the nature of ―property‖ by 
making it more available to seizure was in fact a form of ―democratization,‖ understood as 
increasing access to the equality of consumption offered by credit. As they write: 
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 Going into the specifics of these different legal histories would take us too far afield here. For auto loans see 
Assunção, Benmelech, and Silva (2013); for housing see Sanfelici (2013); for consignado see De Mello and Garcia 




Our evidence suggests that the legal change has led to larger loans with lower spreads, 
longer maturities, and higher leverage. It has also brought about a ―democratization‖ of 
credit, enabling riskier, low-income borrowers to obtain loans and purchase newer, more 
expensive cars. Although the credit reform has improved access to credit by expanding 
credit to riskier borrowers, it has also led to increased incidences of default and 
repossession. In sum, this article provides evidence on the consequences of a credit 
reform, highlighting the crucial role that collateral plays in credit markets. (19) 
 
These kinds of changes in repossession and bankruptcy laws reframed both the importance of 
private property and the legal understanding of ownership. Generally speaking, property 
becomes much less ―private,‖ much more fungible and easier to seize, and the importance of 
repossession as something fundamental to upholding the existing social order becomes much 
more pronounced. If credit forms a part of the post-dictatorship process of democratization, and a 
key part of extending credit is the easy repossession and the direct seizure of income which 
drives profits up, then the state and para-state agencies who enforce these laws have a mandate to 
effect seizures using whatever means necessary. Property, the more it becomes discursively 
associated with democracy, becomes increasingly sacred—to the extent that upholding property 
rights becomes a part of upholding the very institutions of democracy.
132
  
In Althusser‘s famous Ideological State Apparatus essay, he initially argues that there is a 
dialectical relation between the repressive and institutional state apparatuses (RSAs and ISAs, 
respectively). However, over the course of the essay it becomes clear that, like most theorists in 
the moment of mass democracy or the welfare state, Althusser is most interested in the ISAs, in 
particular in those used to impose and inculcate ideology (indeed the ISA essay was born out of a 
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 In what is one example of many, on May 30, 2013 Federal Police in Matta Groso do Sul, acting on a judge‘s 
orders, evicted a group of Terena Indians from a plot of land they had occupied and in the process shot and killed 
Oziel Gabriel, 35. The death generated a brief moment of political intrigue when ministro-chefe da Secretaria-Geral 
(roughly the Secretary of State) Gilberto Carvalho claimed that President Dilma thought the police should not have 
acted on the repossession order. Dilma was forced to publicly address the controversy and to disagree with 
Carvalho. She stated in her response: ―We comply with the law and we think the law is not something that people 
can say ‗I don‘t like this one, I like that one.‘ It‘s not like this. Everybody in this country abides by the law. From 
the President of the Republic to the baby that has just been born‖ (Folha n.p.). 
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larger project on the French school system that had been abandoned). Foucault‘s genealogical 
analysis of regimes of repressive sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical power breaks with 
Althusser‘s emphasis on ideology, in part by turning to the body (disciplinary) and the 
population (biopolitics), but in Foucault‘s conception of power there is still little room for an 
accounting for state and para-state violence.
133
 However, in a moment of finance-led 
accumulation, when new forms of the repressive state apparatuses come to permeate and saturate 
the social field, we need to find ways of tracking and explaining coercion as something other 
than merely the loutish older brother of consent, discipline, or méconnaissance. 
What makes it difficult to talk about subjects of credit is that this is a subjectivity which 
does not privilege interiority. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault pushes beyond Althusser‘s 
theory of interpellation to examine the ways in which the subject performs its own subjection by 
self-surveillance. In this work, Foucault focuses on the subject as an effect of power, with the 
subject‘s interiority being a fold created by power. If the rise of mass credit means new 
imbrications between the legal conception of property and the state power to enforce that 
conception, what does it mean for the subject and subjection? Clearly we are no longer on the 
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 For a slightly different take on this relationship, see Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi who write: 
 
Equally important is that by situating ideology within the complex interaction of the requirements of repro-
ducing the mode of production, and the relative autonomy of the superstructural levels in which this social 
reproduction takes place, Althusser establishes what Warren Montag calls a ―strange ‗dialogue‘‖ with his 
former student Michel Foucault, carried on by the latter in Discipline and Punish.
 
When Foucault contrasts 
a conception of power which is ―localized in a particular type of institution or state apparatus‖ to the 
―micro-physics of power‖ which the apparatuses ―operate,‖ it is precisely Althusser‘s initial distinction 
between ―state power‖ and ―state apparatus‖ that he clarifies
. 
State power is not the expression of a subject 
that is already formed, the model of the bourgeois revolution – it is the field in which this subject is formed. 
Foucault‘s development of this Marxian theme is to displace the distinction between the repressive and ide-
ological apparatus, enclosed spaces in which force is exercised or subjects are interpellated. Instead, he 
points to disciplinary technologies that act on bodies, by which force and knowledge form part of a process 
of power. (n.p.) 
 
For my part, I agree that Foucault displaces the distinction between the repressive and ideological apparatuses but I 
would hold that there is still little room in his work for  accounting for state violence and its effects on the subject 
(i.e., ―force‖ is not an adequate category).  
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terrain of power and discipline, which was a concept of the welfare or national popular state. 
And instead of self-surveillance or the monitoring of interiority we have the subject as a pass 
thru. Subjects of credit are hollow because the new regimes of property and seizure care little for 
their particularity, care little about cultivating their interiority; rather, the subject is a pass thru to 
the seizure of an asset or income. Contra Lazarrato and the interpretation of credit or debt as 
guilt, when it comes to credit connected to a tangible, resellable asset, the guilt of the subject is 
of very minor importance. What matters is the ability to seize and resell, the power to force the 
―free‖ circulation of collateral and assets: if you can‘t pay someone else will purchase the good 
that you have already made a number of payments on. Or if you have no goods and your future 
wages have been pledged as collateral—it doesn‘t matter if you feel guilty enough to pay, the 
state will seize your checks. From this perspective on credit, there is no subject, rather only a 
door, a gateway, a passage to an asset or income stream.
134
 
 Thus, my argument is that the legal environment that undergirds the expansion of 
personal credit in Brazil has required a new imbrication between the threat of state or state 
sanctioned violence and the production of subjects. The subjects produced in this moment, who 
we might call ―anti-subjects‖ due to how their production breaks with the Christian pastoral 
tradition of monitoring and cultivating interiority, are exposed in new ways to the threat or 
possibility of state violence, both because credit is inherently unstable as both a corporativist 
formation and structure of feeling (thus leading to the use of state violence as a supplement) and 
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 In a section in Crowds and Power entitled ―Inflation and the Crowd,‖ Canetti describes the relationship between 
individuals and an inflationary financial crisis: ―An inflation can be called a witches‘ sabbath of devaluation where 
men and the units of their money have the strangest effects on each other. The one stands for the other, men feeling 
thmselves as ‗bad‘ as their money; and this becomes worse and worse. Together they are all at its mercy 
and all feel equally worthless‖ (186). A credit crisis featuring seizure of assets and income has a different effect 
upon the subject: the subject is now without a face, and becomes blank. Not the internal pathos of ‗devaluation‘ but 
a cipher, a Sphinx, an unreadable mask.   
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because the state commits itself to defending a new, more rigid conception of private property as 
well as to using force to seize assets as the credit bubble expands, contracts and then deflates.  
 
UPPs, the Caveirão of Finance 
What I have tried to trace in this chapter is the fragility of each of the transformations, as 
corporativism, feeling, and on the level of the subject, that the expansion of finance, and in 
particular personal credit, has wrought in Brazil after 2003. I have also tried to draw attention to 
how credit expansion has mirrored the expansion of militarized public security (Amar 2013) and 
how the expansion of finance requires the threat of state sanctioned violence to structure its legal 
environment and to deal with the political subjects that result from the end of anticipation. This 
imbrication between attempted finance-led accumulation and state violence as joined forms of 
public security is nowhere more apparent than in Rio de Janeiro, in particular in its most recent 
public security strategy of the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs). Because Rio is an 
advanced laboratory of national public security strategies, I want to conclude by examining the 
links between finance, the UPPs and the recent appearance of new formations on the Rio 
political scene and what they might herald for the political future on a national scale as the 
financial and economic crisis deepens.  
The UPPs are a public security strategy begun in the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2008, 
which aim at producing a new form of police control over informal areas of the city and region. 
Most informal areas have no police stations—and have been long ―policed‖ by the militarized 
BOPE forces. The UPPs consist of the implantation of a physical UPP unit in a determined 
peripheral zone, which then begins a form of community-based police work. To date, UPPs have 
been primarily implemented in areas close to sites for the World Cup or the upcoming Olympics 
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and academic and popular opinion has been decidedly mixed. Some have praised the program for 
inaugurating a new moment of state-community relations in Rio, others have seen the UPPs as 
yet another dystopian policing future in Brazil, this one with a humanized or social face.
135
  
Without too much exaggeration we can see the UPPs as the caveirão
136
 of finance, 
opening new terrain for the more efficient extraction of financial rent and strengthening the 
connection between finance and state violence. This connection was visible in the first 
implantation of a UPP in Santa Marta, where on the morning of December 19, 2008, residents 
awoke to two important changes: first, the UPP and, second, many residents found tacked to their 
front doors an electric bill (Renato Cosentino, pers. comm.). As many commentators have noted, 
the UPPs have had the effect of making certain communities seem safe enough for capital to 
enter. However, what has not been so frequently remarked is how the UPPs open these areas to 
forms of financial accumulation as well. In addition to the regularization of electric, cable, and 
water bills (bills on which people can get ―behind‖ and, as a result, be forced to pay ―fees‖ which 
are a form of interest on past due accounts), the UPPs have brought an expansion of both banks 
and commercial stores into comunidades—as well as real estate speculation. While it will be 
obvious that banks make their money from interest and fees charged to consumers, what is 
perhaps less known is that as much as 20% of many stores‘ bottom lines are accounted for by 
offering credit to consumers (Saltorato and Donadone n.p.).
137
 Thus, UPPs make possible not 
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 The two-part special issue of DILEMAS: Revista de Estudos de Conflto e Controle Social 7(3) and (4) 2014 
contains a fairly representative range of critical opinion on the UPPs.  
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 These are the armored vehicles the BOPE uses during its invasions of informal zones.  
137
 Saltorato and Donadone (2012) also note that financial side of large varejistas is growing much more quickly 
than the retail side and that the profit margins on financial services (while varying across year and establishment) are 
frequently twice that of retail (approaching a 100% margin in some cases).  
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just the spread of commercialization or commodification (as some accounts have it), but the 
spread and further penetration of forms of financial accumulation into peripheral communities.
138
 
While there is no credit data specific to Rio that differentiates between the formal city 
and comunidades, one can extrapolate from national data and from data on peripheral regions in 
São Paulo to see how credit expansion has made more vulnerable certain populations, further 
exposing them to the threat of violence. First, on a national level, Serasa‘s 2014 ―Mapa da 
Inadimplência no Brasil,‖ revealed the populations currently with problems managing their credit 
are the urban poor: with 23% of ―Jovens Adultos da Periferia‖ and 17% of ―Massa Trabalhadora 
Urbana‖ having one credit account in default by 30 to 90 days (Serasa, ―Mapa‖ n.p.). A 2015 
Serasa study in São Paulo found that in Paraisópolis, one in three ―moradores da comunidade‖ 
have a delinquent account (Serasa, ――Um em cada‖ n.p.). While a 2015 Data Favela study 
revealed that ―48% [of moradores] disseram ter usado o cartão de crédito emprestado de parentes 
ou amigos‖ and a 2014 study found that three out of four people who loan their names (so family 
members or friends can take out credit because they are unable) have delinquent accounts 
(Brasileiros n.p.; Instituto GEOC n.p.).  
 We can draw two perhaps obvious conclusions from this: adults in peripheral 
communities, whether in Rio or Recife, are the group with the greatest need for credit to fill in 
what their wages are unable to provide. They are also the group with the smallest margin of error 
when it comes to paying money back—which is illustrated by the higher rates of delinquency in 
comunidades. A few missed weeks of work or a lost job and individuals can become stuck, if 
they were not before, on a treadmill or under a mountain of unpayable debt. Second, as the 
economy continues to contract these will be the first people thrown out of work, which thus 
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 It is no surprise then that the UPP project attracted the attention of the quintessential Brazilian (failed) 
financialized capitalist, Eike Batista (Werneck n.p.), who before the collapse of his empire pledged R$ 20 million 
per year for the UPPs.  
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makes them among the most vulnerable to forms of economic decision-making that will affect 
their ability for self-reproduction, such as having to decide to pay their debt or rent, buy food or 
pay debt, etc.  
What is perhaps less obvious is that credit exacerbates the most marginalized individuals‘ 
already significant vulnerability. So much of the current mediatic and institutional discourse 
around credit in Brazil sees it as a net positive, as opposed to being what it is: a form of financial 
exploitation. Annual interest rates, as noted before, on credit card debt are currently topping out 
at 345% and are continuing to rise (Martello n.p.). In a situation in which the state has already 
begun to take measures to decrease the credit supply and in which more and more individuals are 
falling behind on payments, it will become harder and harder for individuals to avoid default by 
rolling over or transferring their debt. As time (and credit) run out on finance as a corporativist 
measure, the only lever left at the state‘s disposal to enforce debts and keep the financial 
extraction running that Brazil is now dependent on is violence—and this is a purpose that new 
security measures like the UPPs will serve.   
 However, if finance has produced, across the territorial space of the nation and the city, 
new, failing forms of financial corporativism and sensoriums of anticipation, it has also then 
produced, as well, new political possibilities. Several observers of Rio have noted a recent shift 
in political formations in the city, with new overlaps between the morro and asphalto and new 
alliances between comunidades, which have been attributed, in part, to the attention the UPPs 
have received as part of Rio‘s security strategy in the run up to the megaevents of the Copa and 
the Olympics (Bianchi n.p.; Parkin n.p.). That is most certainly the case, but I also would argue 
that at least some of the possibility for such relations is contained in the spread of linked forms of 
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finance and state violence charted in this essay—and here is perhaps a clue to what the political 
future of finance‘s failure in the rest of Brazil might look like.  
 The possibility for new political relations is rooted in how finance, in particular in the 
form of credit and as real estate speculation, creates new forms of possible commonality across 
the formal/informal city divide.
139
 There are two ways in which this is the case. First, if the 
morro/asphalto divide has been structured in part by a divide between access to formal and 
informal labor markets, credit is a form of exploitation which all groups share in common. 
Moreover, as the air begins to slowly leak from the credit bubble and as real estate speculation 
continues to price people out of consolidated comunidades, a shared sense of exasperation with 
the state‘s promotion of credit as a form of democracy, and the illusory nature of this credit 
democracy, is apparent across social sectors—which I think, as argued above, is one lesson we 
can take from the protests of June 2013. Second, instead of seeing the UPPs as normalizing 
policing across the formal/informal city divide (a claim that appears difficult to make as their 
shine begins to wear off), we can see that attempted financial accumulation requires the spread of 
exceptional forms of state violence to populations outside comunidades.
140
 Due to the legal 
redefinition of private property, the state now has to defend private property much more 
strenuously and at higher cost. As well, the instability of credit as a corporativist structure means 
that the state has to rely more on the lever of violence to control unruly populations, particularly 
as the credit bubble begins to deflate, if not burst. The end result is instead of Rio‘s future—and 
Brazil‘s more generally—being the spread of normalized police functions to peripheral areas, it 
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and Nezar Alsayyed (2004) and of the critique presented in chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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 In no way are the forms of violence or levels of exposure between the informal and formal city equal. I am rather 





might be, in fact, more marked by the reverse: the increasing exposure of multiple sectors of the 
population to routinized exceptional state violence.  
 Thus, instead of the UPPs themselves representing the beginning of a new political 
conjuncture as they introduce a new kind of policing into peripheral spaces, perhaps part, but 
only part, of the new conjecture—and the new forms of cross-community political contact that 
are emerging—is defined by the spreading of forms of financial exploitation and exceptional 
state violence across the urban and national territory. In Rio‘s case, perhaps there are new 
opportunities now for alliance—sure to be fraught and complicated—as financial exploitation 
has bridged different urban spaces (between morro and asphalto and between comunidades). At 
the same time, perhaps the exceptionality of the violence of the UPPs is now more visible to 
traditionally middle class sectors of the city, because these sectors of the population are now 
exposed, in limited ways as well, to the threat of similar kinds of violence. Perhaps, then, some 
of the political possibilities in Rio in the financialized present, and on the national level as a 
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If Brazil‘s path through the aughts and the new financial architectures created in the 
1990s resulted in the euphoria of a temporary credit and primary commodity extraction fueled 
boom, Mexico‘s path through this stage of the long downturn involved a turn, not to consumer 
credit, but to circulation. While both Mexico and Brazil switch to export-oriented strategies 
coupled with new forms of financial integration, the difference is that Brazil‘s exports are 
primary commodities flowing to China and elsewhere which did produce some level of new 
value and expansion, while Mexico‘s non-oil exports are primarily from the maquiladora and 
product assembly. Product assembly, as an export-oriented ―growth‖ strategy, had a fatal flaw 
(especially in its early stages); namely, it ran a persistent current account deficit, meaning the 
sector consistently imports more machinery and parts than it exports. 
In terms of finance, Brazil manages to aggregate a significant portion of global flows to 
fuel domestic consumption (becoming one of the now fading BRICs). In Mexico‘s case, there 
was no attempt to grow domestic consumption with a massive influx of personal credit (as of 
2013 less than 50% of Mexicans have bank accounts, only 1 in 4 have a credit card).
141
 However, 
the mass of overaccumulated capital in the global economy does find ways of entering, 
especially after the 2009 crisis. These points of entry pass primarily through the state or public 
                                                          
141
 This is something that Pena Nieto‘s 2014 financial reform law is attempting to change. The law attempts to chase 
the Brazilian dragon precisely at the moment of its clear demise.  
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sector, in the form of PEMEX and the state-supported housing sector, as total public sector debt 
climbs from 474.70 bn MXN in 1995 to 5,744.70 bn MXN in 2013. However, while Brazil turns 
to extraction and consumer credit as a form of financial corporativism in a moment of ―stability‖ 
in the long downturn, in Mexico these years are marked by widespread death and destruction. 
This chapter argues that there are two reasons for this difference. In Mexico, the economy 
turns—not just to finance—but away from production to circulation and the state turns from 
corporativism to state violence as its primary infrastructure. 
In the 1980s and 90s in Mexico, a switch to an ―export-led‖ economy was seen as the 
only way out of the debt crunch. However, by the mid-90s it was clear that in Mexico the export-
oriented strategy, which depended heavily on the maquiladora, had a structural weakness: 
because national industry had been destroyed by liberalization, assembly plants along the border 
were now importing both parts for assembly and capital goods. This meant that Mexico has a 
persistent current account deficit.
142
 Thus, the maquiladoras have not only been less profitable 
than hoped, they have created their own set of currency-related problems. A current account 
deficit means that the Mexican government has to buy U.S. dollars on the open market to balance 
the trade deficit. A perennial issue of the Mexican economy in the export-oriented era, in 
particular at the beginning of this period (after the 1994 crash and throughout the late 1990s), has 
been how to cheaply acquire more foreign (i.e., U.S.) currency.
143
 Permitting and inducing 
migration has been one strategy (currently one tenth of the Mexican population lives in the 
                                                          
142
 See James M. Cypher and Raul Delgado Wise, Mexico’s Economic Dilemma: The Developmental Failure of 
Neoliberalism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), p. 99 and Enrique Dussel Peters, Polarizing Mexico: 
The Impact of Liberalization Strategy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 98-9. 
143
 This has led to some paradoxical measures. For example, beginning in 1996 the Mexican government starts a 
policy of building up foreign currency reserves, in essence stockpiling money that could be employed for productive 
ends. The government (as do many ―developing‖ countries in this moment) does this in part to reassure foreign 
investors (that Mexico has reserves that withstand a crisis or speculative attack) and to be able to borrow more 
cheaply. In effect, we have a paradoxical situation wherein the government is holding (and indirectly borrowing) 
large sums of money (by 2001 38bn USD [Sidaoui 2005]) in order to keep credit and portfolio investment flowing 
into the country and keeping the price of that credit and investment low. 
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United States and remittances from workers in the United States are the second largest source of 
foreign currency in Mexico after PEMEX).
144
 Drug logistics and the courting of financial inflows 




 Thus, the label of ―export-orientation‖ for this period, which has dominated in the fields 
of political economy and public policy, is something of a misnomer. Instead of seeing these 
years and the dominant political economic form in Mexico as one of export, I will argue that it 
has been one of ―circulation‖—understood as a turn away from the sphere of production to the 
sphere of circulation. Marx (in Capital, vol. 1) divides capitalist economies into two spheres: 
production, where goods are produced, and circulation, where value is realized (usually by 
converting commodities via prices into money) and where people purchase the commodities 
necessary for their survival. The sense in which I understand the turn to circulation is, on the one 
hand, negative: it marks the decreasing importance or emphasis placed upon production. 
However, this should not be understood as a kind of nostalgia for or complete overcoming of 
production, as the turn to circulation marks, in Mexico, an attempted expansion of processes of 
accumulation in areas like finance and logistics.
146
  
                                                          
144
 The Pew Center reports that ―In 1970, fewer than 1 million Mexican immigrants lived in the U.S. By 2000, that 
number had grown to 9.8 million, and by 2007 it reached a peak of 12.5 million‖ (―Demographic Portrait‖ 2013). 
Since the 2007-8 crisis, the total numbers of undocumented Mexican and Central American immigrants has held 
steady; at some moments, for Mexico, the overall figure has been negative. 
145
 The size of the drug trade is notoriously difficult to estimate. One widely cited figure puts it at 30 billion USD, 
see http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689. For comparison in 2014, the total amount of worker 
remittances from the United State to Mexico was $23.6 billion USD. David Fitzgerald‘s A Nation of Emigrants: 
How Mexico Manages its Migration (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008) describes how through the 
3x1 program, federal and state governments have turned remittance inflows into a (limited) developmental strategy: 
―In 2005, registered HTAs [hometown associations] donated US$20 million to hometown projects, which, when 
complemented with matching funds from municipal, state and federal government through the ‗3x1‘ program, 
generated US$80 million in investments‖ (113). 
146
 In reading the contemporary period as one of circulation or through the production-circulation distinction, I am 
drawing on recent discussions in several areas. First, one way the rise of finance has been read is through the 
category of circulation, which has implied a return to the little discussed volume 2 of Marx‘s Capital (which deals 
with circulation and the circulation of capital). Christopher Arthur and Geert Reuten‘s edited volume The 
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 This turn to circulation takes many different forms including, the drug trade, which is a 
logistics operation that moves commodities into the high-value consumer zone of the United 
States but which does not control their sites of production; out-migration, primarily into the 
United States, which involves the circulation of bodies and induces capital flows back into the 
nation not tied to its productive apparatus; and finance, which has taken on two important forms, 
the first being a switch to forms of financial speculation (in derivatives) by large, Mexican non-
financial corporations and, second, government  backing of speculative real estate bubbles and 
housing lending (which led to a major housing market crash in 2013).  
 These turns away from production have exacerbated the already exorbitant growth of 
surplus population, or individuals who exist outside or on the fringes of the capitalist apparatus 
of production, in Mexico.
147
 It is estimated that roughly 60% of economically active Mexicans 
are in the informal economy (INEGI, 2014).
148
 At the same time, the move away from 
productive labor has furthered the breakdown of the mediation of the capital-labor relation. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Circulation of Capital (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1998) was an important landmark in those discussions and 
Joshua Clover‘s ―The Time of Crisis‖ represents a sophisticated use of circulation to link globalization and 
financialization into a common framework. Circulation has been discussed as a critical concept in literary and 
cultural studies recently, but never quite taken as central to cultural life. See for example: Regenia Gagnier‘s ―The 
Global Circulation of Charles Dickens‘s Novels‖ (2013) and Esther Whitfield‘s Cuban Currency: The Dollar and 
''Special Period'' Fiction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008) both of which employ a notion of 
circulation. My aim here is to use circulation to link together a set of phenomena which normally appear as 
unrelated (except through the category of crisis or catastrophe)—namely, drug logistics, immigration/migration, and 
finance—to then examine the content of cultural works which dwell on or pass through these sites.  
 
147
 Or, as Michael Denning has put it, also in a recent essay: ―Under capitalism, the only thing worse than being 
exploited is not being exploited‖ (79). Denning describes these new conditions as ―wageless life.‖ Part of what I am 
attempting to capture here in the term surplus population are these new forms of informal labor in an attempt to 
describe the new forms of violence and danger that accompany the condition of ―not being exploited‖ directly by 
capitalism through wage labor but still being required to provision daily the resources for one‘s social reproduction 
in a capitalist environment. 
148
 Report located at: http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/cn/informal/default.aspx It is also important 
to note that informality is also unevenly distributed across the national space. For example, using 2000 numbers, 
Oaxaca had the highest percentage of economically active residents in the informal sector at 76.73%, with Chiapas 
at 69.23%, Guerrero at 69.49%, and Michoacán at 69.67% (Flores Curiel & Valero Gil, 2003). Throughout this 
chapter I will use the term ―unfree‖ labor to refer to forms of labor that fall to some extent outside classical forms of 
state mediation of the capital-labor relationship. Of course, no labor is ―free.‖ My use of ―unfree‖ is only an attempt 
to mark a historical shift from one labor regime to another, in which certain contemporary forms of labor in Mexico 
are marked by new, more intensive forms of exploitation, self-exploitation, danger, and death.  
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turns to drug logistics and out migration, coupled with state dismediation of the labor market, has 
led to an increase in unfree labor and surplus population where force, domination, and exposure 
to death are the rules of the day.
149
  
 We have seen how Brazil switches in this period to forms of financial corporativism 
along with state violence and how this calls forth new subjectivities. In Mexico, there is no 
comparable turn to consumer credit, instead state violence and state-permitted violence becomes 
the primary vector of social control for surplus populations who either remain, attempt to 
emigrate, or pass through the nation-space. The turn to state violence has taken two primary 
forms. The first is an increase in the amount of money spent on the police and military, which 
has taken on many policing functions after 2006. The defense budget in Mexico has increased 
from 2 billion in 2006 to 9.3 billion in 2009 (Paley 127), while the U.S.-funded Merida Initiative 
has funneled 2.35 billion into Mexican military and policing between 2008 and 2014. This is a 
vast increase in the amount of money flowing into the repressive apparatus. The second form has 
been the redefinition and reclassification of roles, the most important being the usage of the 
military for policing functions.
150
 For example, in 2008, policing in Ciudad Juárez was turned 
over entirely to the military. In quantitative terms, in 2009 the Mexican military reported that it 
had 48,750 involved in combatting organized crime (Sabet 16). In 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta estimated the total number of dead in Mexico since 2006 at 150,000 (Karlin n.p.). 
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 These dynamics have been the focus of recent work by Marxist and left communist theorists: see ―The Holding 
Pattern‖ in Endnotes 3 (http://endnotes.org.uk/) and Alberto Toscano‘s talk at the 2012 Historical Materialism 




 There is now a growing literature on the militarization of various Mexican police forces and police functions in 
general, see Moloeznik ―Organized crime, the militarization of public security, and the debate on the ‗new‘ police 
model in Mexico‖ (2013) and Moleoznik and Suárez de Garay ―El proceso de militarización de la seguridad pública 
en México 2006-2012‖ (2012). 
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Post-Developmentalist Social Theory  
 As theorists from Marx on forward have noted, capitalist modes of production and social 
formations tend towards producing collectivities, for example, of workers and capitalists (in a 
moment of industrialization) or between surplus populations and the formally employed (in a 
moment of deindustrialization or circulation), which then, under certain conditions, have the 
possibility to come into conflict with one another. This tendency toward the production of 
collectivities which have the potential to be politicized has meant that states and capital have 
frequently concerned themselves with preventing, forestalling, or channeling the growth of these 
collective groups. Indeed, much of Foucault‘s work tracks the proliferation of individualizing 
processes linked to the rise of the state (governmentality) and how these individualizing 
processes break down prior collective forms (the crowd, for instance, in Discipline and Punish) 
but also allow these newly produced ―individuals‖ to be grouped together into weakly collective 
forms (the army, ―workers,‖ etc).
151
 What we see in the post-developmentalist or post-national 
popular period in Mexico is the slow breakdown of these linked processes of individualization 
and collectivization. Mexico in the present moment, due to its turn to circulation, that is, away 
from the productive capitalism that was the foundation of the developmentalist state 
infrastructure and imaginary, represents a limit case of the breakdown of these processes which 
have held sway, in Mexico at least, since the late nineteenth century.
152
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 These weak large collectivities always carried with them the possibility of their politicization. Thus, the large 
corporativist unions were exposed (and had to be protected from) a far-left radicalization (think of the Revueltas-
Lombardo antagonism in Mexico, for example) and in most revolutionary theory of the twentieth century 
developing a split within (or politicizing the collectivity of) the army was seen as a key to seizing state power (see 
Carlos Prestes in Brazil or any number of other experiences in Latin American countries).  
152
 I would locate the emergence of a Mexican version of state governmentality in this moment, specifically in the 
Porfiriato. However, it is important to note, and significant in Mexico, that what Foucault identifies as the basis for 
the practices of governmentality, i.e., the pastoral power of the Church, goes much further back, indeed to the very 
beginning of la conquista. 
206 
 
In the national popular or developmentalist moment in Mexico, the state produced a 
series of individualizing and collectivitizing processes, which atomized individuals and then 
pooled them into non-revolutionary collectivities, creating and defending certain formulations of 
the ―people,‖ the ―worker,‖ and the ―campesino,‖ as well as a gendered imaginary of social 
reproduction (―amas de casa‖).
153
 The production of subjects and their summation into limited 
collective forms was a central means of control in this period. In terms of subjectivity, the state‘s 
primary role was to link processes of subjectivization originating in capitalist relations of 
production with collective figures of the nation and national capital, which occurred not just via 
―imaginaries‖ but through infrastructures, or material and ideological corporativist formations. In 
moments of crisis, such as that after 1968, the state played a key role in developing new figures 
of collectivity which would attempt to mediate the capital-labor relation, such as that of 
―desarrollo compartido.‖
154
 The continued reproduction of a theory of mestizaje has been as well 
a means of bridging both the rural-urban proletarian/indigenous divide and one between workers 
and the bourgeoisie.  
 What happens in the turn to circulation is that the state, because of its shift away from 
corporativist infrastructure to one of state violence, is unable to produce either processes of 
subjectivization or meaningful collectivities to mediate the very deep splits between the 
increasing surplus population and the remaining individuals connected to the productive 
apparatus. As noted above, the military-policing apparatus replaces the corporativist structures of 
the developmental state. It is this shift that the cultural works in the period before, but most 
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 At the same time, the state controlled a whole slate of other subjectivizing processes connected to education, 
health, and security which fed into these. 
154
 In the midst of increasing worker rebellion in the 1970s, the Echeverría government attempted to refound the 
developmentalist pact between organized labor, national capitalists, and the state on a notion of ―shared 
development.‖ The term was meant to indicate that the state would ensure that more resources were distributed to 
workers (i.e., more sharing) but that workers would have to consent (once again) to a class alliance (i.e., the second 
meaning of shared) with national capitalists and the state bureaucracy.  
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intensively after, 2006 register and respond to. In the following, I track this registering and 
response along two main lines. First, by focusing on the ―drug war‖ film, El Infierno and the 
poetry of Dolores Dorantes, I trace the transformation of two key sites for producing collectivity, 
labor and death. I then turn to cultural objects that directly address the conditions of surplus 
population in a moment of circulation to demonstrate how they pivot on the production of new 
forms of relation between the individual and the collective. At a most general level, I read all 
these cultural works as involved in thinking through the end of the developmentalist problematic: 
that is, their critical valence is no longer how to preserve agency in the face of, or to break with, 
overwhelming structure but rather to limn the possibilities of collective reproduction and defense 
in a world rendered unlivable by state and capital. 
 
The Failure 
 The failure of the state and capital to produce inhabitable lifeworlds and forms of 
collectivity can be registered in the cultural objects that deal with the drug war; in part because 
during the developmentalist period in Mexico labor was a privileged site of the production of 
subjectivity and collective identities and these cultural objects index how little labor serves that 
function today.
155
 These objects reveal that in a moment of surplus population and a turn to 
circulation, what was once a site for the generation of subjectivity is now one of interruption of 
these prior individualizing processes. However, in many cultural objects which meditate on the 
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 There are, of course, any number of cultural works which continue to repeat the classical dictums of the 
collectivizing structure of labor. One example is the 2013 film Nosotros Los Nobles (the title being a play on the 
classic Mexican Golden Age film Nosotros los Pobres) in which a group of obscenely wealthy niños bien are forced 
into employment by their father (he lies to them that they are bankrupt). Rubbing shoulders with the lower classes of 
Mexico, the niños bien learn about how (in the film) work creates horizontal bonds of real community (as opposed 
to the ―fake‖ friends and lovers found in their milieu). These are lessons they take with them as they re-ascend at the 
film‘s end back to their true class position. The film‘s message is that labor is what makes us all equal and what 
produces lasting bonds, and it is this fiction which covers up the considerable class difference amongst the various 
―characters‖ the niños bien befriend in their time amongst the pobres.  
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―drug war‖ there is still a connection with labor, which means we have not passed beyond all 
interiority, unlike, as we will see, in cultural works on migration, but we remain rather at a stage 
of interruption. But this interruption is both conditioned by the specific nature of this labor, 
which is connected more to circulation or logistics than to production, and which no longer 
results in the production of the grand, de-politicized collectivities of the developmentalist state-
capital relation.  
The drug trade, as Luca Rastello notes in I am the Market, is at the cutting edge of 
contemporary logistics. That is, the drug trade is not conducted by mules swallowing 40 
condoms filled with heroin at a time but rather by moving massive amounts (hundreds of tons) of 
product into high value northern markets.
156
 In the South to North American trade, cocaine is the 
primary source of profit. In this trade, the Mexican drug logistic groups primarily control the 
transportation (as opposed to production) and they have little interest in vertical integration, 
unlike prior ―cartel‖ forms. This is due in part to geography (Colombia/Bolivia/Peru is not their 
home base), but also to a shift in the structure of modern mega-corporations involving the rise of 
global logistics which the new Mexican organizations mimic.
157
 The new corporate form 
produces nothing, rather it is a condensed core of upper and middle management controlling a 
global supply chain. Profit is made by exploiting the international division of labor and the key 
moment is the product‘s movement into a high value consumer area (like the United States) 
where the price undergoes a substantial mark up. Jasper Bernes has analyzed this new production 
model: 
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 These figures are difficult to estimate. The 2008 UN World Drug Report noted that that year alone 712 tons of 
cocaine had been seized world-wide. Many estimate that world production (of cut, not pure cocaine) is perhaps 
double that figure.  
157
 Or they did up to a certain historical moment. Part of what is happening now is the fragmentation of larger groups 




Through precise coordination, firms can invert the traditional buyer-seller relationship in 
which goods are first produced and then sold to a consumer. By replenishing goods at the 
exact moment they are sold, with no build-up of stocks along the way, JIT [just-in-time] 
firms perform a weird sort of time-travel, making it seem as if they only make products 
that have already been sold to the end-consumer. As opposed to the older, ―push 
production‖ model, in which factories generated massive stockpiles of goods that retailers 
would clear from the market with promotions and coupons, in today‘s ―pull‖ production 
system ―retailers share POS [point-of-sale] information with their vendors who can then 
rapidly replenish the retailers‘ stock.‖ This has lead to the functional integration of 
suppliers and retailers, under terms in which the retailers often have the upper hand. 
Massive buyers like Wal-Mart reduce their suppliers to mere vassals, directly controlling 
product design and pricing while still retaining the flexibility to terminate a contract if 
needed. They gain the benefits of vertical integration without the liability that comes 
from formal ownership. (n.p.) 
 
The new Mexican drug logistics groups, while lacking just-in-time production and POS 
informational systems, are, however, built on this model. Like Apple or Walmart, the goal of 
these organizations is to force prices upon the supply chain, as opposed to paying suppliers‘ 
price. There are some drugs they produce in mass quantities, for example marijuana and 
methamphetamine, but these are seen as being used as short-term financing for the more capital 
intensive cocaine trade (Keefe n.p.). The golden calf of Mexican drug transport is the cocaine 
trade and in this trade the logistics organizations directly control very little of the production.
158
 
Thus, the key site for profit generation is no longer control of production but rather the control of 
the points of entry into the high price consumer zone of the United States. Profits are made not in 
the exploitation of labor and vertical integration, but in the mark up, the space of circulation, in 
controlling the transition between exchange rates and national spaces. What these organizations 
are able to realize through a mastery of logistics and this new corporate form is the super-profits 
of logistics:
159
 they battle over a monopoly, not of production, but of the supply chain. The labor 
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 See Norberto Emmerich ―Una teoría política para el narcotráfico‖ for an argument that this is in fact a 
generalized condition of the industry. 
159
 Dawn Paley notes that the lion‘s share of the profits stay in the United States: ―According to a 2010 report by the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 85 percent of gross proceeds in the $35 billion cocaine market stayed in the United 
210 
 
of drug logistics is touched by this predominance of circulation in two ways: first, it is a site 
where the state has shifted from mediating between capital and labor to burrowing into and 
siphoning off super-profits from the drug trade and, second, drug logistics are outside the 
enclosure of the factory. Logistics is concerned, rather, with the defense of a territory through 
which commodities pass, and wherein laborers are exposed to new forms of death and force.
160
  
Perhaps none of the cultural productions in the aftermath of the ―drug war‖ have 
addressed these conditions as smartly as Luiz Estrada‘s El Infierno. The film opens with the 
main character, Benny, played by Damián Alcázar, being deported from the United States where 
he has spent twenty years working as an undocumented laborer. His return, in the middle of the 
U.S. economic crisis, highlights the transition between two moments of foreign currency flows to 
prop up Mexico‘s current account and two different destinations for surplus population: from 
migrant labor to labor in the drug trade. Moreover, the film spends most of its time, particularly 
in its first half, detailing the specificities of the labor regime of low level drug logistics workers.  
  Upon his return, Benny quickly realizes that his little town of San Miguel de Arcángel 
has changed greatly in his absence: few people, many guns. Due to pressing financial concerns, 
Benny quickly becomes caught up in the drug trade to which he is introduced by his childhood 
friend Cochi Loco (Crazy Pig). Once Benny joins the trade the film passes into an episodic 
mode, with Benny being shown the ropes by Cochi. As Benny quickly learns, the labor of narco 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
States. Of that amount, 15 percent went to US wholesalers and mid-level dealers, and 70 percent went to street-level 
dealers who sold to US consumers. Compare this to the $4.6 billion (13 percent) that stayed with traffickers moving 
the product between the Andean region and the US, or with the mere 1 percent that stayed with Andean producers‖ 
(88). Nonetheless, the relative supremacy of logistics versus cocaine production profits is significant. 
160
 The labor of logistics in films like Infierno, as we will see, operates under the same conditions that transportation 
or logistics work has historically; that is, at the edge of state mediations of the capital-labor relation. In societies that 
focus on production, transport is an after-thought, a cost that should be reduced as close to zero as possible. In 
transport, there is a historical tendency to employ unfree forms of labor: which would include nineteenth century 
sailors being ―shanghaied‖ or the recent UPS, FedEx, Amazon.com dependence on part-time labor. The existence of 
or tendency towards unfree labor (what in technical terms would be the exploitation of absolute surplus value) is in 
part historically conditioned as well as being the result of a conscious lack of state mediation of the capital-labor 
relationship in this sector. 
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logistics has a different specificity from even migrant labor as it is even less mediated by socially 
necessary labor time and the state. As Cochi Loco notes, ―La vida del narco: muy buena lana 
pero no es fácil.‖ And it is not hard work because it is physically demanding (indeed, Cochi and 
Benny spend most of their time driving from place to place in a truck or in bars partying), but 
psychologically so. Benny and Cochi are always on call and cannot refuse any task (their 
partying is frequently interrupted by cell phone calls from their boss, demanding their immediate 
presence or attention). Their only site of resistance is that common to logistics and transport 
workers: namely, pilfering, in their case, taking money and drugs that the boss will never know 
are missing.  
If Infierno is a film, at least in part, about labor, what is it that Benny and Cochi actually 
do in the film? Their labor we might say has two sides: first, handling logistical operations 
(delivering product, meeting suppliers, collecting payments, etc) and a second, and increasingly 
as the film descends into a full-on war between capos, killing other low-level drug logistics 
laborers. However, if one compares Infierno with other cultural productions of the narco 
moment, including other films such as Ms. Bala or novels in the graphic violence police genre 
such as Entre Perros, it is immediately apparent that while all traffic in violence and the 
representation of violence, Infierno grounds this representation in a presentation of narco life as 
labor, from which it derives a good deal of its black humor and critical force. The critical force 
of Infierno is contained in its ironic commentary on labor as no longer being a site for producing 
national subjects. For example, the film‘s running gag is to present Benny and Cochi as just two 
normal guys doing their jobs…which includes placing festive sombreros on bodies, etc. As 
Benny and Cochi travel, frequently, at high speed from one point in the film‘s under-inhabited 
landscape to another, to enforce a debt or extract revenge, the film‘s scenes of spectacular 
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violence are offset by the film‘s ironic emphasis on their labor as labor: as Benny responds to 
Cochi honking outside his house early one morning, ―Este trabajo no respeta horarios.‖ 
Foucault‘s work on the great systems of individualization and the production of subjects 
in the long sweep of the rise of the state and governmentality turns around institutions and 
enclosures: barracks, schools, hospitals, asylums, factories, and prisons. What we can 
immediately see about the work of drug logistics is that it takes place not in an enclosure. The 
critical spatial figure in Infierno is the plaza or the territory which one controls and through 
which mercancia passes. Instead of the body being inserted within and produced by an 
institution, one‘s labor takes place within a territory, is tied to this territory, and is directed 
towards the control of this territory. It is this move from enclosure to territory that occasions the 
interruption of prior forms of subjectivization; these interruptions all turn around the 
transformation of a discontinuous anthropological limit which defines the subject and body.   
Infierno tracks this process of interruption and the re-elaboration of the anthropological 
limits of the subject, especially in its attention to Benny‘s attempts to normalize himself to the 
demands of the work. After his first day on the job, while relaxing at a strip club, his co-worker, 
El Huasteco, asks him ―…qué le parecio la chamba?‖ To which Benny replies, ―pues como todo, 
no más es cuestión de agarrarle el modo.‖
161
 However, the film demonstrates that there are many 
parts of the job for which Benny‘s subjectivity has not been prepared. In the next scene, Benny is 
having sex with a sex worker during which he repeats to her his lines from earlier in the film (―te 
voy a sacar de trabajar‖)
162
 originally spoken while having sex with his love interest, Lupe. 
While Benny‘s masculinity is adapted enough to the present to allow him to enjoy the pleasures 
of the narco life, it still requires him to disavow his reasons for this enjoyment and requires him 
                                                          
161
 Translation: ―What do you think of the job?‖ ―Well, like anything else, its just a matter of getting the hang of it.‖ 
162
 Translation: ―I‘m going to get you out of here.‖ Implying that he will set the woman up in a family-like structure 
and ―save‖ her from prostitution. 
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to connect them to a prior form of labor, masculinity, and social reproduction. This activity is 
interrupted by Cochi Loco—the patrón has called and needs them immediately. In the car ride 
there, Cochi gives Benny a packet of white powder (―si JR y el patrón nos encuentran en este 
estado, nos cortan los huevos‖).
163
 Benny‘s body again requires adjusting. Benny is then present 
as the leader of their logistics group (Don José Reyes) cuts off the tongue and hands of a former 
employee (for being a snitch and thief respectively). Benny faints and in the next scene we see 
him sitting alone at his kitchen table taking tequila shot after tequila shot. His love interest, Lupe 
(played by Elizabeth Cervantes), enters the room and Benny shows her his hands, still shaking. 




Each of these moments is the interruption of a prior subject formation and an attempt to 
refashion Benny‘s subjectivity into an instrument adequate to the labor of drug logistics. The 
point of the film is that, with Benny, the subjectivization carried out by drug logistics labor does 
not stick. The film demonstrates that of the hired hands of Don Reyes it is only the two members 
with prior military training (El Sargento and El Sardo) who have successfully completed the 
transition to the subjectivity demanded by the labor of drug logistics—cutting up bodies, 
torturing, etc without a visible response.  
If the film depicts logistics labor as interrupting prior processes of subject formation, it 
shows that also, in this moment, labor no longer serves as a site of collectivization. Instead of a 
figure of the worker which binds individuals, what the film presents instead is the absence of any 
form of collectivity amongst the logistics workers. The primary social relation amongst members 
of Don Reyes‘ network is distrust and suspicion: everyone is always potentially a soplón 
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 Translation: ―If JR and the boss catch us in this state they will cut our balls off.‖ 
164
 Translation: ―Look here honey, in this life we can get accustomed to anything, except for not eating.‖ 
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(―snitch‖). When Benny turns to the government to trade information to protect the life of his 
nephew and Lupe, it is quickly revealed that the government officials are working for Don Reyes 
as well. The film demonstrates repeatedly how little it takes for individuals to switch sides and 
begin playing for the other team. Thus, instead of the grand figures of the campesino, the noble 
proletarian pobre, or the mujer abnegada, in El Infierno we have a gallery of distrust and deceit, 
an interrupted processes of subjectivization that know no limited collective sublimation. 
At the same time, the need for a control of territory (as opposed to the means of 
production) has meant that the interruptive effects of drug labor are not confined (primarily) 
inside any ―institution‖ (such as the factory, the office, etc.), but rather roam across the social 
field at large. This leads to forms of force (display of dead bodies) as a means to control a given 
territory and that forms of force deployed in the moment of drug logistics labor escape from any 
enclosed space and impinge on the lives, bodies, and affects of neighbors, passers-by, etc. The 
labor of drug logistics constitutes an interruptive process not just for Benny as a novice laborer in 
the mines of circulation but for those who live or work in or adjacent to its un-enclosed 
territories. Both of these processes, tied to control of territory, breakdown old forms of enclosure 
and interrupt or de-institute prior forms of subject formation.  
What Infierno can show us is that, unlike many accounts of drug violence that focus on 
the breakdown of a state monopoly on violence, there is a special connection between economies 
of circulation and force. That is, the flows of drugs, their position at a remove from production in 
the realm of circulation, and lack of state mediation of the capital-labor relation, creates, at least 
in a partial way, the openings onto death found in the labor of the drug logistics sector. To the 
extent that it involves control over circulation (points of entry) and the superprofits possible in 
contraband trade, the labor that goes into drug logistics is only partially mediated by the state and 
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by socially necessary labor time. To the extent that the drug trade operates in a new formation of 
the capital-labor relation which is positioned less in production and more in circulation, it 
operates outside the traditional state mediations (the working day, etc). Thus, the labor of the 
drug trade, which tends to suck up those like Benny who are in or on the edges of the surplus 
population, involves an opening onto the destruction of the body and exposure to death as the 
limit of unfreedom. It is this exposure to death which interrupts both prior process of 
subjectivization and forestalls the production of depoliticized collectivities, so characteristic of 
the developmentalist state, at the site of labor. 
It is the failure of this structure that Benny confronts in the film‘s final scene. At a 
celebration of the Mexican bicentenario, Benny walks in slow motion through a cheering crowd. 
Once at the front, he pulls out a cuerno, and still in slow motion, proceeds to kill the ruling class 
of San Miguel, from the priest to Don Jose Reyes and his wife, to mid-level government 
functionaries. Benny is not just extracting retribution for the murder of Lupe, which would imply 
a more limited selection of targets. Rather his total negation of the current symbolic trinity of the 
Mexican elite (state, church, and drug logistics) is extracting revenge for the failure of a system 
at large, which encompasses both state and capital. However, in Infierno, unlike later cultural 
works, this failure is not complete: as Benny walks through the crowd we see that there is a still a 
large population for whom the symbols and structures of the state are still functional, in an 
ideological sense at least; those who respond as Don Reyes waves the flag and chants ―Viva! 
Viva Mexico!‖ The state, and its process of subjectivization, in Infierno, then, still carries a trace 
of its past functionality—not as a hope for the future but as an ideological substrate of the 
present. Infierno marks the limit of the functionality of the state apparatus but for all its negative 
power does not speculate on what might come to substitute for it. To begin to see beyond it, we 
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have to turn away from labor, which is still touched by the trace of production, and into the other 
central Mexican site for the production of subjects and weak collectivities: death.  
The Cadaver 
In a 2012 blog post poet Dolores Dorantes writes of her book Querida Fábrica (2012): 
Comencé escribiendo ese libro con la idea de un personaje enamorado de la fábrica, de la 
industria, de su lugar de trabajo y las situaciones a las que la vida laboral lo somete, en 
los recorridos de una rutina dentro de esas naves industriales típicas de la frontera y, 
supongo, típicas ya del mundo entero. Las naves industriales son ahora para el desarrollo 
de los países, como los iglús para los esquimales. No sé en qué momento el amor por la 
fábrica se convirtió en el amor fascinante hacia un cadáver. No sé en qué momento, la 
fábrica con sus tonos metálicos y procesos sincronizados y automáticos; con sus riesgos 
calientes y el pulso de una vida sujeto a los motores, se volvió un cuerpo muerto 




As Claudio Lomnitz has shown in Death and the Idea of Mexico, death is not a stable cultural 
category but rather one used ―as a conceptual field with which to think through the national 
question, and indeed as a metonymic sign of Mexicanness itself‖ (27). Lomnitz demonstrates 
how after the 1982 debt crisis representations of death change from indicating a common ground 
shared by all humanity or ―a universal that provided ironic distance from the artifice of everyday 
hierarchy‖ into a ―form of social differentiation.‖ He writes: 
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 Translation: I began writing this book with the idea of a character in love with the factory, industry, their place of 
work and situations that work life submits one to, in a routine within those typical industrial buildings of border and, 
I suppose, typical now of the world in general. These factories (naves industriales) are now for developing countries, 
such as igloos are to Eskimos. I do not know at what moment love for the factory became the fascinated love 
towards a corpse. I do not know at what point the factory with its metallic tones and synchronized and automated 
processes, with its hot risks and the pulse of a life subject to its engines, became a dead body decomposing under the 
gaze of love. 
 
The rest of the post tests an alignment of this work with necropolitics: ―Después de escribir Querida Fábrica había 
decidido no escribir más poesía. Consideré que era mi último libro. Luego, junto a Rodrigo Flores, escribí Intervenir 
(un libro con edición limitada a 30 ejemplares que regalamos en una fiesta en el D.F.). Después de escribir Querida 
Fábrica tuve miedo. Me asustó estar acercándome a una especie de fascinación por los cuerpos muertos. Recorría 
cuerpos imaginarios con pasión por su inercia y por los interminables significados y símbolos que provoca la 
muerte. Hoy recibí un link a una colección de fotos de Fernando Brito y el link era anunciadocomo ―necropoética‖. 
Si hubiera podido elegir una fotografía para ilustrar la portada de Querida Fábrica, hubiera sido una de Fernando 
Brito, sin duda.‖ 
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Here death is not a form of ironic distancing, but rather a way of exaggerating 
inequalities, all wrapped in the punch of a highly developed macabre humor that has its 
own long tradition in Mexico. The skull, then, serves to exaggerate social difference and 
to extrapolate it to its final consequences in a kind of grotesque. Whereas for Posada 
skulls were a sign of fundamental equality and communion (and were subversion for that 
reason), in the crisis period they are deployed to uncover inequality. (445-7) 
 
Death then, much like labor but in a more popular rather than state register, has been a site for 
articulating forms of collectivity (either in consonance, critique, or dissonance with state-
produced forms). For Lomnitz, the resurgence of Day of the Dead imagery and cultural practices 
after 1982 is linked to a need to name and note growing inequality. This represents a marked 
shift from the national popular mediations of death where it is a category that reveals or names 
an equality and common-being amongst all social subjects. Before the 1982 crisis, the subversive 
power of death was in its claim to a fundamental equality, after it is the skull (the calavera) 
which exaggerates social difference to the point of a grotesque critique. 
What then does it mean, in the present historical period, but one no less in crisis than the 
one Lomnitz examines, to focus—as a wide range of cultural works do—not on the skull as 
metonym of inequality or the figure of death as common ground, but on the cadaver? The shift 
from death to the skull to the cadaver marks a transition between a modern period defined by 
production, labor power, and grand state collective forms to a world of crisis and growing 
inequality after 1982 to the present world defined by surplus population and circulation. To the 
extent that the years after the 1994 financial crisis one of the key vectors of change in the social 
sphere is the spread and proliferation of circulation, its overtaking of production, the cadaver, 
which inhabits a space somewhere between the living and the dead, between material and 




In the first poem in Querida Fábrica‘s opening section ―Condúcenos‖ we read: 
 
Esto no va más allá de algún vestido al que 
 
Tenemos que buscarle los zapatos o 
 
Una noche que esconde su más preciada estrella tras la quemadura 
          y 
es ese fuego al que nos gusta entrar para mirarnos 




que una época que no pudo borrarse arrastró con nosotros como 
 
arrastra el mar un mar espeso sumergido en lo oscuro 
 
 
Cada paisaje hirviendo recubre lo que fuimos tomando 
 
muy a pecho y que ya es hora 
 
de contarlo como si hubiera números para una decadencia 





hay que alinear los cadáveres con los que te pretendo hay 
 
que apilar los crímenes para alcanzar la carne de un corazón 
   que no batalla como tú 
 




This opening poem inserts the cadaver into a complicated signifying system, one defined by two 
parallel worlds predicated upon immateriality: the light of both the fire and star and the 
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 Rough translation: This is not going beyond a dress that / we have to look for shoes or /a night that hides its most 
beloved star after the burn / and / is that fire that we like to enter to see ourselves /the heart of the dismissed /and 
dispossessed / that a time that could not be erased dragged us as /dragging the sea a think sea submerged in the dark 
/ every boiling landscape covers what we were taking / to heart and it's time / to tell it as if there were numbers for a 
decadence /covered in moribund centers /Because / must align the bodies with which I court/claim you we have to/ 
stack the crimes to reach the meat of a heart/ that does not battle like you /you: a heart without a paddle 
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landscape that boils are all moments of state change, of flicker, of an undecidability as to the 
state of a being‘s substance. There is reference as well to parallel lines of cadavers (―los 
cadavers‖ lined up against those that ―te pretendo‖) which index two different orders of being: 
the ―real‖ cadavers and those with a less defined ontological status. Indeed, the poem in these 
stanzas is an accounting of what is there (material) and what we hope, expect, or pretend is or 
might be there (immaterial). The effects of these multiple gestures (to orders of cadavers, to 
stars, and fire) is revealed in the final set of lines as not that of making the immaterial material, 
that is, to make it flesh, but rather to reach (alcanzar) the materiality of the immaterial, the heart 
or flesh of the spirit. 
It is important to differentiate the use of ―immaterial‖ here from what is its perhaps most 
common contemporary usage, that of the post-workerist theorization of ―immaterial labor.‖ This 
usage of the term immaterial has its roots in Marx‘s Theories of Surplus Value and other 
nineteenth century political economic texts where it is used to describe the product of service 
work (immaterial versus the ―material‖ product of industrial production). There is, however, 
another genealogical tradition that extends back into medieval Christian and Arabic philosophy 
(Augustine and Averroes particularly) where immaterial is used to designate the soul as a 
substance which is not merely mental (non-substantial) nor merely physical (material).
167
 Hardt 
and Negri‘s usage of the term immaterial takes up the political economy side of the genealogy 
and links it to the informationalization of work in Empire. My usage of the term—and which we 
have seen outlined in the work of Dorantes above—draws on the earlier medieval tradition which 
stresses the not non-material nature of the immaterial.  
Of course, the cadaver in Dorantes cannot but help to refer to, on one level, the 150,000+ 
dead in the on-going ―drug war.‖ But focusing only on drug and state violence would miss the 
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 It is this meaning that reappears in the Enlightenment with Berekley‘s philosophy of immaterialism. 
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longer cultural salience of the cadaver in Mexico, as well as what is specific in Dorantes‘ 
description; namely the passage beyond production, the passage from the factory to the cadaver 
(―No sé en qué momento el amor por la fábrica se convirtió en el amor fascinante hacia un 
cadaver‖).
168
 Moreover, as we saw above, the cadaver in Dorantes is not merely the brute 
facticity of the corporal but rather a figure of the immaterial, the not non-material, a 
paradoxically substantial shadow world. As such, the movement into the world of the cadaver, 
not just in Dorantes‘ work but across recent Mexican cultural production,
169
 can be read as 
referring not just to the dead of the drug war period, but also to the move to circulation 
understood as the specific form of the parallel substantial immaterial world, which, I will argue, 
links the present period with the prior 1990s moment of financial crisis, and condenses features 
of the present period‘s form of financial crisis, namely that of second-order finance or 
derivatives (as the trigger of the 2008 global financial crisis). The figure of the cadaver as that 
which is suspended between two worlds indexes a turn away from production in two ways: 
referencing the dead of the logistics of drug trade and the immaterial forms of value produced by 
new financial (derivatives) operations.  
Indeed, the salience of the cadaver has a history in Mexican cultural production that pre-
dates the drug war. As Lomnitz notes, the (now early) work of multi-media and performance 
artist Teresa Margolles ―mobilizes‖ traces from anonymous victims in Mexico City‘s morgue. 
Amy Sara Carroll has pointed out that Margolles‘ work is concerned with ―the life of the corpse‖ 
and is composed primarily of the waste matter, stains and traces of corpses. Carroll, discussing 
Margolles‘ 2002 piece ―Vaporización/Vaporization‖ in which disinfected water used in the 
washing of corpses in the Mexico City morgue is run through a fog machine, writes, ―in this 
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 Translation: I don‘t know in which moment love for the factory became a fascinated love for a cadaver. 
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 These other cultural productions would include the photography of Fernando Brito, the 2013 film Halley (in 
which a man slowly realizes he has turned into a zombie), and Roberto Bolaño‘s 2666 amongst others. 
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regard, Vaporización/Vaporization initially might be understood as allegorically charting an 
ontological transformation in ‗national allegory‘ proper. Like the body, which is 
transubstantiated, but not disappeared‖ (115). Margolles‘s work which extends back into the late 
1990s, and thus predates the start of the ―drug war,‖ but which is located comfortably in the turn 
to circulation, is concerned then with both the cadaver and the immaterial (as that which is 
transubstantiated but not disappeared). There are strong parallels here with Dorantes‘ recent 
work which uses the cadaver as a mediating device and which traffics as well in shadowy, 
immaterial worlds.  
 But to understand how this immaterial world emerges out of not only death but new 
forms of financial crisis we have to take a brief political economic detour. During the 2008 
financial crisis, numerous Mexican companies lost hundreds of millions of dollars as bets they 
had made on derivatives went bad. The Mexican grupo CEMEX required a bailout from the 
Mexican government in order to avoid bankruptcy, even though now it realizes only 16% of its 
sales in Mexico (Mendoza Hernández 166). What this moment revealed was that many large, 
non-financial corporations, that is, those whose profit-making ostensibly occurs in the productive 
sector, had switched to forms of financial speculation to maintain their bottom lines, and that 
much of this speculation had occurred in derivatives markets. The ―real‖ economy in Mexico 
was revealed as having become increasingly dependent on the failed forms of accumulation 
found in finance, or the sphere of circulation.   
The emergence and spread of derivatives has its roots in two processes resulting from the 
long downturn beginning in the 1970s. First, with the growth of multinationals, moving profits 
between currencies became increasingly important. However, with the end of the fixed exchange 
rates of Bretton Woods, moving money across currencies became more volatile precisely at the 
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moment that it became essential to international accumulation. Second, beginning in the 1970s, 
investment banks began to put competitive pressure on traditional banks and companies began 
turning to instruments other than bank loans to finance their operations (Lapavitsas 224). Both of 
these processes led to the invention of new financial instruments, derivatives among them, first 
as a means of controlling or hedging currency volatility and second to generate new revenue 
streams for traditional banks and investment houses.
170
 
Derivatives have since become not only a big business but part of the fabric of everyday 
economic life (currently, the global derivative markets runs at 60 billion USD a day in 
trading).
171
 The simplest explanation of a derivative is that it is a financial instrument whose 
value changes in response to a change in the price of an underlying element. The underlying 
element can be, truly, almost anything: a commodity, an interest rate, a group of assets, the 
weather, a catastrophic event. Derivatives exists at a second order remove from an asset or 
underlying element, but are also more often contracts concerning future actions or events.
172
 
 Derivatives open a parallel world of immateriality, a virtual world of possible futures 
with a tendential relationship to the actual. It is a world of confusion between price and value, a 
world that exists at one remove from and which emerges from the decline of production. This 
parallel world is an immaterial one: it is tied to the actual but its own actuality blurs into the 
multiplicity of possible futures, possible future prices. This immateriality becomes a form, an 
                                                          
170
 For more on these changes generally see Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits 
Us All (New York: Verso, 2014). In Mexico, see Roberto Soto Esquivel Especulación e innovación financiera: 
mercado de derivados y consecuencias macroeconómicas en México (México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2010). 
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 This is the notational amount, meaning the face value of all transactions. Since the majority of derivatives come 
into and pass out of being without being acted upon the actual amount of money changing hands is much less. How 
much less is difficult to estimate because there are no reliable sources of information for the OTC market. 
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 The historical origin in modern-day derivatives is the commodity futures contract, which is an agreement to buy 
or sell a certain quantity of a certain commodity at a fixed price at a future date. A helpful introduction to derivatives 
is Andrew M. Chisholm Derivatives Demystified (London: Wiley, 2004). There is in the critical literature an on-
going debate between Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty (Capitalism with Derivatives [2006]) and Tony Norfield, 
―Derivatives and Capitalist Markets: The Speculative Heart of Capital‖ (2012). Bryan and Rafferty respond to 




effect, a shadow cast upon social life after the expansion and spread of second-order finance. We 
might think that derivatives are too esoteric a financial instrument to have any real impact on 
cultural life other than in a mediated way in a moment of crisis. However, I want to argue that it 
is possible to register the conditioning of cultural categories and production by the immaterial 
materiality of finance in the period after 1994, precisely to the extent that immateriality indexes 
and participates in a general rise of circulation over against production in the Mexican nation-
space. The specific immateriality of circulation cultures, which encompasses both second-order 
finance and drug logistics, is that of a shadow world, linked to, but also just beyond, production. 
To return to Dorantes then: the landscape of Querida Fábrica is a barren zone (―al 
asomarme a este desierto y ver todo/ calladamente gris‖ [50]) that harkens back to the world of 
Pedro Páramo. But unlike Pedro Páramo this is not a world of ghosts (that is, those who are more 
spirit than matter, or what would be a ghost town) but rather the reverse: the space of Querida 
Fábrica is the the immaterial tendentially linked to the actual, the ghost town. Jean Franco has 
argued that Pedro Páramo is a novel about the fragmentation and comingling of capitalist and 
pre-capitalist forms of social being. On Franco‘s account, it is money which causes the 
breakdown: ―In Pedro Páramo, money dispenses the overlord from any personal confrontation, 
absolves him from the moral consequences of his actions…The Mexican society of Pedro 
Páramo is a feudal and tribal structure onto which has been grafted a money economy which is 
connected with the existence of a bourgeoisie‖ (441-2).
173
 If Pedro Páramo maps the transition to 
a money economy, whose primary effect is the move to impersonal structures of social relation, 
Dorantes‘ Querida Fábrica maps the move to an economics of second-order finance and 
circulation, whose primary effect is the immaterialization of life, its turning tendential of the 
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 See also Gareth Williams discussion of Paramo and Jean Franco in The Mexican Exception: Sovereignty, Police, 
and Democracy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).  
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actual, its blurring of the present into a kaleidoscope of possible futures. But here enters the other 
side of circulation, that of drug logistics: futures for whom? For the already dead, not in the form 
of spiritual ghosts, but rather as immaterial cadavers.  
However, while the landscape of Querida Fábrica might be barren, it is saturated with 
social relation. Lomnitz  reads, in the final chapter of Idea of Death in Mexico, the rise of the 
Santa Muerte cult in the 1990s as a consequence of the receding of the state which ―upholds 
Death as the ultimate sovereign,‖ but the cadaver in Dorantes has an entirely different valence, 
namely that of a particular kind of commonality. That is, the cadaver is what we all (potentially) 
are, but also what bears within it other bonds:  
 
Para que florecieras conmigo en la fosa:   una flor sin luz 
      una flor ciega 
           eras 
      húmeda 
 
entonces 
de corazón cayendo me gustabas 
 
       con el golpe en el paladar 
 
 
Me gustabas cayendo, Urna 
Me gustabas sin certeza ni hartazgo, Miedo 
Parecía nuestro el fuego, princesa    pero, alguien 
             te había reventado 
 
 
Te había puesto de espaldas en la tierra 
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 Translation: So that you flower with me in the grave: a flower without light / a blind flower / you were /humid 
/then /a heart you falling I wanted you / with the blow to the palate / I liked you falling, Urn / I liked you without 
certainty or satiety, Fear / It seemed like our fire, princess, but someone / had exploded you /I had put you on your 
back in the earth / I had put you with me, love. 
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The speaker is already in the fosa; but the te/you subject has also been placed in the same 
position (―te había puesto‖). The common position they share is not that of the worker, 
campesino, or ama de casa, but rather the speaking dead, the immaterial material cadaver. 
However, different than Posada‘s calaveras which are ―a sign of fundamental equality and 
communion‖ (Lomnitz, my emphasis), the common position, or collectivity, of the cadaver is 
traversed by surfeit of relation—something that marks Dorantes‘ writing in general, which 
weaves webs of pronouns into complex relational forms. If the common position is the cadaver, 
threaded through it are other forms of minor collectives, which link two elements into a form of 
social relation, signaled in particular by the repetition of ―me gustabas‖ (―I wanted/liked you‖). 
We might even go so far to say that it is a world without individuality, as rarely in the book is a 
subject indicated without it being placed into relation with another. If, for Lomnitz, the Santa 
Muerte cult marks a withdrawal of the state, Dorantes‘ work openly speculates on what comes 
after the state and capital: pushed out from the factory into the surplus of the speaking dead, the 
book searches for fragile forms of collectivity which might house or bear new forms of social 
relation inside itself.  
In the landscape of the aftermath of production—that of the spirit world of immateriality, 
the parallel universe of circulation, the production of the fictitious values of finance and the 
violent contestation for the control of flows of mercania through plazas—Dorantes‘ work would 
seem to indicate that all we have left is this tendential linkage to the material substrate of our 
bodies, the cadaver, wherein we are neither alive nor dead. In the strange light of the parallel 
world of the grave, of flowers without light, we can lie down together in the hopes that from our 
trace of biological materiality something else will spring forth.  
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If death was a figure of equality in the developmentalist moment, and one of a critique of 
social inequality in the neoliberal transition, then the cadaver is what lies on the other side of the 
developmentalist state. It figures neither a shared commonality nor a potentially antagonistic 
critique but rather, as Dorantes writes, ―algo mas entero que yo / es lo que viene.‖
175
 That is, the 
threat of future death does not make us equal (or unequal), because we are already dead. The 
wager is whether love as an immaterial spark can newly animate the undead biological substrate, 
to make it flower. At the edges of the state and against unmediated financial and drug war 
capitalism there is no ready politics, no proletarian subject, no ―human‖ rather just the undead in 
the parallel world of the immaterial looking for a way out, the undead saturated in relation, 
pronouns circling around each other in an attempt to enact a collective body.  
 
The Surplus 
 If Infierno and the poetry of Dorantes show us what happens to sites for the production of 
collectivity emerging from the developmental state, it is in cultural works concerned with 
migration and terror where the failure of capital and the state to provide inhabitable lifeworlds is 
most directly registered and contested. Mexico-based cultural productions about migration, 
concerning either the migration of Mexicans or Central Americans into the United States, present 
migrants as surplus population, as existing outside the apparatus of state and capital.
176
 In these 
cultural objects, but especially in filmic productions, migrants attempting to pass over walls and 
through deserts into the United States are portrayed as existing outside all enclosures. Even when 
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 Translation: Something more whole than I / is what comes. 
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 This is in contrast with work emerging from the social sciences which has tended to focus on the construction of 
transnational linkages (mediated by the state, Church, or hometown associations). See for example, Natasha 
Iskander, Creative State: Forty Years of Migration and Development Policy in Morocco and Mexico (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2010); Debra Lattanzi Shutika, Beyond the Borderlands: Migration and Belonging in the 
United States and Mexico (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011); and David Fitzgerald‘s A Nation of 
Emigrants: How Mexico Manages its Migration (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008). 
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they succeed in crossing, they continue to be represented as part of the informal labor market or 
in ―grey‖ market areas where there is little state mediation (other than state violence). Thus, 
many migrants, at least from the perspective of these cultural works, remain, at best, at the edge 
of the capitalist and state apparatus of subjectivization, and, in the moment of crossing, they pass 
between two state formations, both of which direct excessive amounts of violence at individuals 
in their position. What filmic cultural productions on migration, such as Norteado (2009) and 
Jaula de Oro (2013), reveal is how quickly the interiority of the subject fades once it moves to 
the periphery of these great systems of subjectivization and collectivization.
177
  
 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault discusses modern disciplinary procedures as the 
production of the ―modern soul,‖ and, as we saw in the previous chapter, modern notions of 
control and domination pass through the production of a subject, control of subjectivity, or the 
integration of an individual into an apparatus. In Foucault‘s account, the modern soul emerges in 
a turn away from punishment that is directed at the body. With the rise of disciplinary 
apparatuses and institutions of enclosure, disciplinary techniques like imprisonment came to 
reform the soul instead of punishing the body. They did so, however, through a complex set of 
processes aimed at the body; through disciplinary techniques Foucault describes as the art of 
distributions (placing bodies in enclosed, portioned spaces), the control of activity (of time and 
gesture), the organization of ―geneses‖ (various forms of training), and the composition of forces 
(tactically combining individual bodies into larger ―machines‖). All these are operations on a 
body, but ones which give rise to the subject‘s interiority.  
 If subjectivity as we have known it since the sixteenth century is created by hailing, 
integration into productive process, or in submission to disciplinary procedures, in cultural works 
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 This is not to say that individual migrants in reality have ceased to have feelings and emotions or significant 
interior lives; rather I am referring only to how cultural works dramatize and figure these subjects in a 
representational universe.  
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on migration we register not the dissolution of individuals but rather of that specific form of 
subjectivity: interiority. Surplus populations are controlled by state violence, not by the 
disciplining, policing, and regulation of their ―souls.‖ Once the state and capital let up on these 
individualizing procedures and switch to violence and force, interiority begins to fade. However, 
its absence makes space for the emergence of something else: a form of individualizing (not 
interiority) which derives from a collectivity, instead of the other way around.  
 For example, the 2009 film Norteado follows Andrés, an Oaxacan migrant, and his 
attempts to cross the border at Tijuana into the United States. The film opens with him leaving 
the Oaxacan sierra, travelling by bus to the border, and then crossing into the United States with 
a pollero (smuggler). The pollero abandons him in the middle of the desert and, close to 
succumbing to the heat, he is picked up by the border patrol. Returned to Tijuana, he eats in a 
shelter and then attempts to call his cousins in the United States. He gets a disconnect signal and 
speaks his first words of the film, ―Bueno, bueno‖—at the eighteen minute mark. Andrés then 
begins working for a middle aged woman, Ela (played by Alicia Laguna), who runs a tienda and 
he slowly becomes a part of the social group that passes through the store, which includes 
Asensio, an older gentleman, and Cata, a younger woman who works in the tienda as well. The 
film and Andrés continue in relative silence; not until the film‘s halfway mark does Andrés 
finally have a full conversation with another individual (with Ela in a bar, where she is trying to 
hook up with him), and even this one is halting, monosyllabic, marked by the exchange of only 
the most basic personal information, even though it is filled as well with care and also sexual 
desire.  
 In ―The Subject and Power,‖ Foucault outlines his argument that the modern state 
appropriated and built on the pastoral power innovated by the Christian church. Foucault writes 
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that among the characteristics of this ―very special form of power‖ are that ―it is a form of power 
which does not look after just the whole community, but each individual in particular, during his 
entire life‖ and that ―this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of 
people‘s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost 
secrets‖ (332). The lack of dialogue in Norteado marks a break with this kind of subject 
formation. The film presents us with a hollowing out or absence of interiority—but which does 
not imply the absence of or inability to form social relations. Rather, what we see is that the link 
between confessing or giving an account of one‘s self and the state or pastoral power which 
cultivates this specific type of subjecthood or interiority has been broken. 
 A similar process is at work in the 2013 film Jaula de Oro. Three friends (Juan, Sara, and 
Samuel) begin a journey out of Guatemala to the United States. The first seven minutes of the 
film, as they get ready, meet up, and then journey to the Guatemala-Mexico border, pass without 
them exchanging a single word. After they fail to hop a train, their group is joined by a young 
indigenous man, Chauk, who speaks no Spanish. As the others begin to have limited 
conversations (hopping on the train, counting money, etc) his silence serves as a marker of the 
film‘s anti-pastoral, anti-confession mode. Again, this is not to say there is no ―emotional‖ or 
affective life, but rather that it passes through a different apparatus. Having been sent back by the 
Mexican border patrol, the group decides to make another attempt. Juan, the de facto leader, says 
anyone who wants to should turn back now. Samuel decides to stay. Juan asks him ―¿Por qué?‖ 
Samuel does not respond verbally but the two hug. He then proceeds to hug, with tears in his 
eyes, each of the other members of their group. Thus, it is not that there is no connection, no 
affective or social relation here, but rather it no longer passes through the language cultivated by 
processes of interiority. The question ―¿por qué?‖ that calls the individual to give an account of 
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him or herself has an answer that no longer lies within that domain of accounting. The subject 
still understands the question; the memory of that prior system of subjectivization exists, but 
Samuel‘s current lived practice is other, which is the mark of the rise of surplus population 
outside the enclosures of state and capital.  
 One might make the remark that surplus populations in migration are actually attempting 
to integrate themselves (differently) into the state and capitalist apparatus, and it is true that some 
individuals do manage to do this and that—outside the universe of filmic representation—both 
the (Mexican) state and Church have developed mechanisms for tracking and managing 
migratory populations.
178
 However, what Jaula de Oro also shows is that this re-integration is, at 
least in the example of the film, never complete. The passage through the field of surplus 
population follows and marks individuals even after their re-integration into systems of 
production and state mediation. For example, the final 30 minutes of Jaula, as Juan and Chauk 
cross into the United States and Chauk is shot by a Minuteman-like sniper, contains no dialogue 
other than brief commands. Interestingly, right before passing into the United States, they are 
waiting in a sewage tunnel and the film employs a device that it has not used up to this point: the 
interior monologue. It gives each character several lines in their native language, expressing their 
emotions on crossing over. But this feels less like a return to the interiority of the subject than a 
farewell. In the next scene, Chauk is shot and Juan is now alone, the only survivor of the journey 
(Sara had been kidnapped earlier in the film and never returns). The final scenes of the film show 
Juan working in a meat processing facility—sweeping up the remains from underneath the 
cutting lines—and then walking home in the snow. His face betrays no emotion as he works 
without speaking and then walks in the cold. In the final shots of the film, we see him standing 
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underneath a streetlight watching the snow fall and then the film ends with a long final shot of 
the camera pointed up at the blank night sky, the snow cascading down. Instead of Juan‘s 
reintegration into the subjectivization of work, there is only blankness. Instead of the finite depth 
of the subject, the profound infinity of the night.  
 Part of what Foucault describes by disciplinary measures in Discipline and Punish are a 
series of techniques that limit the possibility of the appearance of the crowd. As Foucault notes, 
under earlier regimes of punishment, the condemned would plead their case to the assembled 
public and occasionally would be rescued by it. Foucault describes this as a form of ―popular 
illegality,‖ which includes a whole range of manifestations, from demonstrations to riots (201). 
Part of the aim of modern disciplinary apparatuses individualizing focus is to prevent the 
emergence of such crowds, riotous multitudes, or ―illegal‖ publics. However, as Foucault also 
notes, states, especially the military, need to coordinate large groups and derive a significant part 
of their power from the ability to concatenate individuals into operationalized masses. States, as I 
argued at the opening of this chapter, drawing on Foucault and Marx, do so by first 
individualizing and then collectivizing these elements into de-politicized groups. This process 
inverts the relationship between individual and collective that one finds in the crowd. In the 
crowd, it is the collective which gives or produces a limited, non-pastoral individuality, while 
disciplinary structures first individualize and then form these elements into non-volatile 
combinatory forms (though the potential for a politicization of these forms is always there, 
however limited). What we can see in migration or surplus population films is a return of the 
forms of individual-collective relation found in the crowd, but of a very specific kind, so it is 
worth attempting to trace this carefully. 
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 As the characters in Norteado slowly congregate around the shared center of the tienda, 
the film reveals that what first appears as a random group of individuals joined by happenstance 
are in fact all conditioned by a similar experience of immigration. Both Ela and Cata have 
husbands who left for the other side and stopped contacting them. Ela first establishes her 
interest in Andrés, taking him out drinking one night. However, Cata also has a clear interest in 
Andrés as well. It is only after he attempts to cross (yet again) and is sent back that their intimate 
relationship is constituted. They go to the same bar to which Ela took Andrés. The film thus sets 
up what is a traditional plot of melodrama: the love triangle. In this instance, as they are all living 
and working in the same small store which doubles as their living quarters, the viewer waits for 
the powder keg to explode. But it never does. Instead what happens is they all work together on a 
plan to get Andrés to cross—building an armchair in which they hide him while Asensio drives 
him across the border in a pickup filled with other miscellaneous household items.  
 This is not to say that demands emerging from desiring self-interest or a form of 
emotional life are not present and articulated by the characters. In particular, Ela does not want 
him to leave. In her car after a day spent working on the armchair she tells him, ―Yo necesito 
alguien que me ayude. Yo no puedo sola con todo.‖
179
 And Andrés for his part extends an offer 
to Cata to cross with him (it is unclear if he means to start a relationship with her or only to help 
her cross). The way that the film diverges from traditional plots of romance is that these demands 
or desires are made but they do not interrupt the form of collectivity that has been generated (or 
the collective process of its generation). That is, there is never a moment in the film in which it 
feels like any of the characters will break their bond with Andrés and stop assisting in the plan to 
help him cross. Nor does the film present a moment of the two women engaged in competition or 
attacking each other to win Andrés to themselves. What the film never calls into question is the 
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group, even though it is non-identical to itself and does not suppress forms of individuality or 
emotional life inside it.   
Norteado sketches a form of intimate groupality based neither in codes of friendship nor 
marriage (as a contract)
180
 because it is not compartmentalized individuals who confront and 
negotiate the terms of a relationship with each other. The film presents not individuals entering 
into state or capital sanctioned forms of contractual groupality but rather the emergence of a 
collectivity in which individuality takes place. While the film‘s ending perhaps pulls the 
narrative back into a more traditional romance register (Andrés gives both of the women dresses 
which the film shows them trying on as the pickup waits to enter the United States), for an 
extended period the film traces a different relationship between collectivity and individuality. 
Instead of the individualized elements that must then be combined into larger forces and 
structures, we have a form of collectivity, of intimacy that does not pass first through subjectivity 
but rather produces individuality along with and inside itself. The film demonstrates that this 
form of collectivity or crowd cannot be broken (by the melodramatic device of the love triangle) 
because, unlike in the collectives of the developmentalist state and capital, the individual has no 
meaning outside it.  
 
The Void 
Against the majority of work written about, in the aftermath of, and alongside the drug 
war, we have to say: there is no such thing as terror. However, this is meant in a very specific 
way: there is no positive content or set of attributes or propositions that adhere to terror, that 
define it and give it its meaning. This is the situation of terror after counter-insurgency. As 
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opposed to the great twentieth century definitions and meditations on terror (Arendt, Merleau-
Ponty) or twentieth-first century reclamations of its Jacobian legacy (Zizek, Badiou), terror in 
Latin America, and Mexico specifically, has been transformed by counter-insurgency tactics into 
a tool for disciplining populations, which it does by displacing a current anthropological limit on 
physical or psychological force. Terror is the name of state-sponsored or legitimated violence 
that operates by exceeding a current threshold on limits of what can be accepted.  
 For example, there is no reason, other than its normalization within an accepted limit on 
force, that the slow death of a community due to pollution should not fill us with terror. And 
there is no reason that executing twenty persons in a central plaza should not seem to be a normal 
practice of state power, other than that it exceeds a current anthropological limit on the use of 
force. Terror is the negative space of this displacement, and what counter-insurgency theory and 
practice has wrought is an operationalization of this as a technique of discipline and as a tactic 
for interrupting processes or forms of collectivization. How this discipline functions as a form of 
state violence, however, remains to be specified.   
 The films of Amat Escalante have been exemplary in their attempts to wrestle with and 
make legible these conditions. For example, Los Bastardos (2008) traces the strange form of 
temporary collectivity that emerges between two migrant workers in the United States and a 
suburban mother whose house they are hired to break into before a moment of horrific and 
unexpected violence irrupts into the plot. But it is Amat‘s ―drug war‖ film, Heli (2013), which 
plunges deep into the set of conditions we have been discussing in this chapter, as it traces how 
neither family nor work provides a form of livable collectivity and how the state has shifted its 




 Heli works at a montadora (car part assembly plant) on the night shift and has a strained 
relation with his wife, Sabrina, who has refused to have sex with him since the birth of their 
child. They live in a house on a deserted, desert road with Heli‘s father, who works the day shift 
at the montadora, and Heli‘s younger sister, Estella, who is twelve and seeing an older teen, 
Beto, who is doing military service. Beto hides a packet of cocaine in their tinaco
181
 which Heli 
discovers and throws away. Heli punishes his sister and any emergency appears to be averted 
when their front door is suddenly knocked down by Mexican military, who shoot the father dead, 
take Heli and Beto to be tortured by local ―gang‖ members, and leave with the younger sister 
(who they then sexually abuse for a number of months).  
 Like Amat‘s other films, the narrative is constructed to place maximum emphasis on the 
suddenness and unforeseen irruption of violence into a space which has not been normalized to 
it; in this case, the family and the family home. In the denouement of this event, Heli returns to 
work at the montadora but is fired once the insurance payout of his father is finished and when 
he turns to the Mexican legal system for help finding his sister, they accuse his father of being 
involved in an illegal union movement. The film registers then the abandonment of two critical 
sites for the production of subjectivization-collectivization in the developmentalist period: the 
family and labor. At the same time, however, the film shows us that the relation between Heli 
and the state is not merely that of direct domination. In a visually stunning scene, the military 
personnel return to Heli‘s house, solely to threaten him with their presence (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Heli threatened by the unspeaking military vehicle.  
 
Much like migration films, there is very little dialogue in Heli, and, in this scene, Heli stands 
mute in front of the military vehicle, the institutional apparatus of the paramilitary state pitted 
against his slight frame. This establishes a relation between Heli as an individual and the 
militarized apparatus of the state, but it is not that of subjectivization. What there is is a reminder 
of a moment of terror that was lived collectively inside, and which has disarticulated, the family 
structure. What terror produces then is not a process of subjectivization, but rather a negation 
that destroys prior forms of collectivization and replaces them with the outline of a voided 
collectivity composed with all those touched by this event of terror. It is a voided collective 
because it is a form of collectivization that interrupts any collectivity. The military vehicle 
returns because the terror hasn‘t stuck, as Heli continues to search for his sister, and they return 
to say remember the terror. The command of the unspeaking, threatening military vehicle is that 
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your social relations are only negative in shape, stop trying to make an operation upon the 
negative form of the voided collective of terror.  
 The film, however, is not from the perspective of the state and so its conclusion makes 
more room for an exploration of what kinds of operations are indeed possible on the voided 
collectivity of terror. At the end of the film, Estella returns, walking up to the front of the house 
by herself. She does not speak and we are informed by a doctor that she is several months 
pregnant (which is how the film alludes to the sexual violence done to her). In the final scene of 
the film, Heli and Sabrina have sex again while Estella lays on the couch curled up with their 
infant son. The sounds of Heli and Sabrina can be heard in the background, as the wind blows 
forcefully pushing the curtains and light into the room where Estella and the infant are laying in 
each other‘s arms.  
The scene is jarring: the re-connection of Heli and Sabrina and Estella into what was the 
space of the family grates against the framework of a scene in which a sexually traumatized 
adolescent is listening to a couple have sex while cuddling with a baby. But this is the wager of 
the scene: it is an exploration of what can be done in the wake of terror, an investigation into the 
possibilities for turning the voided collectivity of terror into something else. The position the 
film seems to adopt is that the terror cannot be escaped, it will (initially at least) always be 
present; thus, Estella is not sheltered from the sounds of their intercourse as a traumatic reminder 
of terror. Rather, the film‘s wager appears to be that to create a non-voided collectivity from the 
void of terror we have to engage it, to enact an operation, a repetition upon it.  
Heli and Sabrina are able to encounter each other again as individuals within their 
working through the possibilities of a new collective form and Estella is also located again as a 
non-traumatized individual within this matrix. What we can see in Heli is an operation on voided 
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collectivity which inverts the traditional state collectivization-subjectivization relation. If in the 
twentieth century states produced individuals in order to then build non-revolutionary collective 
forms, in Heli we witness that on the other side of a collectivity voided by terror stand forms of 
collectivity which do not sum individuals but rather which produce individualization within the 
shape and space of their collectivity. What brings Estella, Heli, and Sabrina together at the end is 
not (simply) that they once formed part of a kinship structure but that they were marked by a 
process of voided collectivization of terror and that this process of interrupted collectivization 
both destroyed and recoded the relations amongst them, and made necessary the task of 
attempting to produce a new form of non-state sactioned (or voided) collectivity. In the final 
scene, the film points to the project of the present; namely to the need for creating, in a moment 
of transitioning from developmentalist collectivizing and individualizing structures to one of 
voided collectivity and the de-subjectivization of surplus populations, new forms of collectivity 
as a shelter and citadel against state and capital. 
*** 
These artistic works are not alone in their thinking about forms of collectivity in 
contemporary Mexico; in fact, they take place against a background of or within a larger set of 
cultural, theoretical, and political meditations on and practices of producing collectivity outside 
of the state and capital. From among these processes stand out the Zapatista experience in 
Chiapas, governance in Oaxaca (and other states and localities) by usos y costumbres and the 
policía comunitaria in the state of Guerrero. These experiences, and the cultural and theoretical 
productions which have accompanied them, were part of a wave of indigenous-led resistance and 
organizing that spread across Mexico from the 1980s into the early 2000s. At the center of these 
movements was the notion of autonomy—which received various theorizations and was the 
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 These artistic works, in particular Heli, take up these collective processes in a much 
different environment than that of the 1980s or 1990s; namely, in the midst of the violence of the 
state-sponsored ―drug war.‖ Since the events of Ayotizinapa, in which 43 students were 
disappeared on September 26, 2014 by Mexican state forces, how we understand the relation 
between the ―drug war‖ and state violence has definitively changed. As Ivonne del Valle has 
written in a recent piece:  
Ayotzinapa and the way the authorities have handled the investigation of the students 
forcibly disappeared by members of the state have revealed what many people already 
―knew‖: that there is hardly any—or no—difference between rule of law (the juridical, 
military, and executive state apparatus) and criminality (drug cartels, illegal forms of 
accumulation—in the form of bribes, payoffs, ―gifts,‖ etc.). Law and criminality are two 
sides that collapse into each other. (n.p.) 
 
Ayotzinapa marks a definitive turning point in our understanding of contemporary Mexico in 
that it is impossible now to argue that the state and the ―narcos‖ are separate forces and that the 
military and police forces are not involved at every level (and across every branch) in state-
sponsored violence, extortion, kidnapping, despojo, and drug logistics.  
 In this situation, one is struck in these artistic works by the fragility of the forms or 
processes of collectization that are traced—how exposed they are to state violence and how 
asymmetrical the balance of force between the state and these collectivities feels. In Chiapas, 
Cherán, Ostula, Xochicuatla, and many other places around Mexico autonomous forms of 
governance have been successful in preventing or limiting, even during the most intense 
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moments of the ―drug war,‖ state violence, at least within the territories controlled by these 
communities.
183
 However, amongst these social movements or communities, such as Cherán 
which has ejected all políticos and partidos políticos from their borders, we also know that long-
term state campaigns of violence and criminalization have been generally successful, 
historically, in disarticulating or severely curtailing these kinds of autonomous movements.
184
 
There is a congruence, then, between the fragility of the forms of collectively seen in these 
artistic works and the complicated and difficult attempts to sustain autonomy against state 
violence on the ground, in particular after 2006 and Calderón‘s declaration of ―war.‖ 
Thus, the last thirty years have seen a turn of the state away from the generation of non-
revolutionary collectivities via corporativist infrastructures to the control of surplus populations 
via state violence, and that in multiple registers and social locations we have seen the 
development of powerful new means of the production of collectivities, but we have also seen 
the successful disarticulation or destruction of these new forms of collectivity by state violence. 
This is the fragile limit traced by works like Heli and Norteado: the limit of the contemporary is 
that we can imagine and bring into being new collective forms but are unable to sustain them 
against a fully militarized state apparatus.    
 
Conclusion: A Kind of Necropolitics? 
Within cultural circles the most common interpretation of the post-drug war period has 
been, not via the idea of circulation, but through applications and repurposings of Achille 
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Mbembe‘s concept of necropolitics. In the Mexican literature, the concept of necropolitics as a 
site for thinking about the drug war and its cultural manifestations was given a significant boost 
by Cuauhtemoc Medina‘s 2009 edited volume on Teresa Margolles‘ work ¿De qué otra cosa 
podríamos hablar? / What Else Could We Talk About? and again in the 2013 Medina edited 
volume Estética y violencia: Necropolítica, militarización y vidas lloradas (2013). In the English 
language literature it was perhaps Melissa Wright‘s 2011 article ―Necropolitics, Narcopolitics, 
and Femicide‖ which increased the visibility of the term in U.S. Mexicanist circles. The usage of 
necropolitics has since expanded, particularly in Mexico, where it has been employed by many 
highly visible authors, including Marta Lamas, Diego Osorno, and Sayak Valencia.
185
 By way of 
conclusion, then, I want to examine how the arguments developed in this chapter differ from a 
reading of Mexico as a necropolitical situation.  
 Achille Mbembe‘s notion of necropolitics draws on the work of Michel Foucault on the 
difference between biopolitical and sovereign power. For Foucault, biopolitics emerges with the 
dissolution of absolutist states which were founded on a power over life and death. Biopolitics 
represents a different kind of power, ―the power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death‖ 
(History of Sexuality 138) aimed not at the individual, but at large groupings, at what Foucault 
terms ―populations.‖ Mbembe‘s intervention is to argue that biopolitics fails to explain the 
expansion of violence and death in the post-colonial present and thus the peculiar contemporary 
―relationship between politics and death.‖ In his ―Necropolitics,‖ Mbembe traces how 
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contemporary forms of sovereignty, states, and parastates are produced, not through ―inscribing 
bodies within disciplinary apparatuses‖ (34) but by killing them. 
Mbembe‘s focus is primarily on sovereignty and the state as a site of power and 
domination, and in particular the constitutive structuring of sovereignty as a state of exception: 
 
[T]his essay draws on the concept of biopower and explores its relation to notions of 
sovereignty (imperium) and the state of exception…. As is well known, the concept of the 
state of exception has been often discussed in relation to Nazism, totalitarianism, and the 
concentration/extermination camps. The death camps in particular have been interpreted 
variously as the central metaphor for sovereign and destructive violence and as the 
ultimate sign of the absolute power of the negative…. My concern is those figures of 
sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized 
instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and 
populations. Such figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or an 
expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body and those of the 
mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what constitute the nomos of the political 
space in which we still live. (12; 14) 
 
But as we have seen throughout this dissertation, the state or sovereignty is not the only force in 
the field. One point at which capital does appear in Mbembe‘s analysis is in the section on 
contemporary African states and the emergence of non-state actors (―war-machines‖ in 
Mbembe‘s terminology). These actors emerge as state power begins to break down: 
 
War machines emerged in Africa during the last quarter of the twentieth century in direct 
relation to the erosion of the postcolonial state‘s capacity to build the economic 
underpinnings of political authority and order. This capacity involves raising revenue and 
commanding and regulating access to natural resources within a well-defined territory. In 
the mid-1970s, as the state‘s ability to maintain this capacity began to erode, there 
emerged a clear-cut link between monetary instability and spatial fragmentation. In the 
1980s, the brutal experience of money suddenly losing its value became more 
commonplace, with various countries undergoing cycles of hyperinflation (which 




These actors are predators and resource extractors—that is, part of their specificity is how they 
interact with a contemporary turn in global capitalism towards the extraction of natural 
resources.   
War machines (in this case militias or rebel movements) rapidly become highly organized 
mechanisms of predation, taxing the territories and the population they occupy and 
drawing on a range of transnational networks and diasporas that provide both material 
and financial support. 
Correlated to the new geography of resource extraction is the emergence of an 
unprecedented form of governmentality that consists in the management of the 
multitudes. The extraction and looting of natural resources by war machines goes hand in 
hand with brutal attempts to immobilize and spatially fix whole categories of people or, 
paradoxically, to unleash them, to force them to scatter over broad areas no longer 
contained by the boundaries of a territorial state. (34) 
 
We might say Mbembe‘s account of capitalism is symptomatic but not systemic—war machines 
ride on the new forms of global capital flows but there is no account of where these flows 
originate and how they might interact in other ways with the kinds of necropolitical sovereignty 
that Mbembe is discussing. In other words, where Mbembe‘s text has trouble is in explaining the 
role or position of capitalism in this new relation between politics and death. At times, 
Mbembe‘s discussion of capitalism links it to a colonial legacy; at others capital enters the text as 
a set of vaguely defined economic transformations in the 1970s. He discusses both the colony 
and slavery, but does not touch on the role of capitalism in either, and the same is, as can be seen 
in the passages above, generally true of his discussion of the present.  
A contribution that this chapter has sought to make is to provide an answer to the 
question of the role of capitalism in the new relationship between politics and death, by centering 
in our analysis the transformations in the forms capital accumulation and their subsequent social 
effects during the period of the long downturn. That is, the aim of this chapter has not been to 
focus on capital to the exclusion of the state, but rather to bring capital back into our 
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understanding of states and sovereignty and the turn of states away from producing collectivities 
to disrupting their formation via state violence. We have seen how Mexico after 2001 has been 
marked by a turn away from production into circulation. As investment in production decreases, 
more and more individuals are forced into the informal economy. The turn to circulation has 
been driven by a surplus of global capital which has, in turn, produced a vast surplus population 
globally and in Mexico. The state, which once directed much of its attention to the production of 
non-politicized collectivities of individuals interpolated into the productive apparatus in specific 
ways, was confronted with a growing population outside all its traditional means of control—to 
which the Mexican state has responded by an unprecedented militarization and state-enacted, 
sponsored or legitimated death and destruction.  
Thus, a new relationship between death and politics is surely at the center of the 
contemporary, but in a different way than theorized by Mbembe. Rather than only an outcome of 
the fragmentation of sovereignty, the constitution of modern sovereignty by the state of 
exception, and the expansion of biopolitical practices into the realm of death, the forms of death 
and destruction witnessed in contemporary Mexico have been driven by a need to solve the twin 
problems of surplus population and surplus capital. This difference matters, in particular, when 
we specify what exactly it is that the state is doing when it commits or permits acts of state or 
para-state violence. In a necropolitical frame, the state or para-state actors are merely re-enacting 
the fundamental constitutive nature of sovereignty (the state of exception) on a new terrain (no 
longer the planation, colony, or camp, but the present of the post-colony). If however we include 
in our analysis how the long downturn has produced an ever growing surplus population, state 
violence takes on a different hue: it is at once more specific (directed at certain sectors of the 
population, i.e., those no longer necessary for capital accumulation) and more historical (this 
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state violence, while it may take a similar form, has a different etiology than the violence of the 
colonial, nineteenth century, or dictatorial state).  
Moreover, this difference in emphasis matters, once again, when it comes to thinking 
about how we might exit this situation. An analysis based solely in necropolitics will lead us to 
focus primarily on the state: on how to improve sovereignty, dismantle it, or eliminate the state 
of exception. Whereas the inclusion of both state and capital into our analysis will led us to ask 
how we might extract ourselves from the dominion of each. Thus, much like how necropolitics 
can explain the behavior of the state in the present but not how we arrived at a situation in which 
a sea of capital and a sea of humanity confront each other, an analysis of the present based solely 
in a critique of the necropolitical state will save us from that state only to then leave us at the 
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Towards a Politics Neither of Nor at a Distance from the State 
 
On the other hand, however, in view of the fact that the rate at which the total capital is valorized, i.e. the rate of 
profit, is the spur to capitalist production (in the same way as the valorization of capital is its sole purpose), a fall in 
this rate slows down the formation of new, independent capitals and thus appears as a threat to the development of 
the capitalist production process; it promotes overproduction, speculation and crises, and leads to the existence of 
excess capital alongside a surplus population.  
 
--Karl Marx, Capital Volume 3 
 
 
 If there is one feature that dominates and unifies most political formations in Latin 
America today, it is the state. This has been apparent in the neo-structuralist policies of the 
marea rosada and in the resurgence of new developmentalist literature before and after the 2008 
financial crisis. We might say that there exist four different political orientations, which, without 
exhausting all contemporary formations or political movements, are conditioned by a specific 
vision of the relationship between the state and politics. These four orientations I will term: 
developmentalist, state socialist, democratic, and at-a-distance.
186
  
 The developmentalist orientation has its roots in the import substitution era and the 
theoretical work of Raúl Prebisch. Within this literature, the central problem is how imperialism, 
foreign domination, or metropolitan countries have interrupted, forestalled, or undermined the 
industrialization process in Latin America and the capitalist periphery more generally. A 
successful political program in this tradition involves using the state to foster capitalist 
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 These categories are not intended as representations of actual movements, which frequently tend to blend 
elements from different categories.  
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development. As such, partisans of this position place great emphasis on the state as a partner of 
domestic capital and as a check on (in theory, if not always in practice) foreign or international 
capital.  
 State socialism derives from the revolutionary side of the dependency theory tradition 
and from anti-imperialist critiques from within Trotskyite and Marxist-Leninist formations. This 
tradition has a slightly more transformational approach to the state. Rooted in Lenin‘s work in 
The State and Revolution (1917), the state is seen as a set of functionalities, some of which can 
be repurposed in a socialist society. Most frequently the part of the state designated for 
repurposing is the bureaucracy which will be expanded to accommodate the additional layers of 
administrators necessary for managing a planned economy. Moreover, in this tradition, the state 
serves as a tool for socializing or nationalizing capital—seizing the state is a means towards the 
end of using it to wrest (parts of) the means of production away from capitalists.  
 The democratic orientation designates positions which emerged or which were 
strengthened in the various (and multi-faceted) democratic turns or openings that occurred 
beginning in the 1980s (in Brazil with the end of the dictatorship and, later, in Mexico with the 
loosening of the PRI‘s hold on state power). This tendency would include progressives, center-
left liberals, and social democrats of all stripes—to the extent that their political vision is of the 
successive improvement of democratic institutions and the expansion of the welfare state, but 
always within the context of a market-based economy where private property is upheld.  
 The final position, at-a-distance, includes some autonomist social movements and 
horizontalist groups, which, like previously revolutionary approaches, have a politics that is 
antagonistic to the state but which also, unlike prior revolutionary traditions, does not seek the 
overthrow of the state. These movements operate, to greater or lesser degrees, on a terrain 
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defined by taking a distance from the state, but one which also, frequently, assumes the 
legitimacy of the state as an actor. The political goal of these kinds of groups most often involves 
establishing some form of regional or local autonomous power and using this localized form of 
power (in a neighborhood for example) to both self-govern locally but also make demands on the 
state.  
 That most political movements can be characterized in one of these ways demonstrates 
the degree to which the state lies at the center of contemporary, and indeed twentieth century, 
Latin American political thought and practice. Developmentalist formations see the state as a 
buffer against capital and catalyst of industry. For state socialists, the state is a means for seizing 
control of critical elements of the productive apparatus and a site for their rational planning. 
Democratic movements see the state as a guarantor of rights and redistributor of wealth. At-a-
distance movements frequently accept the state‘s juridical sovereignty while militating for forms 
of local or regional authority. The first two positions have their roots in an early twentieth 
century moment in which Latin American countries were not yet industrialized; the second two 
in the period of the long downturn when states went on the offensive against labor and marginal 
sectors as capital accumulation began to fail. The goal of developmentalists or state socialists is 
to foment industrialization, economy growth, or technological development (under capitalist, 
mixed, or fully socialist regimes). The goal of democratic or at-a-distance movements is to 
reinforce distributions of rights or citizenship and protect against the excesses of states which are 
ceasing to perform their post-WWII role of mediator between capital and labor.  
 One through-line of this dissertation project has been to track how the state has 
transformed itself across the long downturn, under the twin pressures of surplus capital (finance), 
on the one hand, and surplus population, on the other. What current political formations which 
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are either state-centric or at-a-distance seem unable to grapple with is how the state has been 
transformed in the present and under the force of these twin pressures. If global capitalism in the 
present is defined by the dual conditions of surplus capital and surplus population, we could 
picture the Latin American state at the center of these forces, responding to and transforming in 
response to them. What I want to discuss, by way of conclusion, is how, as result of the spread of 
surplus capital and surplus populations, we can no longer look to the state as a buffer against 
capital, a redistributor of wealth, a guarantor of rights, or a tool for the socialization of the means 
of production.   
 
The Dual Transformation: The State after Surplus Capital and Surplus Population 
 As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, finance has never really been at the 
center of leftist or Marxist political or social theory, which is one of the reasons the last decade 
has been so interesting, at least intellectually, to live through. Generally speaking, there are three 
positions with respect to finance which circulate in left-orientated literatures. The first, with its 
roots in Hilferding, Lenin, and Bukharin‘s early twentieth century work, and which was extended 
by dependency thinkers in Latin America, sees finance as a site of imperial control or vector for 
disciplining peripheral countries. The second, most often associated with Keynesians or post-
Keynesians but which is also found in dependency theorists and mainstream economics, is of 
finance as a necessary accompaniment to industrial production. In this work, the financial 
apparatus performs the (necessary) labor of absorbing surplus capital from workers and certain 
industrial sectors and (rationally) allocating it others. The final social theoretical vision of 
finance draws on arguments in Volume 3 of Capital where Marx notes that the creation of joint-
stock companies (that is, companies under the control of banks and financiers) has consolidated 
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industrial sectors, pulling these means of production out of the hands of individual capitalist 
producers. Marx argues that this is a de facto socialization and that it is possible that a turn to 
financial control (what we might call financialization today), in fact, prepares the ground for 
socialism or communism, making easier (or less complicated) the appropriation of these sectors 
by the state or proletariat. This utopian vision is a minority one, but is visible in certain 
contemporary authors, most notably in Hardt and Negri‘s Commonwealth (2011).
187
  
 Beginning in the 1950s and 60s, Latin American states began to transform themselves, 
building the human capital and material infrastructures necessary to chase and attract foreign 
capital. Since this time, these parts of the state apparatus have only grown—which is a 
transformation that the three dominant schools of leftist social theory of finance are unable to 
track. After the 1982 debt crises, the state apparatus concerned with finance grew massively, as 
stock markets, pension funds, derivatives exchanges, and mass consumer credit lending were 
introduced into Latin American societies. All these changes were, in a sense, building an 
infrastructure to handle the new pools of surplus capital that had begun to slosh around the globe 
in the 1970s. In Mexico, the developmentalist apparatus of development banks like Nafinsa was 
replaced with a financial and regulatory apparatus designed to make pension funds, derivatives, 
the stock market, and personal lending functional. In Brazil, developmental banks were not 
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 Their view of finance is clearly informed by this strain of Marx‘s thought; however, instead of preparing the 
socialization of the means of production, finance capital, for them, ―socializes‖ on a representational plane, the 
commons: 
 
Finance capital is in essence an elaborate machine for representing the common, that is, the common 
relationships and networks that are necessary for the production of a specific commodity, a field of 
commodities, or some other type of asset or phenomenon. This representation involves an extraordinary 
process of abstraction from the common itself, and indeed financial products take on ever more abstract, 
esoteric forms such that they may refer not to production directly but to representations of future 
production or representations of representations…. Abstraction itself, though, is possible only because of 
the social nature of the wealth being represented. With each level of abstraction financial instruments grasp 
a wider social level of networks that directly or indirectly cooperate in the production process. This power 





replaced like in Mexico, but were financialized, which, along with the production of pension 
funds, stock markets, etc., transformed the state-led industrialization apparatus into a financial 
one. In both Mexico and Brazil, the spread of global surplus capital produced new layers of the 
state apparatus concerned with finance, while shrinking (or financializing) those concerned with 
―development‖ and with the supply of cheap industrial inputs so characteristic of the state role 
during import substitution strategies.  
 At the same time, the autonomization of industry and, in particular, of agriculture, as well 
as the global redistribution of the productive apparatus, began to displace, in massive numbers, 
industrial and agricultural laborers, creating what sociologists in the 1960s and 70s such as José 
Nun would call the ―marginal mass‖ and Aníbal Quijano the ―marginal pole‖
188
 and what others 
would later call the ―informal sector.‖ As this process has accelerated through the 1980s and 90s 
with the shrinking of parts of the public sector (particularly in Mexico), there has been a 
transformation of the state apparatus directed at labor (paralleling the transformation of the 
apparatus once directed at industry). Recently, there has been, as austerity and structural 
adjustment have creeped northward, a great deal of attention paid in North Atlantic intellectual 
communities to the expansion of expendable populations world-wide and a return to the term 
―surplus population‖ to describe them. In the vast majority of this work, however, the discussion 
is always of the capital-labor relation and how autonomization reduces the size of the needed 
labor force—almost never is the role of the state invoked.
189
 We have seen throughout this 
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 See José Nun, La marginalidad en América Latina. Planteo general del estudio e informe sobre trabajos en 
curso (Santiago: ILPES-DESAL, 1967) and Aníbal Quijano, Notas sobre el concepto de marginalidad social 
(Santiago: CEPAL, 1968). The work of Roger Vekemans developed a non-Marxist understanding of the category of 
marginality: see Marginaliad, Promoción Popular y Neo-Marxismo (Bogotá: CEDIAL, 1976). For a summary of 
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 Michael Denning, ―Wageless Life,‖ New Left Review 66 (Nov/Dec 2010): 79-97 and Jan Rehmann, 
―Hypercarceration: A Neoliberal Response to ‗Surplus Population,‘‖ Rethinking Marxism 27(2): 303-311 are two 
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dissertation how the response of Latin American states to the expansion of surplus populations 
has been militarization and an increase in state violence.  
Perhaps this transformation of the state apparatus is similar to that of the United States, 
traced by authors such as Loïc Wacquant and Ruth Wilson Gilmore. In his work on the U.S. 
criminal justice and caracel system, Wacquant has persuasively argued against the standard 
understanding of the neoliberal period as one of ―shrinking states‖—rather there has been, in 
Wacquant‘s account, a transfer of resources from the welfare state to the carceral state.
190
 
Gilmore‘s work has tracked a similar shift in the U.S. state (particularly in California), which she 
names as a transition from ―workfare‖ to ―warfare.‖
191
 Across the long downturn in Latin 
America, states have reduced or atrophied those parts directed towards labor, whether in the form 
of welfare or dedicated to mediating their relation to capital (usually the corporativist 
infrastructures). As the informal or surplus population has grown, a population that is outside the 
prior corporativist structures and outside the primary mediation device of the wage, the state has 
had to create new infrastructures for controlling these populations, infrastructures which have 
taken the form of the expansion direct police, military, and paramilitary force and the acceptance 
of their use against civilian populations.  
 In short, this has been the transformation of the Latin American state in the post-
development period: the bureaucratic layers associated with industrial promotion and capital-
labor mediation have been replaced (clearly, to different extents and at different rates in different 
countries) with capacities for promoting always-failing financial accumulation and for the 
violent policing and subjection of surplus populations.   
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 See Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Durham, NC: Duke 
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 What conclusions can we draw from this? If we want to think about the possibilities for 
politics in the Latin American present, we have to think those possibilities as rooted in this set of 
conditions—which means that we can‘t rely on imaginaries rooted in prior historical moments of 
either industrialization or democratization. It means seeing how states are, in fact, thoroughly 
involved in the promotion of always failing finance-led accumulation, which is often predatory 
on the most marginalized sectors of society (either through predatory lending or through the 
socialization of the costs of financial crises). As well, we have to see how states have armed 
themselves against their citizens—developing cadres, technologies, intellectual and discursive 
production, and infrastructures whose only reason for existing is to kill, disappear, and cover up 
and normalize.  
 Starting from these conditions and from the state-centricity of most left formations in 
Latin America today, would mean, at minimum, introducing new forms of anti-state political 
theory into the left. With forces like the BOPE in Brazil and state-sanctioned paramilitaries in 
Mexico, it appears no longer enough to hope for the repurposing of the state or working at a 
distance from it. Some other kind of strategy will have to be thought of—one which is anti-state 
but which also avoids a direct confrontation with this militarized state (which would be suicide). 
Perhaps somewhat ironically, reintroducing anti-state discourses will also mean the need to 
develop new forms of anti-capitalist thought within the Latin American left. For if the state is no 
longer interested in ―defending‖ certain kinds of labor, it also no longer serves as a buffer to 
capitalism or as a (potential) tool for the socialization of the capitalist means of production. 
Thus, without the state to rely on to protect us either in the present or in an imagined socialist 
future against capital, it is our politics that will be charged with this task. Detaching ourselves 
from the horizon of the state, which has been the horizon of politics in the twentieth century and 
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so far in the twenty-first, will mean thinking anew about how to disable and dismantle this 
enigmatic source of so much pain, and it will also mean learning to think anew, that is, also 
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